That is so because that issue implicates irreconcilable decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court. Compare Carolina Casualty v. Oregon Auto., 242 Or. 407, 408 P.2d 198 (1966) ; Mock v. Bell Motors, Inc., 234 Or. 224, 380 P.2d 992 (1963); and Kergil v. Cen. Ore. Fir Supply, 213 Or. 186, 323 P.2d 947 (1958) (all holding that evidence that an ostensibly fully integrated writing is a "sham" designed to mislead third parties is not admissible under the parol evidence rule) with Story v. Hamaker, 245 Or. 584, 423 P.2d 185 (1967) (holding that such evidence is admissible under the parol evidence rule). Cf. Pendleton Grain Growers, 271 Or. at 28 quoting Storywith approval in somewhat different context).

Oregon courts have found that a contract is a sham where there is evidence that parties executed the instrument to deceive a third party and the purported agreement was not the result of a meeting of the minds of the parties. See Roberts v. Maze, 161 Or.App. 441 (1999); Story v. Hamaker, 245 Or. 584 (1967).

The challenged testimony cannot be taken to have been directed to whether there was an agreement at all. The "validity of the agreement" was not "the fact in dispute" (see Story v. Hamaker, 245 Or. 584, 586, 423 P.2d 185 (1967)), and the testimony was not admissible under the parol evidence rule. Pendleton Grain Growers is inapplicable here.

The defendant was entitled to introduce the evidence shown in his offer of proof. In Story v. Hamaker, 245 Or. 584, 586, 423 P.2d 185 (1967), we stated: "* * * Plaintiffs contend that the realtor's testimony upon which the court's decision appears primarily to have been based was inadmissible under ORS 41.740, the parol-evidence rule.