State courts, closer to the problems of administering the rule I suggest, have widely though that those burdens are not substantial. See, e.g., Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App. 1970); People v. Baze, 43 Ill.2d 298, 253 N.E.2d 392 (1969); State v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969); Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1970); State v. Rentschler, 444 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1969); Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971); Denny v. State, 47 Wis.2d 541, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970).The Court's conclusion that Pearce was not foreshadowed by decisions in this Court or by a trend of lower court decisions is somewhat misleading.

At any rate our decisions would not bind the Florida state courts. See Bradshaw v. State, 286 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919, 94 S.Ct. 2626, 41 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App. 1970). Even the state, in opposition to the appellant's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of incompetent counsel under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, argued that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because "Florida cases are legion in holding that in post-conviction relief cases one may not contest the competency of privately retained counsel."

Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). See also Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (of even more importance, it is axiomatic that a decision of a Federal trial court, while persuasive if well reasoned, is not by any means binding on the courts of a state); Mora v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 913 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (In the realm of federal statutory law, decisions of federal circuit courts are persuasive, but state courts are bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court).Second, several District Courts of Appeal, including the First District, have addressed and upheld the constitutionality of section 893.13, Fla. Stat., as amended by section 893.101, Fla. Stat., to eliminate knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances as an element of the offense.

Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972). We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, in Miami Health Studios, Inc. v. The City of Miami Beach, 353 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.Fla., 1973), wherein that court determined that the lewdness provision of Section 796.07 was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite; however, decisions by United States District Courts when well-reasoned are at the most persuasive and are not controlling in matters before us. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935), Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App. 1st 1970). In addition to assigning as error the trial judge's finding that the aforecited statutes were constitutional, appellant assigned as error the court's acceptance of his plea of nolo contendere.

It is axiomatic that a decision of a federal trial court, while persuasive if well-reasoned, is not by any means binding on the courts of a state. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App.1st, 1970). See also Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954); 8 Fla. Jur., Courts, §§ 173, 175.

In Stonom v. Wainwright a more severe sentence imposed on defendant by a second judge after retrial, was set aside by the District Court stating: 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App.1st 1970). Id. at 546.

Upon consideration of the petition, the return and jurisdictional brief of the respondent, we find that the writ was improvidently issued. The writ is discharged but without prejudice to petitioner's right to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in the light of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App.1st 1970); and Shedrick v. State, 235 So.2d 57 (Fla.App.4th 1970). It is so ordered.