McGrew v. S. S. Kresge Co., 140 Ga. App. 149, 151 ( 230 S.E.2d 119) (1976); King Hardware Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 15 ( 84 S.E.2d 686) (1954). See also, Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 ( 129 S.E.2d 196) (1962). However, a store patron "is not bound to the same degree of care in discovering or apprehending danger in moments of stress or excitement or when [his] attention has been... diverted."

McGrew v. S. S. Kresge Co., 140 Ga. App. 149, 151 ( 230 S.E.2d 119) (1976); King Hardware Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 15 ( 84 S.E.2d 686) (1954). See also, Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 ( 129 S.E.2d 196) (1962)." (Punctuation omitted.)

[" (Cit.)'] McGrew v. S. S. Kresge Co., 140 Ga. App. 149, 151 [(4)] ( 230 S.E.2d 119) (1976); King Hardware Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 15 ( 84 S.E.2d 686) (1954). See also, Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 ( 129 S.E.2d 196) (1962)." Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623, supra.

Thus, the only reasonable explanation for appellant's collision with the trash bin is that she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. See Sumner, supra at 370; McGrew, supra at 151; Harris v. Bethel Air Conditioning c. Co., 114 Ga. App. 255, 256 ( 150 S.E.2d 710) (1966); Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80, 82 (3b) ( 129 S.E.2d 196) (1962). Appellant also argues that appellee is liable under the "distraction theory" because appellee was aware that appellant, distracted by playing tennis, could injure herself on the trash bin.

In Stephens v. Dover Elevator Co., 109 Ga. App. 112 ( 135 S.E.2d 593) where an elevator was 4 to 6 inches above floor level, a general demurrer was sustained, and in Roberts v. Wicker, 213 Ga. 352 ( 99 S.E.2d 84), where a ridge existed in a door-threshold strip, the grant of a nonsuit was affirmed. And in Pilgreen v. Hanson, 89 Ga. App. 703, 707 ( 81 S.E.2d 18) and Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 (3) ( 129 S.E.2d 196) our court ruled that a slight difference between floor levels is not usually in and of itself negligent construction. 3. Plaintiff contends the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment since it is questionable as to whether defendant knew that another person had stumbled previously upon the step-down.

Cf. Todd v. Armour Co., 44 Ga. App. 609 ( 162 S.E. 394); Etheredge v. Central R. Co., 122 Ga. 853 ( 50 S.E. 1003). As to what constitutes a mantrap, see generally Crosby v. Savannah Electric c. Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 198, supra; Kahn v. Graper, 114 Ga. App. 572, 576, supra; Wilder v. Gardner, 39 Ga. App. 608 ( 147 S.E. 911); Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 (3a) ( 129 S.E.2d 196); Baxley v. Williams Const. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 670 ( 106 S.E.2d 799). 4.

A slight difference between floor levels is not usually in and of itself negligent construction. Pilgreen v. Hanson, 89 Ga. App. 703, 707 ( 81 S.E.2d 18); Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 (3) ( 129 S.E.2d 196). As to wax on the floor, interrogatories to the defendant did not establish that any wax had been used, and the plaintiff testified: "There was nothing on the floor that I saw then, not that I can recall, nothing wrong with the floor other than the fact that it had a slight slope." The defendant's answers to a question concerning the mat was that it was occasionally used, but on the outside of the doorway rather than on the inside.

Tatum v. Clemones, 105 Ga. App. 221 ( 124 S.E.2d 425); Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170 (2a) ( 138 S.E.2d 77). Since the situation was not so dangerous as to demand the conclusion that the defendant was negligent in maintaining it or in failing to warn the plaintiff of it, the additional allegation as to the absence of a handrail or banister did not serve to create a dangerous situation. Butler v. Jones, 85 Ga. App. 158, 163 (2b) ( 68 S.E.2d 173); Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 129 S.E.2d 196). The defendant provided structurally sound steps and a light illuminating that general area. To require much more than this would be approaching the point of making her an insurer of the plaintiff's safety, which she was not. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 339 ( 15 S.E.2d 797) and cit.

Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, supra; Johnson v. Thompson, 111 Ga. App. 654, 658 ( 143 S.E.2d 51). Anything appearing to the contrary in the decisions and opinions in the following cases, or in any others decided by this court, must yield to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, supra: Lebby v. Atlanta Realty Corp., 25 Ga. App. 369 ( 103 S.E. 433); Avary v. Anderson, 31 Ga. App. 402 ( 120 S.E. 683); Banks v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 79 Ga. App. 313 ( 53 S.E.2d 595); Ford v. S. A. Lynch Corp., 79 Ga. App. 481 ( 54 S.E.2d 320); Hill v. Davison-Paxon Co., 80 Ga. App. 840 ( 57 S.E.2d 680); Mattox v. Atlanta Enterprises, 91 Ga. App. 847 ( 87 S.E.2d 432); Bonner v. Barnes, 103 Ga. App. 364 ( 119 S.E.2d 138); King v. Davison-Paxon Co., 104 Ga. App. 822 ( 123 S.E.2d 269); Tatum v. Clemones, 105 Ga. App. 221 ( 124 S.E.2d 425); Benefield v. McDonough Construction Co., 106 Ga. App. 194 ( 126 S.E.2d 704); Stowe v. Gallant-Belk Co., 107 Ga. App. 80 ( 129 S.E.2d 196); Norwood v. Belk-Hudson Co. of Valdosta, 107 Ga. App. 278 ( 129 S.E.2d 810); Hoover v. Seaboard A.L.R. Co., 107 Ga. App. 342 ( 130 S.E.2d 247); 670 New Street, Inc. v. Smith, 107 Ga. App. 539 ( 130 S.E.2d 773); Stephens v. Dover Elevator Co., 109 Ga. App. 112 ( 135 S.E.2d 593); Brunswick Pulp Paper Co. v. Dowling, 111 Ga. App. 123 ( 140 S.E.2d 912); Platz v. Kroger Company, 110 Ga. App. 16 ( 137 S.E.2d 561). The defendant urges that we should construe the decision in the Wynne case, supra, as this court apparently construed it in Ford v. S. A. Lynch Corp., 79 Ga. App. 481, supra, and that we should follow the decision in Holman v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 454, 462 ( 39 S.E.2d 850). The reasoning of the opinion in the Ford case was that the soapy water on the floor which caused the plaintiff to fall was visible, and that because the plaintiff stepped on a patent defect she failed to exercise ordinary care as a matter of law. It appears from that opinio

The petition in Case No. 41492 does not show that the alleged dangerous condition was not observable to the plaintiff's wife as well as to the defendant, and therefore does not state a cause of action. Stowe v. Belk-Gallant Co., 107 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 129 S.E.2d 196). The trial court erred in sustaining the general demurrers to the petition in Case No. 41491, but did not err in sustaining the demurrers in Case No. 41492.