Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder

73 Citing cases

  1. CCMS 2005-CD 1 v. Northland Good.

    2011 Ct. Sup. 18225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

    " Louis Gherlone Excavating Co. v. McLean Construction Co., 274 Conn. 909, 909-10, 876 A.2d 1201 (2005); the appeal was, however, withdrawn. In Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 682 n. 8, 911 A.2d 300 (2006), our Supreme Court stated: "Our conclusion in the present appeal demonstrates our disagreement with the majority in Louis Gherlone Excavating, Inc." The Court went on to state: "[H]ad the legislature intended to require a written recital of the oath within the lien, that requirement could have been included in the text of § 49-34(1)(c).

  2. Cmty. Preservation Corp. v. Paniccia (In re Derby Dev. Corp.)

    Case No.: 10-50259 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 10, 2013)

    It is further emphasized that the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "complete compliance with the statutory requirements" of the state's mechanic's lien statute is required. Stone-Krete Constr., Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 682, 911 A.2d 300, 306 (2006) (further citations omitted). Any one of the following three bases is sufficient to support the conclusion that Mario's Mechanic's Lien was not valid.

  3. TMC Services, Inc. v. Haines.

    2008 Ct. Sup. 3279 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    A copy of the plaintiff's certificate of lien is attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court's decision in Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 911 A.2d 300 (2006) is instructive. In Stone-Krete, the defendant argued that a mechanic's lien failed to comply with the "`subscribed and sworn to' requirements of § 49-34(1)(C) because the lien did not contain a written recital of an oath swearing to the truth of the fact contained in the lien and because the jurat executed by a commissioner of the Superior Court is not sufficient to satisfy the statute."

  4. 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

    336 Conn. 819 (Conn. 2020)   Cited 12 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc . v. Eder , 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). "Although we generally begin with the text of the statute, we note that we are not writing on a clean slate ...."

  5. Sokaitis v. Bakaysa

    293 Conn. 17 (Conn. 2009)   Cited 19 times
    Rejecting "literal reading" of General Statutes § 52-553 voiding "[a]ll ... wagers" that "results in several conflicts with other, more recent, statutes related to legal wagering"

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). Thus, in considering whether § 52-553 is applicable to the parties' contract in the present case, we are bound to consider the existence of other statutes and regulations concerning gambling in order to ensure that our construction of the statute makes sense within the overall legislative scheme.

  6. Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc.

    285 Conn. 716 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Applying plenary review to employees' claim that they were entitled, as matter of law, to double damages and attorney's fees that generally were discretionary under applicable statute

    In other words, the trial court could have failed to award such damages for any number of reasons, such as factual insufficiency or a legal conclusion that such damages were not recoverable under the terms of the promissory note. Alternatively, the trial court simply may have forgotten to address Bartko's claim for such damages. See Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 685, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). "Under these circumstances, the plaintiff should have filed a motion for articulation to preserve an adequate record for review.

  7. 500 N. Ave., LLC v. Planning Comm'n of Stratford

    199 Conn. App. 115 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that "the purpose of the inclusion of ‘parts’ is to elucidate the meaning of the word ‘lots’ " and that "the two words are meant to be read together"

    ...’ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, ‘we look to the dictionary definition of the term.’ ... Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services , 277 Conn. 681, 690, 894 A.2d 919 (2006)." Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder , 280 Conn. 672, 677–78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). Taking into consideration that "[a] statute should be construed so that no word, phrase or clause will be rendered meaningless"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Verrastro v. Sivertsen , 188 Conn. 213, 221, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982) ; the use of the dictionary definition is appropriate where, as here, neither the word "parts" nor "lots" has been defined by the legislature.

  8. 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore

    99 Conn. App. 690 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 51 times
    In 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 915 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007), this court also addressed the meaning of services under the mechanic's lien statutes.

    " The plaintiffs claim requires us to construe the meaning of the term "owner" as used in the aforementioned statutes. Accordingly, our review is de novo. Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 676-77, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

  9. McDonough v. Collender

    2007 Ct. Sup. 15706 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    Citation omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 682 (2006). The Supreme Court in Stone-Krete Construction also noted its "disagreement" with the majority opinion of the Appellate Court in Louis Gherlone Excavating, Inc., supra, which had interpreted Red Rooster Construction Company as requiring a recitation of an oath or the truth of facts in a certificate of mechanic's lien. Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, supra, 280 Conn. 672, note 8.

  10. North Central v. Dept. of Economic

    2007 Ct. Sup. 11297 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)

    In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply." Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 676-77 (2006). "It is axiomatic that we construe a statute in a manner that will not thwart its intended purpose or lead to absurd results. . .