Since, at the time of their tragic deaths, decedents were not using the car for transportation purposes, they cannot satisfy the third of the three factors and are not entitled to insurance coverage. Among the cases respondents rely on are Jorgensen by Jorgensen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn.App. 1985), and Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn.App. 1988). The former case, decided prior to the Vodinelich and Klug decisions, rests solely on a general causation determination.
Id. Although in Noska, the truck was moving and not parked, that factual distinction is not dispositive. See Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins., 429 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn.App. 1988) (stating that the fact that a motor vehicle is parked "does not change its character as a vehicle used for transportation."). Auto Owners points out that here Beaulieu's pickup was parked and argues this is an essential difference.
The Minnesota "transportation purposes" rule was applied in a more recent decision of the court of appeals to include injury resulting from a gas fumes fire. In Strand v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, 429 N.W.2d 266 (Minn.App. 1988), gasoline leaked from the involved car while it was housed in an enclosed garage overnight. The gasoline fumes were ignited by the flame in the water heater when the garage door was opened.
Thus, if the predecessor judge had still been presiding over the case, he would have had, and hence the successor judge actually had, authority to revise the October 2015 ruling that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address child custody. SeeBuchman PlumbingCo. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 293 Minn. 437, 439, 196 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1972) (stating that, when there was no express determination under rule 54.02, the dismissal of a claim as to one codefendant was "subject to revision in the trial of the remaining issues"); Strand v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 1988) (ruling that a judgment stating that a party was entitled to benefits but not specifying the amount of benefits was not a final judgment absent language of rule 54.02 ). Mother also argues that the district court misread Engvall v. Soo Line R.R. Co. , 605 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. 2000), to mean that father’s failure to appeal the October 2015 order ruling precluded alteration of that ruling at a later time.
We conclude that the district court did not err here in applying Stout and concluding that respondent had standing to arbitrate the matter. Appellant argues that Strand v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266 (Minn. App. 1988), compels a different result. In Strand, we held that "[w]hen the no-fault carrier settles a claim directly with a subrogated health insurer, the insured is not entitled to recover the difference between the amount claimed by the health insurer and the amount paid in settlement."
American States argues that even assuming the common law rule applies, Smith still does not have the right to collect damages twice — first from the tortfeasor and then from his disability insurer. As support for its position that a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same injury, American States cites Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 126, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954) and Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn.App. 1988). These two cases, however, involve a plaintiff settling in full with a joint tortfeasor and being precluded from pursuing the other tortfeasor for the same damages (Gronquist), and a plaintiff being precluded from recovering the surplus caused by his medical insurer's exercise of its subrogation rights and settlement with his automobile insurer for less than what his medical insurer paid out (Strand).
We further note that our decision might have been different had Illinois Farmers committed some "wrongful" act, such as denying coverage under its policy. Cf. Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266, 270-71 (Minn.App. 1988) (concluding that health insurer who had paid its insured's medical expenses was entitled to subrogation against insured's no-fault insurer, which had wrongfully denied coverage). But in the absence of a policy provision establishing subrogation rights or any wrongful conduct by Illinois Farmers, Blue Cross has failed to establish a claim of equitable subrogation.
1986) (original judgment reserving for later consideration the actual award of attorney fees is not final without the language of rule 54.02) rev'd after remand on other grounds, 405 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1987); Strand v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 429 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn.App. 1988) (judgment which only stated that a party was entitled to benefits but did not specify an amount to be paid was not a final judgment absent language of rule 54.02). The trial court did not make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and did not direct entry of final judgment as required by rule 54.02 when fewer than all the claims are adjudicated.