Further, at oral argument, the Debtor raised, for the first time, the issue that the continued prosecution of the foreclosure proceedings interfered with the Debtor's right, as lessee, to redeem the property. The Court has no obligation to address this unbriefed issue but will briefly note that, although "a lessee has a right to redeem[,]" Storrs v. Pannone, 113 Conn. 328, 331, 155 A. 234 (1931), a tenant with an unrecorded lease is not entitled to a law day. City of Bridgeport v. 2284 Corp., Inc., 63 Conn. App. 624, 62627, 778 A.2d 222, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 904, 782 A.2d 136 (2001); Conn. Practice Book § 1069. Perhaps most salient, no such law days have passed or even been set.
She further contends that the owners of other lots in the restricted tract have the right to enforce these restrictions as against the lot sold to her by the defendant, with the consequence that there has been a breach of the covenant against encumbrances in its deed to her. A valid restriction upon the use of real estate is an encumbrance, Storrs v. Pannone, 113 Conn. 328, 331, 155 A. 234, and may constitute a breach of the covenant against encumbrances. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d Ed.) § 452, p. 1685. The restrictions in the Weed modifying agreement and the deeds of the defendant were imposed in pursuance of a general plan of development of the restricted tract, and constitute negative easements which may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee, each parcel becoming both a dominant and a servient tenement.
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Storrs v. Pannone, 113 Conn. 328, 332, 155 A. 234 (1931). Valeri, however, argues that his alleged lack of authority to bind 12 Downs Street is irrelevant to the analysis because "the [v]ariance does not bind the owner of 12 Downs Street to anything.
This they did not do. That they broke their agreement with the plaintiff, there can be no doubt. Musial et ux vs. Kudlik, 87 Conn. 164.Storrs vs. Pannone, 113 Conn. 328, 331. Plaintiff further claims that the defendants broke the contract in that on June 1, 1936, they were not able to convey a marketable title to the building on the premises, because it encroached upon the land east of it, and because the building on such adjoining land encroached on the defendants' land, and because the building of the defendants had no easterly wall.