Opinion
Case No. 04-1298.
April 20, 2005
ORDER
Now before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment by the Plaintiff, Richard Stover ("Stover"), a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Illinois Student Assistance Commission and the State of Illinois (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Illinois Defendants"), and a Motion for Summary Judgment by the U.S. Department of Education and the Federal Government (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Federal Defendants"). For the reasons set forth below, the Illinois Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#20] is GRANTED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Department of Education [#25] is DENIED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Federal Government [#26] is DENIED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Illinois Court of Claims [#29] is DENIED, and the Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#37] is GRANTED. The Court of Claims is hereby DISMISSED for failure to perfect proper service in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
Although Stover's Complaint is far from a model of clarity, it would appear that the Illinois Student Assistance Commission brought suit against him in state court for failure to repay his student loans. He then counter-sued challenging the student loan lending practices of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission. Both suits were voluntarily dismissed. However, at some point, Stover concluded that the Student Assistance Commission had reneged on its agreement by threatening him with confiscation of taxes and wage garnishment and attempted to revive his state court claims in a new suit. On February 29, 2000, his claims were dismissed on the grounds that they could only be brought in the Illinois Court of Claims. Dissatisfied with that result, on August 30, 2004, Stover brought the present action against the Illinois Defendants and the Court of Claims seeking a declaration that the Court of Claims is unconstitutional, as well as money damages and the recovery of his income taxes and garnished wages. He has also sued the Federal Defendants, seeking a declaration that the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 is unconstitutional, as well as money damages and the recovery of his income taxes and garnished wages.
Both the Illinois Defendants and the Federal Defendants have now moved for summary judgment, and Stover has filed his own motions seeking the entry of judgment in his favor. The motions are now ready for resolution, and this Order follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the responsibility of informing the Court of portions of the record or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party may meet its burden of showing an absence of disputed material facts by demonstrating "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1988).If the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party then has the burden of presenting specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and produce evidence of a genuine issue for trial.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Nevertheless, this Court must "view the record and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party]." Holland v. Jefferson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). Summary judgment will be denied where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
I. Motions Regarding the Illinois Defendants and Court of Claims
Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for the "deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It is not itself a source of substantive rights; instead it is a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). The initial step in any § 1983 analysis is to identify the specific constitutional right which was allegedly violated.Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
A. Illinois Defendants' Motion
Before reaching the merits of Stover's claims, however, the Illinois Defendants have asserted several procedural defenses. First, the Illinois Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Stover's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part that, "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend beyond any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State" and has also been interpreted to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in a federal forum in some instances. In other words, states and their entities are immune from private actions brought against them in federal court absent a waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity. Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Here, Stover brings suit against the Illinois Defendants pursuant to § 1983. As it is well established that § 1983 did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Seventh Circuit has held that there has been no waiver of such immunity by the State of Illinois, Stover is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from bringing his § 1983 claims against the Illinois Defendants in this forum. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 384, 118 S.Ct. 2047 (1998), citing Will v. Michigan Department of States Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-70 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139 (1979); Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 786 (7th Cir. 2003); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1985).
Stover's only substantive response to this reality is the assertion in his response that Defense counsel "has received my request to have 42 U.S.C. 1983 change to 28 U.S.C. 2403 under Rule 24 — Intervention." However, this position is unavailing, as § 2403 provides for intervention by the United States or any state for purposes of presenting evidence in a case in which they are not a party. Here, the United States and the State of Illinois are named parties in Stover's Complaint, and § 2403 has no valid application. In denying Stover's December 22, 2004, "Motion Rule 24 — Intervention", Magistrate Judge Cudmore also noted the inapplicability of Rule 24 to the present situation and instructed Stover that if he believed that his Complaint needed to be amended, he should take appropriate action to request leave to file an amended complaint. No motion for leave to amend has been filed.
Moreover, even assuming that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar this suit, Stover has sued the State of Illinois and the Illinois Student Assistance Commission, an entity of the State of Illinois. It is equally well-settled that states and state agencies are not "persons" that can be subject to suit pursuant to § 1983. Idaho Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 312 n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (1997); Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66;Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Stover's claims against the Illinois Defendants would fail for this reason as well.
Finally, the Illinois Defendants argue that Stover's attempt to attack the state court judgment would be barred by theRooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review determinations of state court judgments or claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983);Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). The effect of this doctrine is to make it clear that "no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court judgment." Remer v. Burlington Area School District, 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, Stover essentially seeks to avoid the effects of the state court judgment dismissing his case and finding that the suit against the State of Illinois could only be brought in the Illinois Court of Claims. By asking for relief including finding the Court of Claims to be unconstitutional and refunding any penalties or garnishments that were entered against him, he is effectively requesting redress for injury that resulted from the state court judgment. Thus, under the precedent set forth in the previous paragraph, this Court would alternatively lack jurisdiction to entertain the present claims, as such claims must be presented directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
For each of these alternative reasons, the Court finds that even when all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to Stover, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor. The Illinois Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
B. Stover's Motion
Stover moves for summary judgment against the Court of Claims. In support of his motion, he argues that the Court of Claims was served on August 31, 2004, by certified mail with a return receipt that was stamped by the Secretary of State, Mark Kuntzi, and that any assertion by the Court of Claims that it was not properly served would amount to "perjury." He then maintains that the Court of Claims is unconstitutional because it offers no right to a jury trial and requires defendants to face judges that are attorneys for the state, depriving him of any chance for a fair trial.
The Court of Claims cites Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that valid service of process is a prerequisite to the Court's personal jurisdiction. It then notes that it was never properly served with a summons and copy of the complaint contrary to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that "summons shall be signed by the clerk, bear the seal of the court, identify the court and the parties, be directed to the defendant" and "shall be served together with a copy of the complaint."
The record reveals that the summons directed to the Court of Claims was returned unexecuted on October 8, 2004. Stover disputes this, citing a U.S. Postal Service response to a request for delivery information indicating that an item was delivered on August 31, 2004, and received by Mark Kuntzi in the Secretary of State's Office. With all due respect, receipt of some item by the Secretary of State's Office does not establish service of the summons and Complaint on the Court of Claims. Magistrate Judge Cudmore noted this on December 22, 2004, and advised Stover that he needed to take additional steps to properly serve the Court of Claims pursuant to Rule 4. Stover's failure to heed this warning must result in the dismissal of the Court of Claims for failure to perfect service pursuant to Rule 4, particularly as he has not made any effort to establish good cause for his failure to accomplish proper service.
The Court would further note that even if Stover had properly served the Court of Claims, his claims against it would be barred for the same reasons as applied with respect to the Illinois Defendants.
II. Motions Regarding Federal Defendants
The Federal Defendants and Stover have filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Each Motion will be addressed in turn.
A. Stover's Motions
In his first Motion, Stover first seeks summary judgment against the Federal Defendants because he does not believe that they filed a timely response to his Complaint. However, the Federal Defendants respond that Stover failed to properly perfect service on them in accordance with Rule 4. Specifically, they maintain that he failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(i), which provides the methods for serving the United States and its agencies. Rule 4(i) provides in relevant part:
Service upon the United States shall be effected (A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States attorney and (B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia . . . (2)(A) Service on an agency or corporation of the United States, or an officer or employee of the United States sued only in an official capacity, is effected by serving the United States in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(i)(1) and by also sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the officer, employee, agency, or corporation.
Here, the record clearly establishes that Stover did not initially serve the United States Attorneys Office as the only summonses that were issued or returned executed in connection with his federal claims were directed to the Department of Education and the Attorney General. Stover effectively concedes this in his response to the Federal Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and indicates that he delivered some unspecified papers to an Assistant U.S. Attorney for this District on December 22, 2004. Nevertheless, there is still nothing in the record indicating that he actually delivered summons and a copy of the Complaint to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and the Court would be justified in dismissing his claims against the Federal Defendants for failure to properly perfect service within 120 days of filing the Complaint as required by Rule 4(m).
Given Stover's pro se status, the Court declines to dismiss his claims against the Federal Defendants for failure to timely accomplish service on the Assistant U.S. Attorney. That being said, his failure to properly serve them establishes as a matter of law that he is not entitled to summary judgment against the Federal Defendants for failure to timely respond to his Complaint in November 2004, and his Motions for Summary Judgment on this basis are therefore denied.
The remainder of the arguments made in Stover's Motions are perfunctory and undeveloped, lacking in evidentiary support or citation to legal authority. In an argument consisting of four paragraphs that is utterly devoid of any citation to case authority or admissible evidentiary support, Stover moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the Department of Education promises the Illinois Student Assistance Commission that "they will back them up in the event that they are not able to collect on a loan for any reason and thus becomes personally responsible for any action that may arise from any action that (I.S.A.C.) may be involved in to include illegal action." He then makes vague references to his student loan contracts and student loan lending practices. This is such a weak attempt that the Court finds his arguments to be waived for purposes of the present Motions, and his Motions are denied on this basis, as well. See Finance Investment Co. v. Geberit AG, 165 F.3d 526, 1998 WL 890372, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (finding a perfunctory and undeveloped argument to be waived); Indurante v. Local 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1998);Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. den., 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999).
B. Federal Defendants' Motion
Stover alleges that the Debt Collection Improvement Act ("DCIA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3720D, is unconstitutional and also contends that in collecting his student loan debts, the Federal Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act. As relief, he seeks to an order prohibiting the Department of Education from garnishing a portion of his wages to pay his student loan debt and requests a refund of any monies collected from him through Administrative Wage Garnishment ("AWG") or offsets from income tax refunds made pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program ("TOP").
In order to finance his studies at the University of Illinois, Stover took out two loans totaling $2,768.00 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, now known as the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP"). The FFELP is authorized pursuant to Title IV, Part B of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1071. Although often obtained through local lenders, these loans are generally guaranteed by state agencies and are reinsured and subsidized by the Department of Education. After agreeing to a repayment schedule in June 1991, he began to make the payments on the loans as scheduled. However, on or about March 30, 1992, he defaulted on his loan obligation. On July 1, 1993, the Illinois Student Assistance Commission paid the lender on its default claim. On October 7, 1999, the loan was assigned to the Department of Education, at which time the amount due was $2,164.25, which represented $1,594.19 in principal and $570.06 in unpaid accrued interest. The Department of Education then undertook procedures to collect the debt through the TOP and AWG.
The Court notes that Department of Education records reveal that additional interest and collection costs accrued since that time.
The Department of Education is authorized to pursue collection from a debtor by offsetting certain federal payments to which the debtor may be entitled, such as income tax refunds, through the TOP pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6402 and 31 U.S.C. § 3720A. In order to refer a debt for collection through the TOP, the Department of Education must: (1) provide the debtor with notice of the proposed offset and an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt, and (2) certify to the Department of the Treasury that these steps have been completed and qualify for collection by offset. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3716(a) and (c)(6); 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(a) and (b); 31 C.F.R. §§ 285.2 and 285.4. The Department of Treasury then compares the names and taxpayer identification numbers ("TIN") of the payees with the names and TINs of the debtors in the TOP database. If there is a match, the Department of Treasury then offsets all or a portion of the payment, pays the offset amount to the Department of Education, and disburses any remaining portion to the payee. 31 C.F.R. §§ 285.4(c) and (h).
The Department of Education has promulgated regulations governing the collection of debt through the TOP. These regulations further require that the debtor be provided with written notice prior to the referral that includes information regarding: (1) the nature and amount of the debt owed; (2) the Department of Education's intent to offset; (3) the debtor's opportunity to inspect and copy relevant records, obtain a review within the Department of Education of the existence or amount of the debt, and enter into a written agreement to repay the debt. 34 C.F.R. § 30.22(b)(3). The debtor is also made aware of the availability of an administrative review or hearing upon request. 34 C.F.R. 30.24.
The Federal Defendants have submitted the sworn Declaration of Alberto Francisco ("Francisco"), Senior Loan Analyst in the Litigation Branch, Office of Student Financial Assistance of the Department of Education. In this Declaration, Francisco states that according to the Department's records, Stover was notified on August 31, 2000, that the Department of Education would seek to collect his debt through the TOP if he did not establish repayment arrangements or seek a review. The letter gave a detailed explanation of what he needed to do to request documents, make an objection, seek a review of objections, or obtain a hearing and explained how to avoid the offset by making arrangements to repay the debt. The letter was not returned to the Department of Education as undeliverable, and Stover does not actually dispute receiving the letter. As no objection was received, three offsets have been made pursuant to the TOP. On March 9, 2001, $481.31 was offset. On September 14, 2001, another $300.00 was offset. Finally, on May 3, 2002, $483.51 was offset. These amounts have been credited to Stover's account.
The Department of Education is also authorized to pursue collection from a debtor through AWG pursuant to § 31001(o) of the DCIA, 31 U.S.C. § 3720D. This is a process through which the Department can garnish the wages of a delinquent debtor without first obtaining a court order. The debtor's employer then withholds specified amounts from the debtor's wages and pays those amounts to the Department of Education. Under the regulations governing AWG, before an AWG may be undertaken, the Department of Education must first give the debtor 30 days written notice, mailed to the debtor's last known address, of its intent to collect the debt by wage garnishment and an explanation of the debtor's rights to avoid garnishment. 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.4-6. Such rights include the right to: (1) inspect and copy records; (2) enter into a repayment agreement to avoid garnishment; (3) contest the existence or amount of the debt to be collected, as well as the terms of the repayment schedule; (4) receive a prompt administrative hearing before a hearing official on any timely-filed objections to the garnishment. 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.6-9. Unless the debtor makes an objection or requests a hearing, the Department of Education is authorized to issue an AWG order that does not exceed 15 percent of the debtor's disposable pay. 34 C.F.R. § 34.18.
Francisco's Declaration indicates that on April 23, 2004, Stover was sent written notice that the Department of Education would proceed with an AWG unless he requested a hearing or entered into a repayment arrangement. The Notice of Proposed Garnishment was mailed to Stover's last known address and was not returned as undeliverable. No objection was received, and no hearing was requested. Accordingly, on July 9, 2004, the Department issued an Order of Garnishment to Stover's employer, and a Final Notice of Garnishment was issued to Stover on July 11, 2004. The AWG was cancelled on December 10, 2004, but was reinitiated on December 21, 2004. To date, garnishments in the amount of $905.99 have been received and credited to Stover's account.
Stover's main basis for challenging the constitutionality of the DCIA and the Department of Education's collections procedures appears to be that the statute and regulations "presumes a party is guilty w/o checking the facts and denies judicial process" by taking his money without a trial. However, his belief that due process always requires a formal trial is mistaken.
The right to due process is violated when the Government deprives a person of a property right without notice and an opportunity for a hearing or other opportunity to present objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Determining whether the notice and opportunity for a hearing are sufficient in a particular instance requires the consideration and balancing of the following factors: (1) the nature of the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the Government function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute requirements would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The Seventh Circuit has specifically held in the context of an offset in satisfaction of a delinquent student loan debt through the TOP that by sending notice by mail to the debtor's last known address, the Department "complied with the constitutional requirements that they provide notice reasonably calculated to apprize [the debtor] of the offset, and to provide him an opportunity to present his objections." Omegbu v. United States Department of Treasury, 118 Fed.Appx. 989, 991, 2004 WL 3049825 (7th Cir. 2004), citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-70 (2002); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 318. The Seventh Circuit also noted that the requirements of § 3716(a) were satisfied by sending written notice to the debtor's last known address and providing him the opportunity to be heard prior to certifying his account for offset. Id. Similarly, in the context of an AWG following a debtor's default on her student loans, the Eighth Circuit held that evidence that the Department of Education had mailed a notice of its impending garnishment to the debtor's last known address satisfied the notice requirements of both the HEA and due process. Stewart v. Department of Education, 18 Fed.Appx. 452, 452, 2001 WL 1040002 (8th Cir. 2001).
Here, the Department of Education mailed timely notices of its intent to offset Stover's tax refund and garnish his wages to his last known address, which the Court notes is the same address that Stover currently lists as his address of record in this case. The letters explain the nature and amount of the debt, indicate the Department's intent to initiate collection of the debt through either offset or garnishment, and explain his right to inspect documents, enter into a repayment agreement, or request a hearing. Collection procedures did not begin until after the required time period had elapsed.
In a response devoid of citation to admissible evidence or relevant case precedent, Stover does not deny receiving such letters or that he never filed an objection or requested a hearing. In fact, this portion of his response is dedicated to taking issue with the differences between a hearing and the trial to which he believes he is entitled, reiterating his adamant assertion that the Federal Defendants took money that was legally his, and highlighting portions of the letters indicating that a party dissatisfied with the hearing decision may bring a suit in federal court. At no time does he acknowledge that his failure to register any timely objection or request an administrative hearing after receiving proper notice is dispositive.
After reviewing the record in this case, the Court must conclude that the notices and procedures implemented in this case via the AWG and TOP offset were constitutionally adequate. Under the circumstances, the letters were reasonably calculated to apprize Stover of the impending offset and garnishment, as well as to inform him of the opportunities available to him to avoid the collections or to present any objections to the collections. He was advised that a hearing or review was available upon his request and given instruction as to how to request such a hearing/review.
The private interest at stake in this case is Stover's right to uninterrupted receipt of the full amount of his wages or tax refund. The requirement of predeprivation notice and the availability of a timely hearing and objection procedure, as well as the matching process undertaken by the Department of Treasury prior to any offset, minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation. The Government interest in recovering payments on delinquent student loan accounts is substantial, and the requirement of a full evidentiary hearing or trial (as requested by Stover) would impose significant administrative and financial burdens on the Government that are not justified by the balance of the interests involved. Thus, the Federal Defendants' procedures in this case not only provided timely and sufficient notice but also gave Stover an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. Stover has therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim that the DCIA and various procedures at issue in this case unconstitutionally deprived him of due process, and the Federal Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Stover also makes reference to an alleged violation of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). However, the TILA expressly excludes "[l]oans made, or insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV" of the HEA from its application. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(7). As the FFELP loans at issue in this case were clearly made pursuant to Title IV of the HEA, the TILA is inapplicable, and Stover's claim must necessarily fail.
Stover's Complaint also makes allegations sounding in extortion, fraud, loan sharking, usury, and embezzlement. However, under the circumstances of this case, a condition precedent to the viability of any of these claims is a finding of an unconstitutional deprivation by the Defendants. As the Court has found no such unconstitutional deprivation on the record in this case, these claims must also fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Stover on the record now before the Court. Accordingly, the Illinois Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#20] is GRANTED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Department of Education [#25] is DENIED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Federal Defendants [#26] is DENIED, Stover's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Illinois Court of Claims [#29] is DENIED, and the Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#37] is GRANTED. The Court of Claims is hereby DISMISSED for failure to perfect proper service in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter is now TERMINATED.