The trial court also found that, even if Hayward did not have a reasonable belief that the injury-causing vehicle was uninsured when she filed suit, she became aware of that fact during the pendency of the litigation against the owner/operator by means of the issuance of a declaratory judgment that the vehicle was uninsured, and did not have the UMC served within 90 days of acquiring that knowledge. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the UMC, pointing out that, under our holding in Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611 ( 502 SE2d 226) (1998), the UMC was timely served with process in the renewal action that Hayward timely filed after voluntarily dismissing her action against the owner/operator of the injury-causing vehicle. See OCGA § 9-2-61; Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., supra, 269 Ga. at 612 (UMC timely served under OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) when timely served in renewal action despite not having been served in the original action); U. S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Reid, supra, 268 Ga. at 432-433 (UMC timely served under OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) when timely served in renewal action despite not having been timely served in original action).

The insurer alleged that Stridiron, who did not own the vehicle, lacked permission to drive it and thus was not covered by the automobile insurance. 1. As found by our Supreme Court in Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611, 611-612 ( 502 SE2d 226) (1998), the UM service requirement is not intended to establish personal jurisdiction over the insurer or make it a defendant in the underlying tort action. Compare Bonner v. Bonner, 272 Ga. 545, 546 (2) ( 533 SE2d 72) (2000) (service of summons and complaint under OCGA § 9-11-4 brings defendant within court's jurisdiction).

This case raises a question regarding service on an uninsured motorist carrier in a renewal action under OCGA § 9-2-61. Following Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611 ( 502 S.E.2d 226) (1998), we hold that service on an uninsured motorist carrier in a valid renewal action filed after the running of the statute of limitations is valid even though the carrier was not served in the original action. On June 8, 1997, Orlando Malave was in an automobile accident with Amy Sue Lescrynski.

Rebuelta then filed a motion in the state court to amend the dismissal order so as to certify it as final pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b). The court did so. Rebuelta now appeals the order as amended. His appeal requires us to examine the 1998 amendment to OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), as well as the pre-1998 version of the statute as applied in Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. and Malave v. Allstate Ins. Co. 269 Ga. 611 ( 502 SE2d 226) (1998). 246 Ga. App. 783 ( 541 SE2d 420) (2000).

OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) was amended effective July 1, 1998 to require a personal injury plaintiff to serve his uninsured motorist carrier "as though the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant" only where "a reasonable belief" exists that the vehicle is an uninsured motor vehicle under OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) (D). Ga. L. 1998, p. 1064, § 3. 1. Although we recently held in Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611, 612 ( 502 S.E.2d 226) (1998), that nothing in Bohannon v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 162, 163 ( 377 S.E.2d 853) (1989) "requires that the lawsuit that is eventually served on both the defendant and the UMC be the initial lawsuit which was served only on the defendant," Stout has no application in this lawsuit because Terry served both State Farm and the tortfeasor at the same time while both claims were within the statute of limitation. The effect of the consent dismissal entered into between Terry and State Farm, which expressly reserves for State Farm the opportunity to defend liability and damages in any subsequent renewal action regardless of any judgment obtained by Terry against the tortfeasor, is at issue here.

See OCGA § 9-3-33 (statute of limitation for personal injury action is two years). 269 Ga. 611 ( 502 SE2d 226) (1998). Id. at 611-612.

However, an examination of Georgia case law indicates that Georgia courts would apply a longer out-of-state tort statute of limitations so long as that longer statute continued to protect the UM carrier's subrogation rights without placing the UM carrier in a better position than the tortfeasor. See Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611, 502 S.E.2d 226 (1998); United States Fid. Guar. Co. v. Reid, 268 Ga. 432, 491 S.E.2d 50 (1997). Thus, we can fulfill the legitimate interests recognized by both Georgia and Florida using an analysis that relies on Georgia law, which in turn relies upon the Florida tort statute of limitations.

BLACKBURN, Judge. In Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611 ( 502 S.E.2d 226) (1998), the Supreme Court reversed this Court's opinion in Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 226 Ga. App. 220 ( 486 S.E.2d 195) (1997). Therefore, we vacate our earlier opinion, adopt the opinion of the Supreme Court as our own, and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611, 612, 502 S.E.2d 226 (1998). In contrast, the "obvious intent" behind a separate notice provision in an insurance policy requiring prompt notice of an accident or loss is to "require notice within a reasonable period after the occurrence of a covered event," Lankford, 307 Ga. App. at 15, 703 S.E.2d 436, which ensures that an insurer can conduct its own independent investigation before evidence and witnesses have disappeared and memories have faded.

See Lewis, 282 Ga.App. at 12(1)(b), 637 S.E.2d 505 ; Home Indem. Co., 122 Ga.App. at 641, 178 S.E.2d 297.Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 611, 612, 502 S.E.2d 226 (1998) (punctuation omitted).Here, GEICO was served with the complaint on November 5, 2012, but it filed its answer 101 days later on February 14, 2013.