Summary
construing order lifting stay and concluding that property division did not violate order lifting stay
Summary of this case from Dickinson v. DickinsonOpinion
No. 04-05-00779-CV
Delivered and Filed: December 6, 2006.
Appeal from the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 1999-CI-07235, Honorable John J. Specia, Jr. , Judge Presiding.
Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan , Justice, Sitting: Alma L. Loacute:pez, Chief Justice, Catherine Stone , Justice, Sarah B. Duncan , Justice.
AFFIRMED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Strader and Cynthia Burks divorced January 11, 2000. Under the terms of the agreed divorce decree Strader is obligated to pay Burks $455,400 as alimony in payments of $2,200 a month through February 1, 2017. The decree provides that if Strader defaults Burks may accelerate the remaining obligation, is entitled to eighteen percent interest on all past due sums, and may recover her attorney's fees. Strader failed to pay the amount due in July 2004 and the following month he filed for bankruptcy and ceased making any payments. In February 2005, after obtaining an order lifting the bankruptcy stay, Burks filed a petition in the district court to enforce the alimony obligation in the divorce decree. The trial court accelerated the payments and rendered judgment for contractual alimony in the amount of $336,200, bearing interest of eighteen percent from the date of judgment, and awarded Burks $3,500 in attorney's fees.
1. Strader first argues the trial court erred in enforcing the divorce decree because under federal bankruptcy law the debt he owes Burks is a dischargeable property settlement, not alimony. Strader contends the trial court was required to interpret the decree in accordance with federal bankruptcy law and refuse to enforce the decree if the obligation was in fact a property division rather than alimony. We disagree. Burks moved for relief from the bankruptcy stay so she could enforce the alimony provisions of the decree, and the order lifting the stay authorized Burks to "pursu[e] [s]tate [c]ourt remedies with respect to modification and enforcement of the divorce decree." The order does not direct the trial court to determine dischargeablity or to decide whether the obligation Burks seeks to enforce is alimony or a property settlement under federal bankruptcy law. Neither Burks's petition nor Strader's answer asks the trial court to make these determinations and none of the authority Strader cites supports his contention that the trial court could enforce its decree only if it first determined the obligation in the decree was "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."
. When Strader filed his bankruptcy petition, an obligation to a former spouse imposed by a divorce decree that was "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support" was not dischargeable in bankruptcy; whereas, a property settlement in a divorce decree could be discharged if the debtor established he did not have the ability to pay the debt and that the benefit to him of discharge outweighed the detriment to the former spouse. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5), (15) (2004) (amended 2005); see Gamble v. Gamble, 143 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 1998).
. We note that it appears the obligation would be considered alimony under federal law. "Under bankruptcy law, the intent of the parties at the time a[n] . . . agreement is executed determines whether a payment pursuant to the agreement is alimony, support or maintenance. . . ." In re Evert, 342 F.3d 358, 368 (5th Cir. 2003). "A written agreement between the parties is persuasive evidence of their intent . . . [and] if the agreement . . . clearly shows that the parties intended the particular debt in question to reflect either support or a property settlement, then that characterization will normally control." Id. Here the decree contains separately numbered and labeled sections for "Alimony," "Property to Husband," and "Property to Wife." See Evert, 342 F.3d at 369 ("[T]he existence of separate provisions [for alimony and property division in the decree] is probative of the parties' intent at the time of the agreement."). The section on alimony states that its "[p]urpose and [i]ntent" is to effect the parties' "mutual desire . . . to provide a continuing measure of support for [Burks] after [the] divorce;" and that Strader will provide such support by making support payments "intended to qualify as contractual alimony." Thus the trial court's express finding that the obligation in the decree was for contractual alimony is consistent with federal bankruptcy law. See In re Littleton, 05-41854, 2006 WL 1766185, at *2 (5th Cir. Jun. 20, 2006) (holding that where "agreement . . . unambiguously categorizes the relevant payments as alimony and contains an explicit, separate provision for the division of property," "district court did not err in deciding, without looking to extrinsic evidence" that the parties intended for the payments to be alimony as opposed to a property settlement).
2. Strader next argues the trial court erred in enforcing the agreed decree because the alimony payments required by the decree allegedly are not deductible by him under the Internal Revenue Code. The decree states the payments are intended to qualify as alimony that is deductible by Strader under federal tax law. Strader contends some of the provisions in the decree actually preclude him from deducting the payments as alimony and, without citing any authority, concludes this makes the decree unenforceable. We disagree.
The "Alimony" paragraph of the decree itself provides for the possibility that the payments are not deductible by Strader:
Indemnification. If a final determination is made by the Internal Revenue Service or by a court of competent jurisdiction that the payments under this paragraph are not deductible as alimony for any reason, then the payments due under this paragraph will be reduced by the additional tax actually paid by [Strader] in connection with the obligation, not to exceed $200.00 per month.
Under the terms of the agreed decree, Strader's alimony obligation is not rendered unenforceable if the payments are not deductible; Strader is simply entitled to have the amount of the payments reduced. However, Strader did not plead or present any evidence of a final determination that the payments are not deductible or that any deduction has been challenged or disallowed. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rendering judgment enforcing the alimony provisions of the decree.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
James Strader appeals the trial court's judgment enforcing the contractual alimony provisions of an agreed divorce decree. We affirm.