Stolle v. State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co.

25 Citing cases

  1. McConnell v. Wright

    280 Ga. App. 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times
    In McConnell v. Wright, 280 Ga. App. 546 (634 SE2d 495) (2006), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of James and Martha McConnell's personal injury action as a sanction for the McConnells' failure to attend their depositions.

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stolle v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 235, 236 (3) ( 424 SE2d 807) (1992) (whole court). Thus, we held in Oliff v. Smith, 214 Ga. App. 358, 359 ( 447 SE2d 707) (1994) that no hearing was necessary before imposing sanctions, where the record showed that the plaintiff had repeatedly delayed serving discovery responses and had only offered that she was "out of pocket" as an explanation for her failure to timely respond.

  2. Resource Network Intl. v. the Ritz-Carlton Hotel

    232 Ga. App. 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C). 206 Ga. App. 235, 236-237 (3) ( 424 S.E.2d 807) (1992). See Evans v. East Coast Intermodal Systems, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 749 ( 382 S.E.2d 743) (1989); Bells Ferry Landing, Ltd. v. Wirtz, 188 Ga. App. 344 ( 373 S.E.2d 50) (1988).

  3. Dentistry for Children of Ga. v. Foster

    362 Ga. App. 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    The corporate defendants "do[ ] not assert that [they were] unaware of [the] discovery requests or that [their] failure to respond was accidental or involuntary." Stolle v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. , 206 Ga. App. 235, 237 (3), 424 S.E.2d 807 (1992). Indeed, the record demonstrates that the corporate defendants knew that discovery had been served and knew that their responses were overdue, but failed to respond, while conducting their own discovery.

  4. Capital Floors, LLC v. Furman

    351 Ga. App. 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that "pleadings" includes a complaint and an answer, and citing OCGA § 9-11-7

    " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stolle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 206 Ga. App. 235, 236 (2), 424 S.E.2d 807 (1992). A motion for continuance of a trial is properly addressed to the sound legal discretion of a trial judge, who is in control of the management of the case in court.

  5. Howard v. Alegria

    321 Ga. App. 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    Stating that though an order compelling discovery is not a condition precedent for imposing sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (C) or (d), it is required to have "a request for sanctions, notice to all parties, and a motion hearing to determine if the offending party’s failure to respond was wilful"

    Instead, prior to the imposition of such sanctions, all that is required is a request for sanctions, notice to all parties, and a motion hearing to determine if the offending party's failure to respond was wilful. Exum v. Norfolk Southern R., 305 Ga.App. 781, 782–783(1), 701 S.E.2d 199 (2010); Stolle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 206 Ga.App. 235, 237(3), 424 S.E.2d 807 (1992). Although the appellants cite to Mayer v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 436, 254 S.E.2d 825 (1979), in support of their argument that a party must always file a motion to compel before seeking sanctions under OCGA § 9–11–37(d), Mayer involved incomplete or evasive answers to discovery requests that evidenced a dispute as to whether the answers were adequate and accurate.

  6. Howard v. Alegria

    A12A1883 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013)

    Instead, prior to the imposition of such sanctions, all that is required is a request for sanctions, notice to all parties, and a motion hearing to determine if the offending party's failure to respond was wilful. Exum v. Norfolk Southern R., 305 Ga. App. 781, 782-783 (1) (701 SE2d 199) (2010); Stolle v. State Farm &c., 206 Ga. App. 235, 237 (3) (424 SE2d 807) (1992). Although the appellants cite to Mayer v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 436 (254 SE2d 825) (1979), in support of their argument that a party must always file a motion to compel before seeking sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 (d), Mayer involved incomplete or evasive answers to discovery requests that evidenced a dispute as to whether the answers were adequate and accurate.

  7. Rouse v. Arrington

    283 Ga. App. 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stolle v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 235, 236 (3) ( 424 SE2d 807) (1992). In this case the trial court did not explicitly make a finding of wilfulness in its order dismissing the case for failure to comply with the December 19 order.

  8. James v. Hospital Authority of Bainbridge

    278 Ga. App. 657 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    Finding the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's medical malpractice action because plaintiff failed to file an expert certification

    " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stolle v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 235, 236 (2) ( 424 SE2d 807) (1992). Since our review is confined to the record, we cannot consider the exhibits attached to James' brief which are not contained therein.

  9. Greenbriar Homes, Inc. v. Builders Insurance

    273 Ga. App. 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    Discussing scope of USCR 6.4 (B)

    Therefore, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. See Stolle v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 235, 236-237 (3) ( 424 SE2d 807) (1992); compare Gen. Motors Corp. v. Conkle, 226 Ga. App. 34, 38-40 (1) ( 486 SE2d 180) (1997) (when a party wilfully fails to comply with court order compelling discovery, court can impose drastic sanction of dismissal or default; trial court need not conduct hearing on issue of wilfulness in every case); Vining v. Kimoto USA, 209 Ga. App. 296, 297 (2) ( 433 SE2d 342) (1993) (trial court not required to schedule an additional hearing before determining that party's failure to comply with discovery order was wilful; party had opportunity to present any justification at hearing on motion to compel).Judgment reversed and case remanded.

  10. Motani v. Wallace Enterprises., Inc.

    251 Ga. App. 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that trial court's striking of defendants’ answer was too severe when defendants’ counsel presented evidence that the failure to comply with a discovery order was accidental and not intentional and there was no evidence that the failure was wilful, in bad faith, or in conscious disregard of the consequences

    General Motors v. Conkle, 226 Ga. App. 34, 46 (1) (c) ( 486 S.E.2d 180) (1997) (physical precedent). Compare Schrembs, supra at 183 ("Schrembs had almost 11 months to answer a single, straightforward interrogatory asking for a single answer and failed to do so"); Stolle v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 235, 236-237 (3) ( 424 S.E.2d 807) (1992). (Stolle refused to respond to any discovery requests for almost a year and admitted that his failure to respond was due to the fact that he did not return the necessary documents to his own attorney).