Stoves Stones, Ltd. v. Rubens

22 Citing cases

  1. Slaughter v. Pekich

    67 Misc. 3d 143 (N.Y. App. Term 2020)

    Moreover, the proffered evidence was material inasmuch as it went to the heart of the issues of whether defendant was entitled to retain the $1,800 security deposit and, further, to recover damages from plaintiff for repair work. In view of the foregoing, we find that the District Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's application for an adjournment (see Matter ofHarris-Wilks v. Harris , 56 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2008] ; Byrnes v. Varlack , 17 AD3d at 617 ; Canty v. McLoughlin , 16 AD3d 449, 450 [2005] ; Matter of Shepard , 286 AD2d at 337 ; cf.Stoves & Stones v. Rubens , 237 AD2d 280, 280 [1997] ; Boltz v. Ascolesi , 16 Misc 3d 133[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51499[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007] ). Consequently, the District Court's judgment failed to render substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1804, 1807 ).

  2. Horst v. Brown

    72 A.D.3d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 37 times

    As defendant waived the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, Supreme Court erred in its sua sponte consideration of that defense ( see Paladino v Time Warner Cable of N.Y. City, 16 AD3d 646, 647 ["court may not take judicial notice, sua sponte, of the applicability of a statute of limitations if that defense has not been raised"]). While "courts generally allow pro se litigants some leeway in the presentation of their case" ( Stoves Stones v Rubens, 237 AD2d 280), in this particular case it was error to treat defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on damages as either a motion to amend defendant's answer, or a cross motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. "A motion for summary judgment 'on one claim or defense does not provide a basis for searching the record and granting summary judgment on an unrelated claim or defense'" ( Baseball Off. of Commr. v Marsh McLennan, 295 AD2d 73, 82, quoting Sadkin v Raskin Rappoport, 271 AD2d 272, 273)

  3. Mirzoeff v. Nagar

    52 A.D.3d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 26 times

    Further, although courts will routinely afford pro se litigants, as the defendants were throughout the trial, some latitude, a "litigant's decision to proceed without counsel does not confer any greater rights than those afforded to other litigants, nor may a pro se appearance serve to deprive parties in opposition of their right to a fair trial" ( Sloninski v Weston, 232 AD2d 913, 914; see Banushi v Lambrakos, 305 AD2d 524). Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' request for an adjournment ( see Stoves Stones v Rubens, 237 AD2d 280; Natoli v Natoli, 234 AD2d 591, 592). The defendants' remaining contentions are without merit.

  4. 601-609 W. 175th St. Corp. v. Munoz

    2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51472 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)   Cited 2 times

    Nor is respondent entitled to a new trial, since he was afforded ample opportunity as a pro se litigant to present his case (see, Roundtree v. Singh, 143 AD2d 995). Civil Court's denial of respondent's application for an adjournment was an appropriate exercise of discretion in light of the previous adjournments granted in the proceeding (see, Stoves Stones, Ltd. v. Rubens, 237 AD2d 280). This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

  5. 2215-75 CRUGER APTS v. Stovel

    196 Misc. 2d 346 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)   Cited 2 times

    " (Emphasis added.) Landlord never addressed tenant's statement that he replied to landlord's attorney on November 28, never addressed tenant's claim that the 10-day notice to cure was defective and never explained why it delayed sending the notice, which was dated November 6, 2001 until November 21, 2001. "[C]ourts generally allow pro se litigants some leeway in the presentation of their case" (Stoves & Stones v Rubens, 237 AD2d 280 [1997]; see also, Matter of Village of Attica v Nutty, 184 AD2d 1057 [1992]). It is evident from the record that tenant did not waive the issue of timeliness of service of the notice to cure, but sufficiently preserved the issue for resolution by the court.

  6. 2215-75 Cruger Apartments, Inc. v. Stovel

    196 Misc. 2d 346 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)   Cited 4 times

    " (Emphasis added.) Landlord never addressed tenant's statement that he replied to landlord's attorney on November 28, never addressed tenant's claim that the ten day notice to cure was defective and never explained why it delayed sending the notice, which was dated November 6, 2001, until November 21, 2001. "[C]ourts generally allow pro se litigants some leeway in the presentation of their case" Stoves Stones, Ltd. v. Rubens, 237 A.D.2d 280; see also, Matter of Village of Attica v. Nutty, 184 A.D.2d 1057). It is evident from the record that tenant did not waive the issue of timeliness of service of the notice to cure, but sufficiently preserved the issue for resolution by the court.

  7. Matter of Charles N. F., Jr. v. Terry R. F

    261 A.D.2d 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

    Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Contrary to the contention of petitioner, Family Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a continuance to enable him to secure an expert witness on paternity evaluation reports ( see, Stoves Stones v. Rubens, 237 A.D.2d 280; Insl-X Prods. Corp. v. F K Supply, 228 A.D.2d 478; Michaels v. Dalimonte, 121 A.D.2d 370).

  8. Matter of Estate of Spielberger

    250 A.D.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    Although the February 24, 1997 trial date had, after numerous delays and postponements for objectant's benefit, been marked final, the record clearly demonstrates that objectant, despite ample opportunity to ready her case, was not prepared to go forward. In particular, although objectant complains that after the guardian ad litems withdrawal from acting as her trial counsel she was not granted yet another adjournment to obtain new counsel, objectant had been advised well before trial that her guardian, who did not think that a trial would be in her ward's best interests, would not represent her at trial, and objectant had indicated that she would obtain private counsel, which she did not do. Under these circumstances, the Surrogate's decision to proceed with the long-delayed trial was a proper exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed ( see, Matter of Bales, 93 A.D.2d 861, lv dismissed 60 N.Y.2d 554, 701; see also, Stoves Stones v. Rubens, 237 A.D.2d 280). We have considered objectant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

  9. 100 Realty Equities LLC v. Yifei Tian

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50411 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2023)   Cited 2 times
    In 100 Realty Equities LLC v. Yifei Tian, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50411(U), 2023 WL 3239949 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2023), in dismissing a holdover initiated during the 12-month period after the Landlord accepted ERAP funds, J. Stoller found that acceptance of ERAP "creates an agreement that is essentially a lease..." and therefore a no-cause holdover during the 12-month period after ERAP acceptance was improper.

    Respondent in this case does not have counsel. As the Court must liberally construe submissions of pro se parties, Zelodius C. v. Danny L., 39 A.D.3d 320 (1st Dept. 2007), Stoves & Stones, Ltd. v. Rubens, 237 A.D.2d 280 (2nd Dept. 1997), the Court deemed Respondent to move for a directed verdict and gave the parties an opportunity to brief the issue.

  10. Antonucci v. Bell

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 50479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

    ided evidence of regular correspondence with an attorney via letter, in the exhibits attached to both of his filings in this action. The Second Department has maintained that "while courts may afford a pro se litigant "some latitude" (Duffen v State of New York, 245 A.D.2d 653, 653 [1997]), a pro se litigant "acquires no greater right than any other litigant" (Roundtree v Singh, 143 A.D.2d 995, 996, [1988]) "and will be held to the same standards of proof as those who are represented by counsel" (Duffen v State of New York, 245 A.D.2d at 654; see also Sporten v Samuel, 31 Misc.3d 151 [A], [App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2011]; Boltz v Ascolesi, 16 Misc.3d 133[A] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Tanenbaum Assoc, LLP v. Yudenfreund, 13 Misc.3d 138 [A [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists [2006]). While this court will generally accord" pro se litigants some leeway in the presentation of their case, pro se litigants must still abide by court procedures and calendars" (Stoves & Stones, Ltd v Rubens, 237 A.D.2d 280, 280 [2d Dept 1997]). The Defendant was sophisticated enough to avail himself of the NYSCEF filing system but failed to seek an appearance before this Court through electronic or virtual means.