A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Stone v. United States, 258 F. App'x 784, 787 (2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).
James A. STONE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.Case below, 258 Fed.Appx. 784. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Stone v. United States, 258 F. App'x 784, 787 (2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). When a defendant argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective, a court applies the Strickland standard.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Stone v. United States, 258 F. App'x 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).
"Post-arrest silence also may not be used against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence." (Stone v. United States (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787, citing to Doyle, at p. 611.) "The Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: '[The] use of silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair . . .
"Post-arrest silence also may not be used against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence." (Stone v. United States (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787, citing to Doyle, supra, at p. 611.) "The Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: '[The] use of silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair . because "Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him
" 'Post-arrest silence also may not be used against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence.' [Citation.]" (Stone v. United States (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 118.) "The Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: '[The] use of silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair . . . because "Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him. . . . Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances.
" ( People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 203 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 384, 232 P.3d 32]; see also People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 856 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15].) "`Post-arrest silence also may not be used against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence.'" ( Stone v. U.S. (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787.) "The Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: `[The] use of silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair . . . because " Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him. . . . Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances.
"Post-arrest silence also may not be used against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence." (Stone v. United States (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787.) "The Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: [The] use of silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair... because "Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him....