Public benefits corporations, however, while often snugly secured to the State, nevertheless do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims unless the Legislature specifically places jurisdiction in such forum (Gembala v Audobon Assn., 97 A.D.2d 345, 346; Story House Corp. v State of New York JobDev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, affd 31 N.Y.2d 942; see, Public Authorities Law §§ 361-b [exclusive jurisdiction of tort and contract claims against the State Thruway Authority is in the Court of Claims], 163-a [exclusive jurisdiction of tort and contract claims against the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority is in the Court of Claims], 1007 [10] [claims for the value of property appropriated by the Power Authority of the State are to be brought in the Court of Claims]). ORDA was created in 1981 as a public benefit corporation (L 1981, ch 404; Public Authorities Law §§ 2606, 2608).
Thus, upon these considerations it would appear that the agency here is sufficiently independent of the State as not to enjoy sovereign immunity. Compare Matherson v. Long Island State Park Commission, 442 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971) (Jones Beach Parkway Authority not alter ego); Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F.Supp. 23, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (New York Thruway Authority not alter ego); In re Dormitory Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 114, 271 N.Y.S.2d 983, 218 N.E.2d 693 (1966) (Dormitory Authority of State of New York has no sovereign immunity); Story House Corp. v. Job Development Authority, 37 A.D.2d 345, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 942, 340 N.Y.S.2d 929, 293 N.E.2d 97 (1972) (State of New York Job Development Authority has no sovereign immunity), with Whitten v. State University Construction Fund, supra (State University Construction Fund has sovereign immunity; Charles Simkin Sons, Inc. v. State University Construction Fund, 352 F.Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973) (State University Construction Fund has sovereign immunity); State University of New York v. Syracuse University, 206 Misc. 1003, 137 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 59, 135 N.Y.S.2d 539 (3d Dep't 1954) (State University has sovereign immunity). Section 32(5):
g out of defendant's operation of the Gore Mountain Ski Center or a state-owned Olympic facility (see Public Authorities Laws § 2622 [4], added by L 1994, ch 169, § 93). Facilities owned by other entities, such as the Olympic Arena, were not included within the scope of the statute, and the Legislature's failure to include them indicates that their exclusion was intended (see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240; Matter of Beekman Hill Assn. v. Chin, 274 A.D.2d 161, 170, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 767). Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited to those situations where the Legislature has specifically conferred it (see Gembala v. Audobon Assn., 97 A.D.2d 345, 346) and such jurisdiction was withheld as to the facility involved here, we are not called upon to consider whether the functions of defendant are "so closely allied with the State itself as to meet the [jurisdictional] test" (Story House Corp. v. State of New York Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, 349, affd 31 N.Y.2d 942). Thus, while we have considered defendant to be an agency of the state for purposes and in contexts where the issue presented had not been legislatively resolved (see Craig v. State of New York, 261 A.D.2d 683,lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 752; Morgan v. State of New York, 229 A.D.2d 737, affd in part, revd in part on other grounds 90 N.Y.2d 471; Slutzky v. Cuomo, 114 A.D.2d 116, appeal dismissed 68 N.Y.2d 663), we will not, by implication, expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over defendant where the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously delineated its scope (see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74; People v. Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d 834, 837, 752 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424; De Coste v. Champlain Val. Physicians Hosp., 147 A.D.2d 793, 795, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 604).
The corporation's name was changed at the time of the 1974 revision to Education Law article 14 (see, L 1974, ch 942). Contrary to defendant's assertion, those cases dealing with public authorities (see, e.g., Matter of Dormitory Auth. [Span Elec. Corp.], 18 N.Y.2d 114; Story House Corp. v State of N Y Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, affd 31 N.Y.2d 942) do not compel a different result. First, the entities that defendant refers to were established by the Public Authorities Law as public benefit corporations (see, Public Authorities Law § 1675 et seq.; § 1800 et seq.) and, unlike NYSHESC, were not made part of any existing State agency. Second, public benefit corporations have the authority to issue bonds, making their fiscal autonomy from the State apparent (see, Matter of Dormitory Auth. [Span Elec. Corp.], supra, at 117-118).
The State's sovereign immunity from suit has been waived only to the extent of permitting such claims to be adjudicated in the Court of Claims (Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374; Belscher v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 45 A.D.2d 206, 208; and see Matter of T.P.K. Constr. Corp. v. O'Shea, 69 A.D.2d 316; Olmstead v. Britton, 48 A.D.2d 536, 538). The State Department of Health is not a separate legal entity as are some State-created public corporations (see Grace Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 44 N.Y.2d 84; Cole v. State of New York, 64 A.D.2d 1023; Story House Corp. v. State of New York Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, affd 31 N.Y.2d 942; see Public Authorities Law, § 1002), but is a branch of the State government (Public Health Law, § 200). As such, disputes with it with respect to fair compensation must be adjudicated in the Court of Claims (see Public Health Law, § 401).
(Cf. Matter of Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y. [Span Elec. Corp.], 18 N.Y.2d 114; Story House Corp. v State of New York Job Development Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, affd 31 N.Y.2d 942; Public Authorities Law, §§ 1263, 1264, 1265, 1276.) Section 1276 Pub. Auth. of the Public Authorities Law requires a tort action against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues and a notice of claim to be served on the authority within the time limited and in compliance with all the requirements of section 50-e Gen. Mun. of the General Municipal Law.
In other cases, courts have undertaken an analysis of the public corporation's functions and enabling legislation to determine whether the business of the corporation “is so closely linked with State functions as to be essentially the State itself” ( Belscher v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 45 A.D.2d 206, 208, 357 N.Y.S.2d 241 [4th Dept. 1974] ). For example, in Story House Corp. v. State of N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, 349, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 [3d Dept. 1971], affd. 31 N.Y.2d 942, 340 N.Y.S.2d 929, 293 N.E.2d 97 [1972], an action commenced in Supreme Court regarding the alleged refusal of the New York Job Development Authority to disburse certain loan proceeds, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the Court of Claims did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the Authority. The Court concluded that “[t]he functions—which seem to be the fundamental test in deciding jurisdiction—of this Authority are of such an economic and financial nature and not so closely allied with the State itself as to meet the test that jurisdiction over the Authority attaches to the Supreme Court” ( id., at 349, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 [emphasis added]; see also Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Auth., 255 App.Div. 426, 429, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 [3d Dept. 1938]
In other cases, courts have undertaken an analysis of the public corporation's functions and enabling legislation to determine whether the business of the corporation "is so closely linked with State functions as to be essentially the State itself" (Belscher v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 45 AD2d 206, 208 [4th Dept 1974]). For example, in Story House Corp. v State of N.Y. Job Dev. Auth. (37 AD2d 345, 349 [3d Dept 1971], affd 31 NY2d 942 [1972]), an action commenced in Supreme Court regarding the alleged refusal of the New York Job Development Authority to disburse certain loan proceeds, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the Court of Claims did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the Authority. The Court concluded that "[t]he functions - which seem to be the fundamental test in deciding jurisdiction - of this Authority are of such an economic and financial nature and not so closely allied with the State itself as to meet the test that jurisdiction over the Authority attaches to the Supreme Court" (id., at 349 [emphasis added]; see also Pantess v Saratoga Springs Auth., 255 App Div 426, 429 [3d Dept 1938] [The Court of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the Saratoga Springs Authority, the function of which was found to be "not so closely allied or held in such intimate relation to the health activities carried on by the State itself as to make its work a part of the health work carried on directly
" [T]he issue of whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over legislatively created quasi-governmental entities is frequently a vexing question, replete with potential pitfalls for even assiduous attorneys" (Pandolph v State of New York, 155 Misc.2d 612, 613 [1992]). Generally, a public corporation which enjoys an independent existence separate and apart from the State may not be sued in the Court of Claims absent legislation specifically conferring jurisdiction in that forum (Story House Corp. v State of N. Y. Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, 349 [1971], affd 31 N.Y.2d 942 [1972]; Plath v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 304 A.D.2d 885 [2003]; Gembala v Audobon Assn., 97 A.D.2d 345, 346 [1983]; Cole v State of New York, 64 A.D.2d 1023 [1978]). Although public authorities are corporate bodies created by the State, they " are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to function with a freedom and flexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board, department or commission" (Matter of Levy v City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 N.Y.2d 740, 744 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & A. C. Contrs. Assn. v New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420, 423 [1959]).
"[T]he issue of whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over legislatively created quasi-governmental entities is frequently a vexing question, replete with potential pitfalls for even assiduous attorneys" ( Pandolph v State of New York, 155 Misc 2d 612, 613). Generally, a public corporation which enjoys an independent existence separate and apart from the State may not be sued in the Court of Claims absent legislation specifically conferring jurisdiction in that forum ( Story House Corp. v State of N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 37 AD2d 345, 349, affd 31 NY2d 942; Plath v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 304 AD2d 885; Gembala v Audobon Assn., 97 AD2d 345, 346; Cole v State of New York, 64 AD2d 1023). Although public authorities are corporate bodies created by the State, they "are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to function with a freedom and flexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board, department or commission" ( Matter of Levy v City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 NY2d 740, 744 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping A.C. Contrs. Assn. v New York State Thruway Auth., 5 NY2d 420, 423).