Opinion
C/A 1:21-1405-JFA-PJG
02-08-2023
Christopher Stone, Plaintiff, v. Stephan T. Glass; Michael Williams; Brandon Morgan; Michael Hawthorne; Deputy Poindexter, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Christopher Stone filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five Aiken County sheriff's deputies. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 30), and the defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 35). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that the defendants' motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Plaintiff Christopher Stone claims that Aiken County sheriff's deputies used excessive force when they broke Stone's arm and injured his back while detaining him. The incident occurred on May 12, 2018, when the deputies were twice called to an Aiken, South Carolina house to check on the welfare of Stone's ninety-one year-old grandfather, Leroy Bates. Stone was cleaning the house in preparation for remodeling work that day and, because his grandfather had Alzheimer's disease and was confined to a bed or wheelchair, Stone placed his grandfather in the passenger's seat of Stone's truck in the front yard with the airconditioner running.
Stone, Stone's mother, and Stone's grandfather were all present on the scene that day, though it is not clear which members of the family lived at the house.
Defendant Deputies Glass and Poindexter were first called out to the house in the late morning of May 12 by Stone's brother, who was concerned about Bates sitting in the truck. When the deputies arrived to perform a welfare check, Bates was in Stone's truck and Stone was feeding Bates. It is unclear what else happened during that visit, but there was apparently no confrontation between Stone and the deputies; Stone described them as being “nice” to him at that time. (Stone Dep. at 28, ECF No. 25-2 at 11.) Stone also testified that the deputies threatened to detain his brother due to his brother's behavior. (Id.)
Glass wrote an incident report for Stone's arrest that did not mention any involvement by Stone's brother when the deputies were first called to the house. Instead, the incident report indicates that the deputies responded to a report of a “hoarding issue” that was being investigated by Aiken County Code Enforcement and “poor and unsanitary living conditions.” (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, Glass Aff., ECF No. 25-3 at 5.)
The deputies were again called to the house that afternoon by an acquaintance of Stone's family who briefly visited Bates and apparently called 911 upon leaving, reporting that Bates was “unresponsive.” (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, Glass Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 25-3 at 1.) Deputy Glass returned to the house with fellow Defendant Deputies Hawthorne, Williams, and Morgan.
As explained by the defendants (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 25-1 at 18 n.2), Williams has not been served in this case and has not made an appearance.
Much of the rest of the incident was captured on video by the deputies' body cameras.Stone was in the yard at the time holding three of his dogs on leashes. One or two other dogs were also in the yard, but they were unleashed. Some of the dogs were pit bulls, but none of the dogs was barking or acting aggressively. The four deputies approached Stone's truck to check on Bates while EMS personnel arrived in an ambulance. Glass opened the passenger side door and found Bates to be lethargic, slowly lifting his head when Glass spoke to him. Stone walked toward them with the leashed dogs and told the officers “I'm getting tired of my brother's antics, I know he's the one who called y'all so there's no need for all this.” (Morgan Video at 00:00 to 00:09.) Deputy Williams opened the driver's side door of Stone's truck and one of the deputies asked Bates if he was okay. Williams told Stone to “get the hell out of here” and “go on somewhere else” and Stone told the deputies, “Y'all need to get out of my truck.” (Williams Video at 00:24 to 00:29; Morgan Video at 00:10 to 00:12.) Stone yelled for his mother to come out of the house.
The body camera videos submitted to the court as part of Stone's response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment are not labeled. (ECF No. 38.) The court cites to the videos herein based on the deputies' cameras to which the videos appear to correspond.
One of the deputies told Stone to “relax” as Deputy Glass held Bates's wrist (apparently checking for a pulse). (Morgan Video at 00:18 to 00:19.) Stone yelled, “No I'm not going to relax, you touch him I will have your badge!” (Morgan Video at 00:20 to 00:24.) Deputy Glass asserts that at that point he believed Stone was interfering with his attempt to attend to Bates and that Stone posed a physical threat. (Glass Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-3 at 2.) Stone was walking in front of the truck still holding three dogs on leashes with both of his hands, arms raised outward to each side. Glass closed the passenger's side door and Glass and Deputy Morgan approached Stone. One of the deputies told Stone to let go of the dogs and Glass grabbed Stone's shirt and left arm. Stone said that he couldn't let go of the dogs as Glass and Morgan pulled Stone to the ground, face down.
As Glass and Morgan crouched over Stone to handcuff him, one of the dogs attacked Morgan, biting Morgan on the arm and leg until Morgan used his taser on the dog. Glass claims that at this point he observed Stone reach for Morgan's gun belt. (Glass Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-3 at 2.) Stone denies that he reached for a gun, the deputies' body camera videos did not capture any attempt by Stone to reach for a gun, and the deputies did not contemporaneously state that Stone was reaching for a gun. Glass handcuffed Stone's left wrist. Glass and Morgan disengaged from Stone and Stone was able to sit up. Williams took Morgan's place and held Stone in place while Stone held onto the dog's leashes. Stone's mother had approached at that time and was standing among the commotion. Glass told Stone several times to let go of the dogs, but Stone said he could not let go because the dogs would run away.
A few seconds later Williams helped Stone up and Glass and Williams attempted to finish handcuffing Stone. Stone resisted being handcuffed and Glass and Williams forced Stone against the hood of the truck. Stone continued to refuse to cooperate and be handcuffed. Williams had control of Stone's right arm and forced his arm behind his back. Stone then yelled that the deputies broke his arm. Glass and Williams finished handcuffing Stone as Stone yelled again that the deputies broke his arm. Glass and Williams then pulled Stone back onto the ground to control him. Stone again yelled that his arm was broken and Glass stated, “I don't care, you're acting stupid.” (Hawthorne or Poindexter Video at 00:47 to 00:52.) Glass remained on his knees with Stone laying facedown between Glass's legs for several minutes. At one point, Glass lifted his right knee and placed it on Stone's lower back or buttocks for approximately two minutes. During that time, Stone continued to yell about his dogs and the pain from his arm being broken. After approximately fifty minutes of Stone laying and then sitting up on the ground, the deputies took Stone into custody.
Stone was charged with breach of peace, a violation of a county ordinance, and three counts of third-degree assault and battery. Stone pled guilty to the breach of peace and assault and battery charges and was found guilty of the county ordinance violation after a bench trial. Stone now brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the deputies used excessive force against him to effect the arrest. The parties indicate Stone also filed a “companion” case in state court, but they do not provide any explanation about that lawsuit.
The record does not reveal what ordinance Stone was charged with having violated.
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants assert that Stone also brings claims for false arrest. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 25-1 at 2.) However, only one cause of action is listed in the Complaint-excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3-4.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. The Defendants' Motion
The defendants argue that even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Stone, their use of force was objectively reasonable, and therefore, as a matter of law, they did not violate Stone's Fourth Amendment rights. The defendants also argue that, even assuming they used objectively unreasonable force, they are entitled to qualified immunity because case law did not establish at that time that the use of force in this particular situation violated the Fourth Amendment.
Stone files this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id. at 235, 242.
In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case-that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted-then the law affords immunity from suit.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
[a] Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (first alteration added). In analyzing this prong, a court in this district must first look to case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the South Carolina Supreme Court, and in the absence of binding authority, the court must next consider whether the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority. Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017). The “salient question” “ ‘is whether the state of the law' at the time of an incident provided ‘fair warning' to the defendants ‘that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.' ” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Moreover, “[w]hen a court addresses qualified immunity in the summary judgment context, it can condense its analysis.” Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). The court need not determine directly whether the plaintiff's evidence shows a constitutional violation, because it can combine the two prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry by asking whether “the plaintiff has ‘allege[d] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.' ” Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)) (alteration in original). If so, the court must then determine whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was illegal. Id. (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (1995)). The Fourth Circuit has described this inquiry as whether “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates” the Constitution. Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). “Although the exact conduct at issue need not have been held unlawful for the law governing an officer's actions to be clearly established, the existing authority must be such that the unlawfulness of the conduct is manifest.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)).
2. Excessive Force Standard
A claim that a law enforcement officer has used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person is properly analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). The Fourth Amendment test is an objective one; however, it is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. Id. at 396-97. It requires the court to determine “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397; see also Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 884-85 (4th Cir. 2016); Yarborough v. Montgomery, 554 F.Supp.2d 611, 617 (D.S.C. 2008). The court must balance “ ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion.” Yarborough, 554 F.Supp.2d at 617 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); see also Yates, 817 F.3d at 884-85.
Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the force used was objectively reasonable. Yates, 817 F.3d at 885. Therefore, application of this standard “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). In Graham, the Supreme Court established several factors to consider, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Yates, 817 F.3d at 885 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts also consider the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2019). Courts must view the evidence “ ‘in full context, with an eye toward the proportionality of the force' in light of all the circumstances.” Yates, 817 F.3d at 883 (quoting Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994)). “The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
3. Application of the Graham Factors
The first two Graham factors-the severity of the crime and Stone's threat to the safety of the deputies and others-weigh heavily in favor of Stone. The factors warrant discussion in tandem because the deputies' perception that Stone was a threat to their safety was their purported basis for detaining him. The deputies were called to the scene with EMS to perform a welfare check on Stone's grandfather. Though the deputies were not performing a typical law enforcement function, the deputies had a rational government interest in their use of force to aid their response to a call for medical care. See, e.g., Ames v. King Cnty., Washington, 846 F.3d 340, 348 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that officers had a substantial government interest in using force even in their “community caretaking” capacity); United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In the course of exercising this noninvestigatory function, a police officer may have occasion to seize a person, as the Supreme Court has defined the term for Fourth Amendment purposes, in order to ensure the safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity.”).
However, the record here simply does not support the defendants' argument that they needed to use the amount of force they employed to detain Stone so that they could perform the welfare check. In his affidavit, Glass swears that the EMS personnel had unspecified “security concerns” and noted that when he arrived Stone was holding several leashed dogs and other unleashed dogs were in the yard. Glass also swears that while he was checking on Stone's grandfather in the truck, Stone was moving toward the truck with the dogs and told Glass “Don't you fucking touch him.” (Glass Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-3 at 2.) Glass swears that he viewed Stone's actions as “threatening” and that Glass believed Stone posed a physical threat to the safety of EMS personnel and the deputies.
The deputies' own body cameras call Glass's assertions into question, and a reasonable jury could conclude that Glass had no rational basis upon which he could view Stone as a threat to anyone's safety. Glass notably never specifies how Stone was a threat. Glass claims EMS personnel had “security concerns,” but the EMS personnel arrived at the scene while Glass confronted Stone. In his affidavit, Glass repeatedly mentions the dogs, but Glass does not state that the dogs were barking, showing their teeth, or otherwise being aggressive with the deputies, and the deputies' body camera videos show the dogs milling about the yard and not bothering anyone. Stone verbally and loudly challenged the deputies, telling them to not touch his grandfather or risk professional consequences, but the videos do not reflect that Stone used profanity as Glass remembers it, and Stone did not threaten the deputies physically. Stone was approaching the deputies as they approached the truck and Stone's grandfather, but Stone was walking slowly with his hands full of leashed dogs, and at the time Glass and Morgan tackled him, Stone was standing in front of the truck out of reach of the deputies attending to his grandfather and had moved away from the deputy who told him to “get the hell out of here and go on somewhere else.” (Williams video 00:24 to 00:44). Stone never attempted to get in between the deputies and the truck, nor did he physically impede the officers from checking on his grandfather. Ironically, Glass stopped tending to Stone's grandfather only when he decided to detain Stone. Thus, even though the deputies had a substantial interest in securing the scene to tend to Stone's grandfather, the record does not support Glass's assertion that Stone was a threat to anyone's safety, including Stone's grandfather. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Witt v. W. Virginia State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that when documentary evidence, such as a video, “blatantly contradicts a plaintiff's account so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not credit the plaintiff's version on summary judgment”) (internal alterations and quotations omitted) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380).
The defendants argue that Stone conceded that he was a threat to the officers. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 25-1 at 11.) In Stone's deposition, Stone was asked if it was reasonable for the deputies to perceive Stone as a “potential threat” because Stone lost his temper and Stone agreed. (Stone Dep. at 39, ECF No. 25-2 at 22.) However, Stone has clearly not conceded that point in his briefing (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 30 at 8), and his answer to a general question in his deposition does not amount to a concession on a point of law. See generally United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating “opinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible,” but witnesses may testify to their own knowledge of events using language that has common meanings distinct from their specialized legal meaning). Assuming without deciding that Stone's testimony is admissible, his testimony may create a question of fact, but it cannot be understood as a concession on a point of law.
The defendants argue that Stone was angry, and therefore the deputies reasonably perceived that Stone was a threat. Stone admits he lost his temper, which may reasonably have provided the deputies with justification to detain Stone for the purpose of removing him from the scene. See, e.g., Joseph v. Donahue, 392 F.Supp.3d 973, 989-90 (D. Minn. 2019) (finding officers reasonably detained a belligerent and confrontational person who impeded their investigation). But Stone's temper alone cannot justify throwing him to the ground or breaking his arm. See, e.g., City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987) (“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.”). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Stone, a reasonable jury could conclude that the deputies' use of force in taking him to the ground and forcibly handcuffing him was excessive.
The third Graham factor-whether Stone was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight-weighs in Stone's favor, but much less so than the first factors. The deputies did not tell Stone that he was under arrest or that he was being detained. Rather, Glass approached Stone and told him to let go of his dogs, without explaining why Stone should do so. Glass also immediately grabbed Stone by the shirt, and as Stone told Glass that he could not let go of the dogs (later explaining he was afraid they would run away), Glass and Morgan tackled Stone to the ground. As the Fourth Circuit has previously explained, a suspect does not resist or evade arrest merely by instinctively moving away from an arresting officer. See, e.g., Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 102 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding the third Graham factor strongly favored the plaintiff who was grabbed by the officer without warning or explanation and “instinctively attempt[ed] to pull herself from his grasp); Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that evidence showing that the plaintiff “resisted only to the extent of instinctively trying to protect himself” from the officer's actions weighed in the plaintiff's favor). Stone was not told he was being detained or that he was under arrest and Glass began to tackle him before he could respond to Glass's request to let go of the dogs. Therefore, Stone cannot be said to have been uncooperative, evasive, or resisting when Glass and Morgan tackled Stone to the ground.
On the other hand, the undisputed record shows that, as the moments passed, Stone's refusal to be handcuffed became active, forceful resistance rather than instinctive reticence. While on the ground, Stone refused to let go of the dog's leashes, even after his mother had come out of the house and tried to take the leashes from him. Stone then refused to comply with the deputies' orders by trying to move his arms out of a position to be handcuffed, while Glass and Williams tried to wrench Stone's arms behind his back. Thus, by the time the deputies broke Stone's arm and took him to the ground a second time, Stone was actively resisting being handcuffed.
Further into the encounter, the deputies continued to use force against Stone, even though he had stopped resisting. The video demonstrates that by the time Glass put his knee in Stone's back (when Stone claims his back injury occurred), Stone was not actively resisting but was merely lying face down on the ground, and could not have stood up under his own power. Therefore, the third Graham factor weighs only slightly in Stone's favor because the record shows that Stone actively resisted being detained during some but not all of the time that the deputies used force against them.
Another factor-severity of the injury-favors Stone. Stone suffered a broken arm and a back injury. Stone testified that a bone in his forearm was snapped in half and required a metal plate be placed in the arm. He also testified that his back injury requires that he walk with a cane and prevents him from standing up for more than a few minutes. (Stone Dep. at 12, 42-43, ECF No. 30-1 at 6, 13-14.) Thus, Stone's injuries were debilitating and lasting. Cf. Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing between “slight” injuries such as mere pain from injuries that are “serious” and “permanent”).
The defendants argue that the case of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, C/A No. 1:06CV135, 2007 WL 9734110, at *8 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 26, 2007), is instructive here. The court disagrees. In Cloaninger, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found that sheriff's deputies did not use excessive force against Cloaninger when they effected his arrest by slamming him to the ground and twisting his arm to handcuff him, causing his arm to break. Though Cloaninger and Stone were on the receiving end of the same type of force and suffered the same injury, the similarities between the cases end there. In Cloaninger, the deputies were dispatched to Cloaninger's house because he was intoxicated and suicidal. Cloaninger, C/A No. 1:06CV135, 2007 WL 9734110, at *10. Cloaninger was ill tempered, irrational, and threatened to take his own life and the deputies' lives. Id. at 3, 10. The deputies had reason to believe Cloaninger had a gun and Cloaninger threated to “blow the officer's heads off.” Id. at 3. The deputies could see only Cloaninger when Cloaninger cracked open the door to his home. Id. at 3-4. The deputies spent a great deal of time negotiating with Cloaninger and consulting doctors and other law enforcement personnel in an attempt to defuse the situation. Id. Eventually, the deputies sought and obtained an emergency order of commitment from a judicial officer, and only then, did the deputies forcefully arrest Cloaninger. Id. at 4. Therefore, the deputies had a judicial order requiring they detain Cloaninger, who was a serious threat to the deputies' lives and himself. By contrast, in the case at bar, Stone was not a threat to the deputies' lives, the deputies did not have a court order requiring Stone's detention, and the deputies tackled Stone within seconds of their encounter rather than attempting to first defuse the situation without the use of force.
Cloaninger was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, but the excessive force issue was not analyzed on appeal. Cloaninger ex rel. Est. of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2009).
The court in Cloaninger did not provide facts about how long the incident played out, but unlike the case at bar, the deputies used force after many minutes, if not hours, of negotiation with Cloaninger.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Stone, Stone committed no crime and posed no physical threat to the deputies or anyone else, yet the deputies twice tackled Stone to the ground, forcibly handcuffed him, and held him face down on the ground for several minutes with a deputy's knee to his back, causing severe and lasting physical injury to Stone's arm and back. Even assuming the deputies had a reasonable governmental interest in detaining Stone after Stone threatened to “have” the deputies' badges, that interest is slight, and the deputies applied force that was grossly disproportionate to their interest in calming down Stone or removing him from the scene. See, e.g., Rowland, 41 F.3d at 174 (“When all the factors are considered in toto, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that a man suffered a serious leg injury over a lost five dollar bill.”). Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Stone, a reasonable jury could conclude that the deputies' use of force was objectively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
As explained by the defendants (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 25-1 at 18 n.2), Deputies Poindexter and Hawthorne were not involved in the use of force against Stone. Therefore, the record irrefutably shows that Deputies Poindexter and Hawthorne are entitled to summary judgment.
4. Clearly Established Law
The defendants argue that the law was not clearly established at the time of incident that their conduct violated a clearly established right. Specifically, they argue that case law does not clearly establish that the use of force is not justified to temporarily detain a person so that EMS personnel can attend to another person or to handcuff a person who is actively resisting. The court disagrees.
Initially, the court notes that the defendants' argument is premised on the assumption that the deputies needed to detain Stone because he was a threat to EMS personnel and the deputies. As previously explained, a reasonable jury could conclude based on the evidence that Stone posed no threat to the deputies and was not impeding EMS personnel from tending to Stone's grandfather. Therefore, the relevant question is whether case law clearly established at the time that it is unreasonable for law enforcement officers to tackle a person and forcibly handcuff him because he verbally challenged their actions? The answer to that question is yes.
As far back as 1994, the Fourth Circuit held that the use of “disabling” force on a non-violent misdemeanant who posed no threat to an officer or anyone else was excessive, even where the suspect attempted to flee and resisted the officer's attempt to handcuff him. Rowland, 41 F.3d 167. In Rowland, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff showed that an officer suspected Rowland of stealing a five-dollar bill that was apparently dropped by a woman at a bus station. Id. at 171. The officer, having already accused the plaintiff of stealing the bill, followed the plaintiff out onto the street after the plaintiff failed to give the bill back to the woman who dropped it. Id. The officer believed the plaintiff was fleeing and grabbed the plaintiff by the collar and “jerked him around.” Id. The plaintiff tried to free himself, but the officer punched the plaintiff and threw him to the ground. Id. The officer then used a wrestling maneuver to throw his weight against the plaintiff's leg, wrenching it until the plaintiff's knee cracked. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that based on those facts, a reasonable jury could find that no reasonable officer could have believed his conduct to be lawful. The Fourth Circuit explained that the plaintiff committed a minor criminal offense (at worst), posed no threat to the officer or anyone else, and his only resistance was to the officer's “onslaught.” Id. at 174.
In 2015, the Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Ray held that a male officer used excessive force when he threw a non-violent (but arguably non-compliant) female misdemeanant to the ground, jumped on her, jammed his full weight into her back with his knee, and painfully twisted her right arm behind her back. Smith, 781 F.3d 95. In Smith, Officer Ray was investigating a missing juvenile and information led him to the plaintiff's home. Id. at 98. The officer began questioning the plaintiff on the stoop of the home. Id. The officer asked the plaintiff if a certain person was in the home, the plaintiff replied that he was and that she would go get him. Id. The plaintiff opened the door to go inside but the officer slammed the door shut and told the plaintiff to “hold on.” Id. The plaintiff was startled and took one step off the stoop but continued facing the officer. Id. The officer, apparently believing the plaintiff intended to flee (which the plaintiff denied), grabbed the plaintiff's arm without explanation. Id. The plaintiff pulled her arm away, asking the officer what he was doing. Id. The officer grabbed her arm again and the plaintiff pulled her arm away again and called the officer, who is white, the n-word. Id. The officer then grabbed the plaintiff and threw her to the ground, jumped on her, jamming his full weight into her back with his knee, and painfully twisted her right arm behind her back. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Especially in light of Rowland, no reasonable officer could have believed that, rather than answer the previously compliant young woman's legitimate question concerning why Ray was suddenly grabbing her, Ray was justified in throwing her to the ground, slamming his knee into her back, and wrenching her arm behind her. Not only did that violent response subject [the plaintiff] to an obvious risk of immediate injury, it also created the very real possibility that, as in Rowland, the attack would continue to meet with frightened resistance, leading to an even further escalation of the violence.... Nor could a reasonable officer believe that [the plaintiff's] initial act of pulling her arm away when Ray grabbed her without warning or explanation justified Ray's decision to throw her down, jam his leg into her back, and wrench her arm behind her.Id. at 103. The Fourth Circuit went on to state that as in Rowland, the weakness of the Graham factors was so apparent that any reasonable officer would have realized that the force employed was excessive. Id. at 106.
Thus, Fourth Circuit case law clearly established by 2018 that tackling, forcibly handcuffing, and sticking a knee in the back of a non-violent and non-threatening misdemeanant violates the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, in the case at bar, the deputies were on notice that tackling Stone, forcibly handcuffing him, and sticking a knee into his back was excessive because he did not pose a threat to anyone's safety and he was not suspected of committing a crime. Thus, the deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to Poindexter and Hawthorne but denied as to Glass and Morgan. (ECF No. 25.) Additionally, because Williams has not been served with process or made an appearance in this case, Williams should be dismissed for lack of service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).