Stone v. Rosen

23 Citing cases

  1. Alan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    604 F. App'x 863 (11th Cir. 2015)   Cited 30 times
    Setting forth the standard for defamation per se

    For the sake of maintaining the high standards of the profession and disciplining those who violate the Canons of Legal Ethics, one who elects to enjoy the status and benefits as a member of the legal profession must give up certain rights or causes of action which, in this instance, is the right to file an action against a complainant who lodges an unsuccessful complaint with the Grievance Committee of The Florida Bar.Id. (quoting Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977)). The Court emphasized "strong public policy reasons for encouraging individuals with knowledge of attorney misconduct to step forward and present such evidence" so that the Court can accomplish its disciplinary duties, even though some individuals may occasionally file "groundless or baseless complaints." Id. at 977.

  2. Ritchie v. Dolman

    20-CV-61047-CANN/STRAUSS (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Defendants' second argument - that Dolman's Bar complaint is entitled to “absolute privilege” - also does not merit dismissal. Defendants cite to Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975 (Fla. 1998), and the earlier decision of Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), for the proposition that a citizen's complaint to the Bar is entitled to an absolute privilege that shields the complainant from civil liability based on that complaint. (DE 54 at 8-9).

  3. Tobkin v. Jarboe

    710 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 14 times
    In Tobkin, a client filed a complaint letter with the Florida Bar alleging that her attorney, Donald Tobkin, engaged in professional misconduct.

    After The Florida Bar Grievance Committee unanimously found no probable cause to believe that Tobkin was guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action, Tobkin filed a civil action against the Jarboes alleging libel stemming from the Jarboes' complaint letters to the Bar. The trial court dismissed Tobkin's fourth amended complaint with prejudice finding that Tobkin had failed to present facts sufficient to state a cause of action for defamation in Florida. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Tobkin's complaint holding that statements made to The Florida Bar in a complaint are protected by an absolute privilege under Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Stone involved circumstances similar to those presented in the instant case.

  4. The Florida Bar re Amend. to the Rules

    558 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    While we believe that the amendments removing the gag rule should be applied retroactively, we decline to retroactively apply those provisions opening disciplinary files to public inspection for several reasons. First, in many cases information contained in the file was given under the belief that the information would remain confidential and that the complaint would have absolute immunity. See, e.g., Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (complainant has absolute immunity from liability arising out of making a grievance complaint). It would be unfair to now change the rules after the fact and open those records to the public. The publication of the confidential information in those files could subject a complainant to a possible suit for libel and slander.

  5. Feldman v. Glucroft

    522 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1988)   Cited 22 times
    Discussing an analogous pleading requirement

    This type of immunity is not unusual. There is an absolute, rather than a qualified, immunity from defamation actions in all judicial and legislative hearings; moreover, this type of immunity applies in many other professional, licensing, and administrative proceedings. See, e.g., McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428, 431 (Fla. 1966) (statements of public officials in their official capacity); Robertson v. Industrial Insurance Co., 75 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1954) (statements made in license revocation proceedings before the Insurance Commissioner); Lloyd v. Hines, 474 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (statements of state law enforcement agent as witness in criminal trial); Bell v. Gellert, 469 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (statements made in labor grievance complaint which were relevant to that complaint); Farish v. Wakeman, 385 So.2d 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (compelled testimony before a legislative committee); Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (absolute privilege of citizen to make complaint against Florida Bar member); Seidel v. Hill, 264 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (statements introduced in quasi-judicial proceedings such as worker's compensation proceedings); Greene v. Hoiriis, 103 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (statements made in connection with unemployment compensation proceedings). The justification for the immunity in these circumstances is that the necessary information could not otherwise be obtained without this protection.

  6. Halle v. Banner Indus. of N.E., Inc.

    453 S.W.3d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 44 times
    In Halle, the Court of Appeals held that the judicial statements privilege applied only to a defendant’s statements during legal proceedings, not to a defendant’s motives for initiating legal proceedings, and therefore, it did not shield a defendant from abuse of process claims.

    Id. Ultimately, the decision to afford absolute immunity to KBA complainants for the act of filing the complaint was premised on the notion that “one who elects to enjoy the status and benefits as a member of the legal profession must give up certain rights as causes of action....” Id. (quoting Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387, 389 (Fla.App.1977) ).We conclude the Court did not intend its reasoning to extend the privilege to acts other than disciplinary complaints filed with the KBA.

  7. State v. Rutherford

    863 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Id. Thereafter, the attorney filed a civil action against the complainant for defamation, but the case was dismissed. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal based on a finding of absolute privilege under Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Tobkin, 710 So.2d at 975-76. On review, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal concluding that the following reasoning from Stone was sound:

  8. Tobkin v. Jarboe

    695 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that notice requirement does not apply to client who made Bar complaint

    Under Parker v. Gordon, 442 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the dismissal can properly be affirmed on an alternative ground; and we do so. In Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the third district has stated: Members of the legal profession are accorded rights and privileges not enjoyed by the public at large; the acceptance of these carries with it certain responsibilities and obligations to the general public.

  9. Field v. Kearns

    43 Conn. App. 265 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 120 times
    In Field, the Appellate Court of Connecticut granted absolute immunity from vexatious litigation for complaints made in a quasi judicial proceeding about an individual's fitness to practice law.

    In Drummond v. Stahl, 127 Ariz. 122, 618 P.2d 616 (Ariz.App. 1980), the Arizona Appellate Court held that there is an absolute privilege for anyone who files a complaint with the state bar alleging unethical conduct by an attorney. See also Capoccia v. Couch, 134 App. Div.2d 806, 522 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1987); Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complaints, 96 N.J. 669, 477 A.2d 339 (1984); Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla.App. 1977); but cf. Goldstein v. Serio, 496 So.2d 412 (La.App. 1986) (holding absolute privilege not affirmative defense to claims of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). The important public policy involved is to protect the integrity of the court.

  10. State v. Stephens

    586 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 3 times

    long recognized the "tipsy coachman" rule, which states that a trial court should be upheld if it is correct for any reason even though an incorrect reason is given by the trial court for its holding. See Vandergriff v. Vandergriff, 456 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1984); In re Yohn's Estate, 238 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1970); MacNeill v. O'Neal, 238 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1970); Carraway v. Armour Co., 156 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1963); Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1962); Brookridge Community Property Owners, Inc. v. Brookridge, Inc., 573 So.2d 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Taylor v. Orlando Clinic, 555 So.2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), review denied, 567 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1990); Greenbriar Condominium Apartments II Ass'n, Inc. v. Koch, 480 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied, 491 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1986); Citizens Federal Savings Loan Ass'n of St. Lucie County v. Loeb, Rhoades, Hornblower Co., 473 So.2d 679, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Alls v. 7-Eleven Food Stores, Inc., 366 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Stone v. Rosen, 348 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's acquittal of Stephens on the charge of burglary of a conveyance.