Opinion
NO. 12-15-00224-CR
02-17-2016
FEDRICK HARRIS STRALOW, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Fedrick Harris Stralow appeals his conviction for "assault causes bodily injury family member." In a single issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's implied rejection of his self-defense claim. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested after an altercation with his sister, Stephanie Duggan. He was charged by complaint and information with "assault causes bodily injury family member." The cause proceeded to a jury trial, and Appellant asserted he was not guilty because he acted in self-defense. The jury found Appellant guilty as charged. Following a hearing on punishment, the court sentenced Appellant to 365 days of confinement and a $750 fine. His confinement was suspended for twenty-four months with the special condition that he serve twenty days in jail to be completed on weekends. Appellant timely appealed.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense. Specifically, Appellant argues there is no evidence controverting his self-defense claim. Standard of Review and Governing Law
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction be supported by legally sufficient evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The issue of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, and a jury's verdict of guilt is an implicit finding that it rejected a defendant's self-defense theory. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Accordingly, the jury's implicit rejection of a defendant's self-defense theory must be supported by legally sufficient evidence. Id. at 914. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's rejection of self-defense, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense and also could have found against the defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In this case, Appellant was charged with committing family violence by assault. As pertinent here, a person commits the offense of "assault causes bodily injury family member" if he commits an act against another member of the family "that is intended to result in . . . bodily injury . . . , but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(1) (West Supp. 2015). A person commits the offense of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2013). "Bodily injury" is defined as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2013). Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of the charged offense.
"Family" includes individuals related by consanguinity or affinity, as determined under sections 573.022 and 573.024 of the Texas Government Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2014). Two individuals are related to each other by consanguinity if one is a descendant of the other or they share a common ancestor. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.022(a), (b) (West 2012). --------
A person acts in self-defense in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is necessary to protect him from the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (West 2011). A "reasonable belief" is that which "would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor." Id. § 1.07(a)(42) (West Supp. 2015). The use of force is not justified if the actor is responding to force that he himself provoked, unless the actor abandons the encounter and the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the actor. Id. § 9.31(b)(4) (West 2011). The Penal Code justification for self-defense focuses on the existence of some necessity, the circumstances under which the force was used, the degree of force used, and the type of conduct against which the force was used. Kelley v. State, 968 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, no pet.). The amount of force used must be in proportion to the force encountered. Id.
When a defendant raises self-defense, he bears the burden of producing some evidence to support his defense. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once the defendant produces some evidence supporting his defense, the state then bears the burden of persuasion to "disprove the raised defense." Id. The burden of persuasion does not require the production of evidence; it requires only that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Moreover, "[d]efensive evidence which is merely consistent with the physical evidence at the scene of the alleged offense will not render the [s]tate's evidence insufficient since the credibility determination of such evidence is solely within the jury's province[,] and the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive evidence." Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. When the evidence is conflicting, we presume that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Analysis
Duggan, Melody Ellerbe, Sergeant Thomas Goodell with the Henderson County Sheriff's Department, and Appellant testified at trial. Duggan, Ellerbe, and Appellant each testified that Appellant and Duggan engaged in a physical altercation. However, Appellant disagreed with Duggan's and Ellerbe's descriptions of the confrontation.
Duggan testified that she went to her mother's house the afternoon of the altercation to leave her daughter with Ellerbe so that she could attend Zumba class. When she entered the kitchen to leave, Appellant approached her and asked why she had not cleaned out the dog's water bowl the previous evening as Appellant had requested. According to Duggan, Appellant appeared angry and upset. The conversation escalated, and both Duggan and Appellant began yelling and cursing at each other. Duggan testified that Appellant approached her and got within six to eight inches of her face-so close that "when he was talking, [she] was getting spit on." Duggan stated that she pushed him away from her because she was scared and did not want to catch Appellant's chronic illness from his spit. Appellant then punched her in the nose and she fell to the floor. Duggan related that while she was on the ground, Appellant continued to hit her until Ellerbe came into the kitchen and intervened. Duggan further stated that Appellant screamed at Ellerbe and chased the two of them out of the house.
Ellerbe testified that she was in the basement with Duggan's daughter when she heard a scream and a crash. She stated that the crash sounded like it was someone falling onto the floor. She said that when she went upstairs, she saw Appellant "pounding on" Duggan. According to Ellerbe, Duggan was curled up on the floor unable to defend herself. Ellerbe further stated that Appellant stopped hitting Duggan only after Ellerbe screamed at him to stop. She also testified that Appellant screamed at her and chased her and Duggan out of the house.
Appellant testified that he calmly asked Duggan why she had not cleaned out the dog's water bowl the previous evening. He further stated that Duggan then began screaming and cursing. According to Appellant, he and Duggan moved toward each other during the conversation and then Duggan pushed him twice. He further stated that Duggan grabbed him by the throat with both hands. Appellant testified that Duggan grabbed him hard enough for him to stop breathing, so he hit her once to make her let go and she fell to the floor. Appellant denied that he continued to hit Duggan while she was on the floor. Appellant also claimed that Ellerbe's testimony was fabricated because she does not like him.
Sergeant Goodell testified that he responded to the call from dispatch about the incident. After he arrived, he inspected Appellant for injuries when he arrived on scene. He testified that he did not see any scratches, red marks, blood, or any other evidence that Appellant had been injured in the assault.
It was the province of the jury to determine which of this conflicting testimony to credit and which to reject. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury reasonably could have rejected Appellant's testimony regarding his version of the events and credited the testimony of Duggan, Ellerbe, and Sergeant Goodell. From their testimony, the jury could have determined that Appellant provoked the confrontation, repeatedly punched Duggan, and did not use only the force reasonably necessary to defend himself.
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense and also could have found against Appellant on his self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's implicit rejection of Appellant's self-defense claim. See id. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice Opinion delivered February 17, 2016.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
JUDGMENT
Appeal from the County Court at Law No 2 of Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2014-0626CL2)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.