” “Where conjunctive pleadings set forth more than one act by which the accused committed the crime, the evidence is sufficient so long as it shows at least one of the acts alleged.” Straker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 904, 905–906(a), 578 S.E.2d 568 (2003). Thus, the State could establish asportation through evidence that Moore enticed the victim to his Clayton County residence for the purpose of child molestation either (1) by giving her money or (2) not punishing her for bad behavior.
10. Judice v. State, 308 Ga.App. 229, 232(2), 707 S.E.2d 114 (2011) (punctuation omitted). 11. SeeJohnson, 283 Ga.App. at 106–07(4), 640 S.E.2d 644 (affirming mother's cruelty-to-children conviction based on evidence that mother did not intervene despite knowledge that her boyfriend was sexually abusing her daughter); Straker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 904, 906(b), 578 S.E.2d 568 (2003) (same). Moreover, although Ramirez does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, we note that “[i]t is well established that in child molestation cases, the victim's testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction.”
Because pointing the gun at the victims was one way of establishing aggravated assault, see Willingham v. State (" the presence of a gun would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently" ) (punctuation omitted), whereas threatening to kill them while pointing the gun at them was a second way, the evidence of the verbal threat-even though included conjunctively in the indictment-was unnecessary to sustain the convictions. Straker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 904, 905-906(a), 578 S.E.2d 568 (2003). Wilson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 375, 375(1), 506 S.E.2d 882 (1998).
1. The evidence outlined above was sufficient to sustain Williams's convictions for child molestation and cruelty to children. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (defining child molestation as commission of "any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy" the molester's sexual desires); OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) (defining cruelty to children as "maliciously caus[ing] a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain"); Sims v. State, 273 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 615 SE2d 785) (2005) (whether belt beatings were malicious and caused cruel or excessive pain was for the jury to decide); Straker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 904, 905-906 (a) ( 578 SE2d 568) (2003) (where an indictment sets out more than one act of cruelty to children, the evidence is sufficient "so long as it shows at least one of the acts alleged" in each count) (footnote omitted). 2.
(Footnote omitted.) Straker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 904, 905-906 (a) ( 578 SE2d 568) (2003). The determination of what is cruel or excessive physical or mental pain is to be made by the jury.
The evidence was legally sufficient. Jackson, supra; Straker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 904 ( 578 S.E.2d 568) (2003). 2.