Strandholm v. Barbey

18 Citing cases

  1. Sproul v. Gilbert

    226 Or. 392 (Or. 1961)   Cited 53 times
    In Sproul, the court emphasized that possession is determined by the character of the occupant's right to use the property until the occupant's interest is terminated. "If, prior to termination, the transferor can rightfully interfere with every use the occupant might make of the premises, the interest is clearly a mere license."

    In determining the intention of the parties, "[t]he courts construe the whole mass of words and not merely some of them." Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 441, 26 P.2d 46 (1934). In the case at bar plaintiffs contend that no interest in land was created by the grant of the grazing privilege to them and that plaintiffs are "licensees" only.

  2. Delta Logistics, Inc. v. Emp't Dep't Tax Section

    279 Or. App. 498 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 6 times
    In Delta Logistics, Inc. v. Employment Dept. Tax Section, 279 Or. App. 498, 507, 379 P.3d 783 (2016), aff'd, 361 Or. 821, 401 P.3d 779 (2017), we were tasked with determining the meaning of "lease" in the context of a for-hire carrier's contention that it was not the "employer" of its owner-operator truck drivers for the purposes of unemployment insurance taxes under ORS 657.047, another statute that did not provide a specific definition.

    ); Thomas , 225 Or. at 552, 358 P.2d 1066. SeeStrandholm v. Barbey , 145 Or. 427, 441, 26 P.2d 46 (1934) (in determining the intention of the parties, courts construe “the whole mass of words and not merely some of them.”); Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co. , 343 Or. 339, 347, 169 P.3d 1255 (2007) (the substance of an agreement, not its label, determines its legal effect); Eggen et ux. v. Wetterborg et al. , 193 Or. 145, 153, 237 P.2d 970 (1951) (“Such construction should be given the agreement, if possible, as will render all of its clauses harmonious, so as carry into effect the actual purpose and intention of the parties as derived from them.” (citing Dellwo v. Edwards , 73 Or. 316, 323, 144 P. 441 (1914) )).

  3. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank

    752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)   Cited 161 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that defendants who were responsible for collision resulting in pollution of river were liable to commercial fishermen

    Id. at 250 (citations omitted).Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 1943, 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538; Columbia River Fisherman's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 1939, 160 Or. 654, 87 P.2d 195; Strandholm v. Barbey, 1933, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46; Radich v. Fredrickson, 1932, 139 Or. 378, 10 P.2d 352. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C comment h, illustration 11, discussing recovery by fisherman who uses specific waters where fish are killed.

  4. State of Washington v. United States

    87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936)   Cited 119 times
    In State of Washington v. United States, 9 Cir., 87 F.2d 421, 430, the owner of the reversionary interest was held to be an indispensable party in a suit against the lessee to determine ownership and possession.

    It is further alleged that the beach or spit on the west and southwest end of the island is peculiarly adapted to the drawing of seines and floating fishing gear, and that the said waters are immensely valuable for the purpose of seining for salmon; that on or about May 1, 1930, appellant Barbey and appellant Columbia River Packers Association, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as the association, leased from appellee for a period of five years, for seining purposes, the land on the south side of Sand Island, described as Sites No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in said lease, which sites are described and mapped in Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46, which is incorporated in the bill; that defendants, after occupying Sand Island for the years 1930 and 1931, secured a cancellation of the lease and abandoned the premises.

  5. Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Ctr.

    863 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D.S.D. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Interestingly, in describing the differences between leases and licenses, the North Dakota court in Lee noted that a license is generally revocable at will without notice. Id. at 471 (citing Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 440, 26 P.2d 46, 51 (1933)). In the agreement between the Civic Center and Mr. Soltesz, the agreement was terminable only upon giving a 45–day notice.

  6. Hager v. City of Devils Lake

    2009 N.D. 180 (N.D. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting argument that district court was precluded from taxation of costs for separate claims that happened to involve same property as inverse condemnation claim

    A license "conveys no estate in affected property, and is generally revocable at will without notice." 262 N.W.2d at 471, quoting 25 Words and Phrases,"License", p. 231 (1961) [citing Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46, 51 (1933)]. A license is not property "requiring just compensation for its taking."

  7. Port of Coos Bay v. Department of Revenue

    691 P.2d 100 (Or. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    Discussing whether agreement entered into by taxable individuals and port was a lease, making subject property taxable under ORS 307.110

    This thirty-day notice provision to terminate use, when construed with the monthly use rate, is sufficient to create a monthly term. A license, unlike a lease, is generally revokable at will without notice. Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 440, 26 P.2d 46 (1934). The thirty-day notice provision quoted above is inconsistent with construing the "Use Agreement" as a mere license.

  8. Lee v. North Dakota Park Service

    262 N.W.2d 467 (N.D. 1978)   Cited 19 times
    Noting lease is contract for possession of property for a term of years usually for a specified rent

    "`License,' unlike `lease,' conveys no estate in affected property, and is generally revocable at will without notice. Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46."

  9. Tarlow v. Arntson

    505 P.2d 338 (Or. 1973)   Cited 19 times
    In Tarlow v. Arntson, 264 Or. 294, 300-01, 505 P.2d 338 (1973), for example, this court considered an unclear 1927 agreement concerning the use of an elevator to determine whether that agreement granted a license to use the elevator terminable upon notice or whether the parties intended the right of use to be akin to a right that ran with the land.

    The right conferred to a licensee is usually personal to him and is not the subject of transfer. Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46 (1934). However, the rule that a license is not transferable is not an invariable one. It may be assignable if the parties so intend. Where it is created for commercial purposes, it is normally inferred that the parties intend it to be assignable unless there is evidence of contrary intent.

  10. Rouse v. Roy L. Houck Sons'

    249 Or. 655 (Or. 1968)   Cited 9 times

    Houck has argued that the license, if any, given plaintiffs' predecessors was personal to them and was not assignable. While we need not pass upon the question in this case, it might be well to note that a license can be assignable if the parties so intend. See Strandholm v. Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 26 P.2d 46 (1934) (by implication); 2 American Law of Property § 8.122 (A J Casner ed 1952); Restatement of Property § 517 (1944). Where a license is created for commercial purposes, it should normally be inferred that the parties intended it to be assignable, unless the evidence proved the contrary intent.