Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-245, C/W 02-2455, SECTION: E/2
September 19, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' liability expert report and to exclude the liability expert's testimony (r.d. 43), and plaintiffs' motion in limine regarding collateral source evidence (r.d. 46). All motions are opposed. The motions were submitted on the briefs at an earlier date. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' liability expert report and to exclude the liability expert's testimony is granted, and plaintiffs' motion in limine regarding collateral source evidence is denied.
BACKGROUND
This is an action for damages for personal injuries that plaintiff Douglas W. Stonicher (Stonicher) alleges he suffered on June 24, 2001, while working for Halliburton Energy Services on a fixed offshore platform off the Louisiana coast. He fell while attempting to descend stairs leading from the well-side pipe panel storage system on the main deck of the platform. Chevron designed and built the pipe panel storage platform, but International Snubbing Services (ISS) constructed the stairway on which Stonicher fell.
The four step stairway unit was installed by securing a length of angle iron onto the top surface of the structural I beam at the end of the pipe panel storage platform. The the angle iron rested on top of the surface of the I beam, creating an overhang with an uneven surface at the top of the stairway. Stonicher alleges that he tripped and fell on the uneven surface when he attempted to negotiate the stairs while carrying several wrenches in one hand.
ANALYSIS
1. Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' expert report and testimony.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs introduction of expert testimony. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The rule requires the trial judge to ensure that expert testimony or evidence presented to the jury is not only relevant, but reliable.Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). However, the touchstone of whether a witness may testify as an expert under Rule 702 is whether the witness would be helpful to the trier of fact, not to the party's case. Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs hired Stephen A. Killingsworth, a mechanical engineer with expertise, according to plaintiffs, in designing stairways like the one at issue. In his report, he opines that (1) the overall design of the pipe storage panel system was defective because it did not incorporate a stairway in the initial design; (2) the pipe storage panel system did not have a proper drip pan and/or drainage system; (3) an elevated and graded walkway should have been provided for each pipe storage panel section on the platform; and (4) that the stairway was defective because the use of the angle iron to connect the stairway to the main beam of the pipe storage panel created a trip and slip hazard.
Defendants do riot challenge Killingsworth's credentials. They argue that expert testimony would not be helpful to a jury which must only determine whether or not a particular stairway poses a trip hazard. According to defendants, that determination does not require explanations based on the principles of mechanical engineering because the answer can be determined by a jury's common experience and understanding.
Plaintiffs' argue that the expert testimony need not be necessary, but need only be relevant to assist the trier of fact in determining the liability issues. Plaintiffs also argue that any conclusion that the Court draws about the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert report and testimony should apply equally to the defendants' expert reports and testimony.
Both Chevron and ISS have submitted expert reports dealing with the same subject matter as plaintiffs' expert report.
Killingsworth's report and opinions go beyond the liability issue that will be decided by the jury: whether or not the angle iron resting on top of the I beam to which it is attached constitutes a trip hazard on the stairs. Stonicher does not claim to have "slipped and fallen in any liquid that may have accumulated on a poorly drained pipe storage panel, nor that he tripped and fell while walking across the panel platform. He simply claims he tripped and fell while attempting to descend the stairs. The expert testimony of either plaintiffs' or defendants' mechanical and petroleum engineers will not be helpful to the jury's determination of whether or not that particular stair posed a trip hazard. The Court agrees with plaintiffs to the extent that all expert reports and testimony on the issue should be stricken.
2. Plaintiffs' motion in limine regarding collateral source evidence.
The collateral source rule is a substantive rule of law that bars a tortfeasor from reducing the quantum of damages owed to a "plaintiff by the" amount of recovery the plaintiff receives from other sources of compensation that are independent of (or collateral to) the tortfeasor. Married to this substantive rule is an evidentiary rule that proscribes introduction of evidence of collateral benefits out of a concern that such evidence might prejudice the jury. [Footnotes omitted.]Davis v. Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1243 (5th Cir. 1994). However, a narrow exception to the collateral source rule allows admission of collateral source evidence in certain circumstances:
If there is little likelihood of prejudice and no strong potential for improper use, and a careful qualifying jury instruction is given, the [a collateral source] may be admissible for the limited purpose of proving another matter.Global Petrotech, Inc. v. Engelhard Corporation, 58 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Simmons v. Hoegh Lines, 784 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to introduce evidence that Stonicher is receiving medical and disability benefits from his private insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and not from his worker's compensation insurer, as proof that his injuries are not work related. Plaintiffs argue that Stonicher's receipt of private insurance benefits is not an admission that his injuries are not work related, and there is substantial "evidence explaining why he is receiving his private insurance benefits rather that worker's compensation benefits, with the knowledge of his employer, and that his injuries are indeed work related. He argues that his worker's compensation claim against his employer, Halliburton, is presently pending before an Administrative Law Judge, that Halliburton approved his application for benefits from his private insurer pending resolution of his worker's compensation claim, and that he has never claimed "to any doctor or insurer that his injuries were not work related.
The dispute ultimately goes to the weight of the evidence, an issue for the fact finder. Defendants are entitled to introduce evidence of the fact that Stonicher is receiving private insurance benefits as a defense to the issue of defendants' liability for Stonicher's injuries, but not the amount of those benefits or any suggestion that any damages awarded to him should be reduced because he has received private (or any other) insurance benefits. Likewise, plaintiffs are entitled to introduce rebuttal evidence showing the facts and circumstances surrounding Stonicher's receipt of benefits from his private insurer, and any other evidence that his injuries are in fact work related. With a qualifying jury instruction, under the facts surrounding the collateral source benefits in this case, the court concludes that there is little likelihood of prejudice to plaintiffs and no strong potential for improper use of the evidence of Stonicher's receipt of the private insurance benefits.
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' liability expert report and to exclude liability expert's testimony is GRANTED; likewise, defendants' liability experts' reports and testimony on the same issue are excluded; and, plaintiffs' motion in limine regarding collateral source evidence is DENIED.