Stone v. Johnson

1 Citing case

  1. Busick v. Corporation

    18 A.2d 190 (N.H. 1941)   Cited 12 times

    But the opinion discusses at length the question of liability for the consequences of a breach of a contract, whether or not the breach is a negligent one, and definitely distinguishes the case from one where "special circumstances" charge the defendant "with knowledge of facts from which the likelihood of special damage should be inferred" (Ib. 360). It may be inquired why it was not suggested in the Dustin and Petroski cases that the declarations might be amended by a count for breach of contract, but if a conclusion that the amendment could not be made, might be drawn, it would be of no avail in view of the distinction adopted subsequently in the Barrett case. In Stone v. Johnson, 90 N.H. 311, the distinction set forth in the Barrett case was impliedly recognized through reference to the case between the same parties reported in 89 N.H. 329, the court there (p. 331) saying that the promise to repair was not relied upon by the plaintiff as a condition of her services. If the weight of authority denies recovery on the basis of contractual as well as tortious liability, it would seem to be because of the special features of the relations between landlord and tenant, leading to an exception to the general rule for the allowance for consequential damages for a breach of contract. It is not thought that the special features have sufficient importance to require the adoption of the exception.