Opinion
No. 1045 C.D. 2014
01-22-2015
Wadeeah I. Stokes, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Wadeeah I. Stokes (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) holding that she is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits under both Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Law), because she voluntarily quit her job without a necessitous and compelling reason, and Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, because she was neither able nor available for suitable work. We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, § 402(b), as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(b). Section 402(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week... [i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature ...." Id.
Section 401(d)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[c]ompensation shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed, and who...[i]s able to work and available for suitable work...." 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1).
The facts found by the Board concerning Claimant's employment with Child Guidance Resource Center (Employer) and her separation from that employment are as follows:
1. Claimant was last employed as a billing coordinator by Employer from June 6, 2011, at a final yearly salary of $35,000 and her last day of work was May 17, 2013.
2. On or around Claimant's last day of work, Claimant was experiencing medical conditions which rendered her unable to work for Employer, at which point Claimant stopped working for Employer.
3. On or around July 2, 2013, Employer's division director of human resources contacted Claimant to inquire when she would return to work or if she was going to apply for a leave of absence.
4. Claimant indicated that she had a health condition and that she was resigning.
5. Claimant did not ask her physician if she could work under restrictions before resigning.
6. Claimant did not ask Employer for any accommodations before resigning.
7. Claimant resigned her employment because she no longer cared to work for Employer.
8. Continuing work was available.
9. For waiting week ending December 7, 2013, Claimant's health condition rendered her neither able nor available for suitable work.(Record Item (R. Item) 12, Board's Decision and Order, Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶1-9.)
The Unemployment Compensation Service Center (Service Center) issued a determination that although Claimant had work limitations and had a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving her employment, she did not inform Employer of her limitations, and as such did not sustain her burden of proof and was ineligible under Section 402(b); the Service Center further found that Claimant failed to show that she was able and available for suitable work and therefore ineligible under Section 401(d)(1). (R. Item 5, Notice of Determination.)
Claimant appealed, and the referee conducted a hearing at which Claimant testified but was not represented by counsel; Employer's Revenue Cycle Coordinator (Coordinator) and Division Director of Human Resources (Human Resources Director) also testified, with a hearing representative from Equifax. (R. Item 9, Referee's Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 1.) On February 18, 2014, the referee issued a decision (i) affirming the Service Center's determination that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law because she made no efforts to preserve her employment prior to leaving; and (ii) reversing the Service Center's determination denying benefits pursuant to Section 401(d)(1) of the Law because the referee could not "conclude sufficient evidence...in the record to establish that [C]laimant has any physical restrictions or any logistical limitations on her ability or availability for work...." (R. Item 10, Referee's Decision at 2; Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶ 6.)
Claimant appealed the referee's decision to the Board. On May 13, 2014, the Board issued a Decision and Order denying benefits to Claimant pursuant to Sections 402(b) and 401(d)(1) of the Law. (R. Item 12, Board's Decision and Order at 3.) The Board resolved any conflict in testimony in favor of Employer's witnesses, and found:
Here, Claimant left work on or around May 17, 2013, due to health issues. On or around July 2, 2013, Employer contacted Claimant to inquire when she would return to work or if she would be requesting a leave of absence. At that point, Claimant indicated that she had a health condition and was resigning. Claimant admitted that she had not spoken to her physician about whether she could work under restrictions and also admitted that she did not ask Employer if it could accommodate her due to any medical issues. In fact, Claimant testified that she no longer cared about maintaining her employment with Employer at that point.(Id. at 2.) The Board concluded that because Claimant did not afford Employer the opportunity to accommodate her health condition, she failed to show a necessitous and compelling health reason for quitting her employment, and benefits must be denied under Section 402(b) of the Law.
With regard to Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, the Board reasoned that on her application for benefits dated December 3, 2013, Claimant indicated that she was neither able nor available for work due to trouble with her medication and diagnosis; Claimant also testified that it was not "conducive" for her to work anywhere except on a farm because of issues related to "white supremacy." (Id. at 3; R. Item 2, Internet Initial Claims; R. Item 9, H.T. at 5.) The Board therefore concluded that Claimant's testimony that she was available to work on a farm was not credible, and benefits must also be denied under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law. Claimant then filed the instant petition for review appealing the Board's order to this Court.
At the hearing, Claimant stated that she was a slave wherever she worked, and it was not going to be conducive for her to work anywhere; subsequently, in response to additional questions from the referee as to whether Claimant would consider herself available for work at that point and for what type of work, Claimant stated, "[y]es, I'm available for work...probably on a farm." (H.T. at 5.)
Our review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights were violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; Mathis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 64 A.3d 293, 297 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
In her petition for review, Claimant challenges a number of the Board's findings of fact, including findings that she resigned from her employment and that she did not request accommodation from Employer. Claimant argues that she provided documentation to the Coordinator, who was her supervisor and who testified for Employer, and states that she was permitted to modify her schedule between January 2013 (when her medical issues began) and May 2013 (when her last day of work occurred). (Claimant's Petition for Review at 3.) On appeal, Claimant does not challenge the Board's finding that she was neither able nor available for suitable work; rather, she submits that she "never resigned," but rather "abandoned her job due to mental illness." (Id. at 4.) Claimant submits that she is learning again to care for herself and for her children while managing her mental illness. (Id.)
At the referee's hearing, Employer's Coordinator testified that at the end of June 2013, following Claimant's hospitalization due to a reaction to a medication, the Coordinator did not know Claimant's intentions regarding a return to work. (R. Item 9, H.T. at 18.) The Coordinator stated that Claimant had notified her back in January 2013 that Claimant had been diagnosed as bipolar, and she testified that Claimant was nonetheless able to continue to perform her job between January 2013 and May 2013; the Coordinator indicated that Employer was able to accommodate Claimant. (Id. at 19.) The Human Resources Director testified that at the end of June 2013, the Coordinator consulted her as to Claimant's employment status; the Human Resources Director stated that she called Claimant several times, but that Claimant did not answer, and she then called the emergency number listed in Claimant's file, which was Claimant's mother's telephone number. (Id. at 20.) The Human Resources Director stated that she reached Claimant's mother and asked her to have Claimant return her call; she testified that she did not discuss any other issue with Claimant's mother, and stated that within two minutes, Claimant returned her call. (Id.) The Human Resources Director stated that Claimant told her that she was resigning due to her health condition, and the Human Resources Director then told Claimant that she would send Claimant a letter confirming their conversation; she also stated that she told Claimant that she believed there had been some possible overpayment to Claimant, and that she would be contacting Employer's finance department to look into it. (Id. at 20-21.)
Claimant testified that the Human Resources Director told Claimant's mother that Claimant had been overpaid for time off, and that Claimant was going to be arrested, thereby sending her mother into a panic, and requiring Claimant to undergo therapy; Claimant stated that the fact that this phone call occurred prompted her not to return to work. (R. Item 9, H.T. at 8.)
The letter from the Director of Human Resources to Claimant, with date obscured by a Certified Mail Receipt indicated its receipt on July 25, 2013, is attached to the hearing transcript as Employer's Exhibit 1; it acknowledges Employer's acceptance of Claimant's resignation and also indicates that there is no record that Claimant submitted a leave of absence following her departure from work on May 17, 2013, as is required by company policy, and states that Claimant continued to be paid her salary, in error, after her last day worked. (R. Item 9, Employer's Exhibit 1.) The letter further notifies Claimant that she will be receiving a letter from Employer's finance department outlining the overpayment and explaining how Claimant may proceed to pay back Employer for the payroll received in error. (Id.) --------
A claimant seeking benefits after voluntarily quitting her job has the burden to demonstrate that she had a necessitous and compelling reason for doing so. Mathis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 64 A.3d 293, 299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Green Tree School v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 982 A.2d 573, 577 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Nolan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 797 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); Craighead-Jenkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 796 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). When an unemployment compensation claimant voluntarily terminates employment for health reasons, the claimant must demonstrate through competent and credible evidence the following: (1) health reasons of sufficient dimension compelled her to quit; (2) she informed the employer of the health problems; and (3) she is able and available for work if her employer can make a reasonable accommodation. Watkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 65 A.3d 999, 1004-5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). A claimant must also demonstrate that she acted with ordinary common sense and made a reasonable effort to preserve her employment. Solar Innovations, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 A.3d 1051 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
Here, the Board found credible Employer's witnesses, and concluded that Claimant resigned without affording her Employer the opportunity to accommodate her health condition. Moreover, the Board found that Claimant's health condition, as evidenced by her own actions and her testimony, rendered her unable to perform and unavailable for suitable work. The Board is the ultimate fact finder and the arbiter of witness credibility. Mathis, 64 A.3d at 299; Bruce v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 2 A.3d 667, 671 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Ductmate Industries, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 949 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Here, the Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's denial of benefits.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of January, 2015, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge