Opinion
C. A. 8:21-3876-TMC-PJG
02-08-2022
Brian Joseph Stoltie, Plaintiff, v. County of Anderson; County of Greenville; Anderson County Sheriff; Greenville County Sheriff; John Doe; Michael Sloan; D. Ledbetter; James Berggrun; Mr./Ms. Kelly; Mr./Ms. McCoy; Mr. Burdine; Timothy McCarley; Robert Smith; Brandon Brewer; J.T. Bowers; Greg Hayden; Cassie Darnell; Heath Davis; Johnny Chandler; Christopher Sellars; Jonathan Velez; Micaela Andres Tomas; Et. Al. Defendants 1-100, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Brian Joseph Stoltie, a self-represented Pennsylvania state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that Plaintiff's claims against all of the defendants except for Timothy McCarley and Greg Hayden should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
In a contemporaneous order the court authorized the issuance and service of process against Defendants Timothy McCarley and Greg Hayden.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in a Pennsylvania state prison. Plaintiff brings this action against various parties who were involved in Plaintiff's April 2019 arrest in South Carolina based on the following allegations. In April 2019, Defendant Micaela Andres Tomas reported to the Greenville County Sheriff's Department that her car was stolen while being driven by her cousin. The cousin claimed that two men in a truck blocked him in at a gas station and stole Tomas's car at gunpoint. Defendants James Berggrun and Kelly, Greenville County Sheriff's Department deputies investigated Tomas's claims. Plaintiff claims Berggrun and Kelly made mistakes in the investigation, such as failing to review the gas station security footage themselves and relying on Tomas's third-party report of the incident.
On the same day that Tomas reported her car stolen, Plaintiff and an “associate” were sitting in a parked car when Defendant Cassie Darnell of the Anderson County Sheriff's Department pulled up behind Plaintiff's car and activated her blue lights. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11.) Out of “fear, ” Plaintiff drove away, which apparently led to a car chase involving multiple law enforcement officers. (Id.) Plaintiff successfully evaded the pursuing officers in the car chase and he and his associate got out of the vehicle and began fleeing on foot into the woods. Law enforcement officers in an unmarked, black SUV found Plaintiff in the woods. Plaintiff claims that he did not know the people in the black SUV were law enforcement officers, so Plaintiff or his associate fired several gunshots into the air in an attempt to scare the officers. Plaintiff began to flee again but found himself surrounded by law enforcement officers, though Plaintiff was unarmed. Plaintiff put his hands in the air to surrender but Plaintiff was shot from behind by Defendant Timothy McCarley of the Anderson County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff claims McCarley did not identify himself as a law enforcement officer and did not give Plaintiff any verbal commands before shooting. Plaintiff also claims that McCarley failed to use a K-9 unit to subdue Plaintiff.
Plaintiff appears to assert that Darnell initiated the traffic stop based on information received from Berggrun and Kelly's investigation (such as a description of the vehicle or the suspects), but this is not clear from the allegations in the Complaint.
The officers held Plaintiff at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and then began to beat him. The officers punched and kicked Plaintiff in the back and ribs and placed pressure on his gunshot wound. The officers found a gun in the woods and planted it near Plaintiff. The officers also removed Plaintiff's wallet but never placed it or its contents into evidence or returned it to him. Defendant Greg Hayden of the Anderson County Sheriff's Department wrote in his incident report that he observed drugs fall from Plaintiff's pocket when they stood him up to get medical treatment, but Plaintiff claims that could not have been true because the officers had already taken his pants off to check for injuries.
The South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”) became involved in the investigation of either Plaintiff's criminal charges or McCarley shooting Plaintiff (it is not clear in the Complaint). Plaintiff claims that SLED investigators, including Defendants McCoy, Burdine, and John Doe, failed to properly investigate, preserve evidence, and report their findings from the crime scene. Plaintiff also claims that the officers did not use body cameras and dash cameras to record the incident.
Plaintiff names a Defendant “John Doe” and a separate Defendant “Et. Al. Defendants 1-100.” When referring to “John Doe, ” the court refers to the Defendant that Plaintiff describes in the Complaint as a SLED investigator. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff brings this action for damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. Plaintiff expressly raises claims of unlawful seizure, excessive force (against Defendant McCarley), and assault and battery. Plaintiff also raises various self-styled causes of action such as “evidence tampering, ” “conspiracy for perjury, ” state law “failure to protect, ” “neglect, ” and “knowingly giving a false report.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 17-18.) Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief in the form of reforms to law enforcement agencies.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff does not expressly state which defendants correspond to the numerous causes of action listed in his Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are generally subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that the Complaint provide a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 where “the complaint . . . does not permit the defendants to figure out what legally sufficient claim the plaintiffs are making and against whom they are making it”). However, in the light of the court's duty to liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se parties, the court has attempted to match the claims raised by Plaintiff with the appropriate defendants. But, even giving the Complaint liberal construction, the court concludes that most of Plaintiff's claims in this case are subject to summary dismissal for the reasons explained below.
1. Sheriff Defendants
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a “person” acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However, states, their agencies, and their officials are not “persons” amenable to suit for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005). In South Carolina, sheriffs are state officials rather than employees of the counties. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (concluding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state and cannot be sued in their official capacities), affd, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (table). Therefore, Defendants Anderson County Sheriff and Greenville County Sheriff are not “persons” amenable to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for damages.
Also, it is not clear whether Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the Sheriff Defendants. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Ex parte Young . . . permits a federal court to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.”). To the extent Plaintiff is pursuing such relief, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a claim. See Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 466 (2001) (“Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the courts' judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States.”) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)). Plaintiff's lone encounter with these sheriff's departments, even if he can prove that his constitutional rights were violated in that encounter, does not provide him with standing to seek prospective injunctive relief to reform law enforcement policies generally. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983) (requiring that a plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief against law enforcement agencies demonstrate that they are more likely than any other citizen to be subjected to the purported unconstitutional conduct in the future to establish standing); see also York v. City of Burlington, 225 F.Supp.3d 341, 350 (M.D. N.C. 2016) (finding that under Lyons, one past incident with law enforcement is not sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of future harm required to establish standing).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise state law tort claims against the Sheriff Defendants, they would be immune from suit. State law tort claims against state agencies must be brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). The Act provides, “This chapter constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity. An employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b).” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). However, under the Act, the State expressly consents to suit only in a South Carolina state court, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e); see also Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at n.9 (1984) (recognizing that a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court). Therefore, because the waiver of immunity extends only to suit in state courts, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act in federal court. See, e.g., Gaskins v. South Carolina, C/A No. 8:15-4456-JMC-JDA, 2016 WL 8677201, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016) (observing that a claim sought to be filed initially in federal court under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act “is not permitted in this federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment”), adopted by 2016 WL 3207855 (D.S.C. June 10, 2016); cf, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (holding that a State that voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court by removing a case waives immunity for claims in which it has consented to suit in its own courts). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the Sheriff Defendants are subject to summary dismissal from this court.
2. County Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Anderson County and Greenville County are also subject to summary dismissal. Plaintiff provides no allegations about these defendants and he does not explain why they are named as defendants in this case. To the extent Plaintiff named the counties because he perceived they are associated with the sheriff's departments located within them, as previously explained, sheriff departments in South Carolina are state officers that are independent of the county governments. See Gulledge, 691 F.Supp. at 954-55. Otherwise, these defendants have no apparent connection to Plaintiff's claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Therefore, the claims against Anderson County and Greenville County are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
3. Individual Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against all of the individual defendants, except for McCarley, Hayden, and certain John Doe Defendants, are also subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Initially, Plaintiff fails to mention Defendants Michael Sloan; Robert Smith; Brandon Brewer; J.T. Bowers; Heath Davis; Johnny Chandler; Christopher Sellars; Jonathan Velez, D. Ledbetter, or “Et. Al. Defendants 1-100” in the body of the Complaint. At most, Plaintiff merely states that these defendants work for one of the law enforcement agencies involved and broadly describes their duties. Like the county defendants, these defendants have no apparent connection to Plaintiff's claims without any allegations that they were involved in the incident described in the Complaint. Therefore, these claims are subject to summary dismissal for Plaintiff's failure to meet even the most basic pleading standards. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As to Defendants Berggrun, Kelly, McCoy, Burdine, and John Doe of SLED, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that these defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to claim that these defendants' investigations of Plaintiff violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the investigations were flawed. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (holding that the State violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when it suppresses evidence favorable to the accused); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the prosecution of the accused without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment); Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) (providing that the fabrication of evidence to secure a conviction deprives the accused of their liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). However, Plaintiff provides no allegations that these defendants took any action that is prohibited by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. For instance, Plaintiff claims the defendants made mistakes such as not personally reviewing security camera video or relying on third-party testimony about the carjacking, but such allegations do not show that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or fabricated evidence. Otherwise, Plaintiff merely claims that the investigations were flawed or improper, but Plaintiff provides no specific allegations about the defendants' actual conduct that would plausibly show that their investigations violated his constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As to Defendant Cassie Darnell, the court liberally construes the Complaint as asserting that Darnell's initiation of a traffic stop violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009) (providing that a traffic stop is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment that requires the officer to have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is committing or has committed a criminal offense). But Plaintiff provides no allegations that could plausibly show that Darnell's traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff alleges only that Darnell initiated the stop without explaining why the stop was unlawful. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim against Darnell upon which relief may be granted.
As to Defendant Micaela Andres Tomas, Plaintiff expressly claims that her reporting of the carjacking to law enforcement makes Tomas liable for “knowingly giving a false report.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 18.) Plaintiff's self-styled claim is not a recognizable legal cause of action, but the court liberally construes the Complaint as raising a state law tort claim of malicious prosecution. See generally Jordan v. Deese, 452 S.E.2d 838, 839 (S.C. 1995) (providing that the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil or criminal; by, or instigated by the defendant; the termination of such proceedings in the plaintiff's favor; malice in instituting the proceedings; a lack of probable cause; and resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff). However, Plaintiff's claim is plainly frivolous by his own allegations because he alleges Tomas merely reported information she heard from a third party to the sheriff's department. Therefore, Tomas is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that Tomas acted with malice in instigating legal proceedings against Plaintiff without probable cause. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that all of Plaintiff's claims except for those against Defendants McCarley and Hayden be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).