Opinion
24A-CR-481
10-28-2024
Donald Stone, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jane Spencer Craney, Judge The Honorable James Kevin Snyder, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No. 49D28-2109-F4-28482
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAKER, SENIOR JUDGE.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Donald Stone appeals the trial court's determination that he is an habitual offender. He claims the State failed to prove its case. The State concedes the evidence it submitted at trial is insufficient. Consequently, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the habitual offender sentencing enhancement.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2021, the State charged Stone with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. The State further alleged Stone qualified for an habitual offender sentencing enhancement ("the enhancement").
[¶3] The jury determined Stone was guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm and unlawfully possessing a syringe. Stone waived his right to a jury for the remaining phases of his trial. The trial court determined Stone was a serious violent felon and an habitual offender. The court imposed a sentence, including the enhancement, and this appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] Stone claims the State failed to prove that he is eligible for the enhancement. We consider this claim as we would any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264-65 (Ind. 2015) (discussing sufficiency of evidence standards of review for habitual offender sentencing enhancements and credit restricted felon designations). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Lakes v. State, 224 N.E.3d 373, 374 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). "We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id. We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[¶5] The State may obtain an enhancement by proving a defendant "has accumulated the required number of prior unrelated felony convictions[.]" Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(a) (2017). In Stone's case, the State concedes the two prior felonies it alleged Stone had committed "are not 'unrelated' as defined by the statute." Appellee's Br. p. 9. The State further concedes that the enhancement should be reversed. In light of the State's concession, we need not further extend our analysis.
Conclusion
[¶6] For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to vacate the habitual offender sentencing enhancement and amend the sentencing order and abstract of judgment accordingly.
[¶7] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.