Peters v. State, 240 Ala. 531, 200 So. 404. There was no error in admitting evidence of statement made by defendant prior to the shooting, nor in admitting evidence that the solicitor had not told him how to testify in rebuttal of evidence in effect that the solicitor had tried to tell him how to testify. Payne v. Roy, 206 Ala. 432, 90 So. 605; Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239. LAWSON, Justice.
Vintson v. State, 22 Ala. App. 338, 339, 115 So. 695; Carlisle v. State, 22 Ala. App. 255, 114 So. 475; Pendley v. State, 23 Ala. App. 539, 541, 128 So. 589. Statements of Clements, made in the absence of defendant, were hearsay, irrelevant, inadmissible and not binding on defendant, and no part of the res gestรฆ. Darby v. State, 92 Ala. 9, 9 So. 429; Hays v. State, 110 Ala. 60, 20 So. 322; Benjamin v. State, 12 Ala. App. 148, 67 So. 792; Edelman v. Gadsden, 16 Ala. App. 381, 77 So. 914; Howard v. State, 17 Ala. App. 464, 86 So. 172; Davis v. State, 20 Ala. App. 131, 101 So. 171; Kiel v. State, 28 Ala. App. 308, 184 So. 208; Id., 236 Ala. 585, 184 So. 210. Moreover, only the fact, and not the details, of a former difficulty is admissible. Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239; Lambert v. State, 208 Ala. 42, 93 So. 708. To be admissible on the theory of a conspiracy, the statements must have been made pending the existence of the conspiracy; if prior to its inception or subsequent to commission of the offense, they are inadmissible. Langford v. State, 130 Ala. 74, 30 So. 503.
State v. Shelton, 30 Ala. App. 484, 8 So.2d 216; Denson v. State, 36 Ala. App. 216, 57 So.2d 830; Harrison v. State, 38 Ala. App. 60, 77 So.2d 384; Id., 262 Ala. 701, 77 So.2d 387; State v. Knight, 31 Ala. App. 174, 14 So.2d 159. The error, if any, in excluding evidence, is cured by the subsequent admission thereof. Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239; 7 Ala.Dig., Criminal Law, 1170 (3). All of the evidence offered by appellant amounted to a defense, and cannot be considered in this proceeding. State v. Curry, 2 Ala. App. 251, 56 So. 736; Tingley v. State, 34 Ala. App. 379, 41 So.2d 276; Morrison v. State, 258 Ala. 410, 63 So.2d 346; McGahee v. Wall, 38 Ala. App. 348, 83 So.2d 252; Blackwell v. State, 38 Ala. App. 562, 89 So.2d 228; Gambrell v. Bridges, 39 Ala. App. 5, 96 So.2d 178.
The questions copied above called for answers which related to the details of a former difficulty. Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239; Wright v. State, 252 Ala. 46, 39 So.2d 395. Effort was made also by appellant's counsel to prove what the Copelands did at the place of the homicide after they returned and before the appellant and kinsmen arrived the second time.
Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So.2d 54. Testimony as to a conversation had by defendant with witness prior to the difficulty was improperly allowed to the prejudice of defendant. Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239. Testimony relating to other transactions between defendant and deceased and to statements of defendant not amounting to threats was erroneously admitted. A.A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Jas. L. Screws, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
This situation having been invited by appellant's counsel's cross examination, the State was, in our opinion, properly permitted to show by redirect examination of Adams that at the time he knew appellant's reputation for violence, turbulence and bloodthirstiness was bad, in order to explain his conduct, and offset such prejudice as may have been engendered by the cross examination, even if such redirect testimony was prejudicial to appellant's cause. Hamil v. U.S., 5 Cir., 298 F. 369; Sanders v. State, 131 Ala. 1, 31 So. 564; Hardin v. State, 8 Ala. App. 215, 63 So. 18; Hall v. State, 19 Ala. App. 229, 96 So. 644; Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239; Davis v. State, 25 Ga. App. 532, 103 S.E. 819; Morse v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 83, 210 S.W. 965; State v. Vaughn, 186 N.C. 759, 120 S.E. 338; Craig v. State, 78 Neb. 466, 111 N.W. 143; State v. McGahey, 3 N.Dak. 293, 55 N.W. 753. Affirmed.
Threats by a defendant to kill or injure one person are not admissible in evidence on indictment charging the murder of another person. State v. McHamilton, 128 La. 498, 54 So. 971; Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 21 S.Ct. 403, 45 L.Ed. 570; George v. State, 145 Ala. 41, 40 So. 961, 117 Am.St.Rep. 17; 30 C.J. 191, ยง 420; Roper v. State, 25 Ala. App. 397, 147 So. 201; Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239, 241; Duncan v. State, 22 Ala. App. 382, 115 So. 856; Naler v. State, 25 Ala. App. 486, 148 So. 880, 881; Clemmons v. State, 18 Ala. App. 650, 94 So. 245; Shipman v. State, 23 Ala. App. 82, 121 So. 503; Ratliff v. State, 19 Ala. App. 505, 98 So. 493; State v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142; Lawrence v. State, 128 Tex. Cr.R. 416, 82 S.W.2d 647; Fugate v. Com., 202 Ky. 509, 260 S.W. 338; Garrison v. Com., 236 Ky. 706, 33 S.W.2d 698, 699; Stokes v. State, 17 Ala. App. 27, 81 So. 363. In a prosecution for murder it is error to allow a witness to go into details of a previous difficulty between the defendant and the deceased, or the defendant and a third person.
Other cases of similar import might be cited both from the Court of Appeals and from the Supreme Court, but the foregoing seems to us to be sufficient. The appellant insists that on the trial the State was permitted to prove the details of a prior difficulty, and that these several rulings of the court constituted reversible error. It is the general rule in the trial of a murder case, that the facts of a previous difficulty between deceased and defendant may be shown, but the particulars or merits of such difficulty are not admissible. Stover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 222, 143 So. 239; Newman v. State, 25 Ala. App. 526, 149 So. 724. However, this rule does not apply in a case such as the one at bar, where the facts testified to consist of connected actions and transactions leading up to and explanatory of the killing.