In the absence of truly ambiguous policy language, though, consideration of an insured's expectations about coverage is limited to cases where "a policy is so constructed that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it." Storms v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 429-30, 388 A.2d 578, 580 (1978). This rule originated in reaction to unnecessarily complex and confusing insurance policies which hid important qualifications or limitations under an avalanche of verbiage.

Reliance is unreasonable when the party asserting estoppel, at the time of his or her reliance or at the time of the representation or concealment, knew or should have known that the conduct or representation was either improper, materially incorrect or misleading. See Olszak v. Peerless Ins. Co., supra at 690-91, 406 A.2d at 715; Town of Nottingham v. Lee Homes, Inc. supra; Storms v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 432, 388 A.2d 578, 581 (1978); Town of Rye v. McMahon, 117 N.H. 857, 861, 379 A.2d 807, 810 (1977); cf. Margolis v. Insurance Company, 100 N.H. 303, 308, 125 A.2d 768, 772 (1956) (reliance on non-action is unreasonable when there is no duty to act or disclose by the non-actor). Each element of estoppel requires a factual determination.

The difficulties created by ambiguous policy language, conflicting provisions, and complex forms have been illustrated in recent cases before this court. See Shea v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 120 N.H. 106, 411 A.2d 1118 (1980); Storms v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 388 A.2d 578 (1978). In general, the rules governing the construction and interpretation of written contracts apply with equal force to insurance policies.

We reaffirm the vitality of the "reasonable expectations rule." E.g., New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Schofield, 119 N.H. 692, 406 A.2d 715 (1979); Hanover Insurance Co. v. Grondin, 119 N.H. 394, 402 A.2d 174 (1979); Storms v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 118 N.H. 427, 430, 388 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1978); Magulas v. Travelers Insurance Co., 114 N.H. 704, 706, 327 A.2d 608, 609 (1974). Peerless contends, nevertheless, that the present case is distinguishable from Atwood, because in Atwood there was no indication of dual agency, and because the insurer's agent in Atwood had not discussed with the insured the fact that the insured would not be covered once he left his job, and further because it had never occurred to the agent that the insured was not covered by the policy.

Moreover, as we have recognized these policies usually are imposed on the consumer on a take-or-leave-it basis. . . . The pretense that the parties had bargained for the resulting contract of insurance is an absurdity. Storms v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 118 N.H. 427, 429, 430, 388 A.2d 578, 580 (1978). The policy in the present case is entitled "Comprehensive General Liability Insurance" and is seventeen pages long.

"If a policy is so constructed that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it, the insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by the policy language, regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among the Augean stable of print." Storms v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 430, 388 A.2d 578, 580 (1978). In the case before us the master found that, had the defendant's officers read the policy, they "would have noted that the actual rate [would be] determined at the close of the policy year and that the selling agent had no authority to determine rates."

[T]he rule in this state has long been that the policy should be considered as a whole in the light of all the circumstances and interpreted as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand it. However in so doing it is fair to interpret the policy in the light of what a more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured. Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors, Inc., 109 N.H. 120, 125, 244 A.2d 64, 67 (1968) (citations omitted); accord, Storms v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 430, 388 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1978); Atwood v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636, 637, 365 A.2d 744, 746 (1976); Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaChance, 115 N.H. 487, 488, 343 A.2d 642, 643 (1975). In applying the "reasonable expectation rule," we have held that "it is well settled that the interpretation of an insurance policy is for the court," Sun Ins. Co. v. Hamanne, 113 N.H. 319, 321, 306 A.2d 786, 788 (1973), and that "the court will honor the reasonable expectations of the policy holder."

The "Guaranteed Insurability" rider is short and refreshingly lucid, and even a cursory reading could not fail to reveal the 60-day waiting period. Cf. Storms v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 118 N.H. 427, 430-31, 388 A.2d 578, 581 (1978). There is, incidentally, no evidence that Stephen did not read the policy; and if he did read it he could not have been misled by the agent's failure to mention the waiting period, even if the period had been material to him.

Hatch also argues that even if the language of the policy is read to exclude coverage, his reasonable expectations of coverage must be honored because the policy "is so constructed that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it." Storms v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 430, 388 A.2d 578, 580 (1978); Titan Holdings Syndicate, supra, 898 F.2d at 270. The court disagrees.

An agreement to rescind an insurance contract is itself a contract. Storms v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 118 N.H. 427, 431 (1978). In order for a contract to be formed there must be a meeting of the minds.