A plaintiff must prove the indebtedness, the debtor's insolvency, and that the conveyance was voluntary; when those facts are proven, "the law conclusively presumes a fraudulent intent and declares the instrument void" with respect to creditors that had demands at the time of the conveyance. Chambers v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 249 S.E.2d 214, 217 (Ga. 1978) (describing elements); Stokes v. McRae, 278 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ga. 1981) (establishing burden of proof). See Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e do not agree with the district court that the repeal [of this statute] extinguished causes of action that had arisen under the repealed section but had not yet made it to final judgment.").
(3) that the transferees knew of Reid's intent to defraud his creditors.Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). To establish a case under this subsection, the Government does not have to show that Reid was insolvent.
A plaintiff must prove the indebtedness, the debtor's insolvency, and that the conveyance was voluntary; when those facts are proven, "the law conclusively presumes a fraudulent intent and declares the instrument void" with respect to creditors that had demands at the time of the conveyance. Chambers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 249 S.E.2d 214, 217 (Ga. 1978) (describing elements); Stokes v. McRae, 278 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ga. 1981) (establishing burden of proof). See Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e do not agree with the district court that the repeal [of this statute] extinguished causes of action that had arisen under the repealed section but had not yet made it to final judgment").
In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration.
In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration.
In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration. McDonald v. Taylor, 200 Ga. 445, 449, 37 S.E.2d 336 (1946).
[Cit.]" Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 (2) ( 278 SE2d 393) (1981). "`The second element may be established either by proof of actual knowledge or by proof of circumstances sufficient to put (the taking party) on inquiry. (Cit.)' [Cit.
This evidence, together with Beckwith's verbal request for payment of the note and the August 5, 1983 letter, raised questions of fact for the jury and authorized the jury to find that Merrell's conveyance of her home constituted a voluntary conveyance at a time when she was insolvent or that she conveyed the property with intent to defraud and that sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion of her intent existed. See Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981) (close familial relationship, inadequacy of consideration and transferee's knowledge of indebtedness are circumstances which, considered together, preclude grant of directed verdict); Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 908) (1981) and Powell v. Westmoreland, 60 Ga. 572 (4) (1878) (insolvency and intent are questions for the jury); Lewis v. Lewis, 210 Ga. 330, 332 ( 80 S.E.2d 312) (1954) (question of grantee's knowledge of fraudulent intent is for the jury); Glenn v. Tankersley, 187 Ga. 129 ( 200 S.E. 709) (1939) (there is sufficient prima facie evidence of fraud, subject to explanation, if the grantor remains in possession of the property after its conveyance); McLendon v. Reynolds Grocery Co., 160 Ga. 763 ( 129 S.E. 65) (1925) and Hilburn v. Hightower, 178 Ga. 534 ( 173 S.E. 389) (1934) (conveyances between near relatives are to be scrutinized closely and slight evidence of fraud shown between them may be sufficient to set the transaction aside);
"The second element may be established either by proof of actual knowledge or by proof of circumstances sufficient to put [the taking party] on inquiry. [Cit.]" Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981). The legislature would not subject a taking party to the same liability as a debtor based upon such a wide spectrum of circumstances which might merely put him "on inquiry,' without any specific intent on his part.
" In Bussell v. Glenn, 197 Ga. 816, 818 ( 30 S.E.2d 617) (1944), it was held that a deed from a father to his daughters without consideration other than love and affection was a voluntary conveyance. In Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981), the court stated: "We have held, as the subsection indicates, that a voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration." Thus, the debtor's testimony that the conveyance was "voluntary on his part" and of his "own free will" does not establish that the conveyance was "voluntary" within the meaning of OCGA § 18-2-22 (3), supra.