Stokes v. McRae

26 Citing cases

  1. In re Terry Manufacturing Company, Inc.

    CASE NO. 03-32063-WRS, CASE NO. 03-32213-WRS, CASE NO. 2:07-CV-620-WKW (M.D. Ala. Sep. 30, 2008)   Cited 3 times

    A plaintiff must prove the indebtedness, the debtor's insolvency, and that the conveyance was voluntary; when those facts are proven, "the law conclusively presumes a fraudulent intent and declares the instrument void" with respect to creditors that had demands at the time of the conveyance. Chambers v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 249 S.E.2d 214, 217 (Ga. 1978) (describing elements); Stokes v. McRae, 278 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ga. 1981) (establishing burden of proof). See Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e do not agree with the district court that the repeal [of this statute] extinguished causes of action that had arisen under the repealed section but had not yet made it to final judgment.").

  2. U.S. v. Reid

    127 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Ga. 2000)   Cited 11 times
    Noting that an example of a facially invalid conveyance is one only for love and affection

    (3) that the transferees knew of Reid's intent to defraud his creditors.Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). To establish a case under this subsection, the Government does not have to show that Reid was insolvent.

  3. In re Terry Manufacturing Company, Inc.

    Case No. 03-32063-WRS (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Sep. 30, 2008)

    A plaintiff must prove the indebtedness, the debtor's insolvency, and that the conveyance was voluntary; when those facts are proven, "the law conclusively presumes a fraudulent intent and declares the instrument void" with respect to creditors that had demands at the time of the conveyance. Chambers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 249 S.E.2d 214, 217 (Ga. 1978) (describing elements); Stokes v. McRae, 278 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ga. 1981) (establishing burden of proof). See Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e do not agree with the district court that the repeal [of this statute] extinguished causes of action that had arisen under the repealed section but had not yet made it to final judgment").

  4. In re Holmes

    Case No. 02-52793 RFH, Adversary Proceeding: No. 02-5133 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2003)

    In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration.

  5. Matter of Galbreath

    207 B.R. 309 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1997)   Cited 9 times
    Finding that a gift from one party to another is not a preferential transfer

    In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration.

  6. In re Holmes

    296 B.R. 567 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    In Stokes v. McRae, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: 247 Ga. 658, 278 S.E.2d 393 (1981). [A] voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration. McDonald v. Taylor, 200 Ga. 445, 449, 37 S.E.2d 336 (1946).

  7. Byers v. McGuire Properties

    285 Ga. 530 (Ga. 2009)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that "evidence that closing attorneys may have had some inquiry notice prior to closing fails to show actual knowledge by SunTrust, and thus, cannot create a jury issue regarding culpable or inexcusable neglect."

    [Cit.]" Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 (2) ( 278 SE2d 393) (1981). "`The second element may be established either by proof of actual knowledge or by proof of circumstances sufficient to put (the taking party) on inquiry. (Cit.)' [Cit.

  8. Merrell v. Beckwith

    439 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that evidence of whether borrower conveyed property with intent to defraud was a jury issue

    This evidence, together with Beckwith's verbal request for payment of the note and the August 5, 1983 letter, raised questions of fact for the jury and authorized the jury to find that Merrell's conveyance of her home constituted a voluntary conveyance at a time when she was insolvent or that she conveyed the property with intent to defraud and that sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion of her intent existed. See Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981) (close familial relationship, inadequacy of consideration and transferee's knowledge of indebtedness are circumstances which, considered together, preclude grant of directed verdict); Goodman v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 605 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 908) (1981) and Powell v. Westmoreland, 60 Ga. 572 (4) (1878) (insolvency and intent are questions for the jury); Lewis v. Lewis, 210 Ga. 330, 332 ( 80 S.E.2d 312) (1954) (question of grantee's knowledge of fraudulent intent is for the jury); Glenn v. Tankersley, 187 Ga. 129 ( 200 S.E. 709) (1939) (there is sufficient prima facie evidence of fraud, subject to explanation, if the grantor remains in possession of the property after its conveyance); McLendon v. Reynolds Grocery Co., 160 Ga. 763 ( 129 S.E. 65) (1925) and Hilburn v. Hightower, 178 Ga. 534 ( 173 S.E. 389) (1934) (conveyances between near relatives are to be scrutinized closely and slight evidence of fraud shown between them may be sufficient to set the transaction aside);

  9. Kesler v. Veal

    257 Ga. 677 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 18 times
    In Kesler, the Georgia Supreme Court found that a transferee could not be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22, the former Georgia transfer statute, unless there was some "proof of bad faith, actual fraud, or conspiracy."

    "The second element may be established either by proof of actual knowledge or by proof of circumstances sufficient to put [the taking party] on inquiry. [Cit.]" Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981). The legislature would not subject a taking party to the same liability as a debtor based upon such a wide spectrum of circumstances which might merely put him "on inquiry,' without any specific intent on his part.

  10. Brown v. C. S. Nat. Bank

    253 Ga. 119 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 10 times

    " In Bussell v. Glenn, 197 Ga. 816, 818 ( 30 S.E.2d 617) (1944), it was held that a deed from a father to his daughters without consideration other than love and affection was a voluntary conveyance. In Stokes v. McRae, 247 Ga. 658, 659 ( 278 S.E.2d 393) (1981), the court stated: "We have held, as the subsection indicates, that a voluntary conveyance or deed is one without any valuable consideration." Thus, the debtor's testimony that the conveyance was "voluntary on his part" and of his "own free will" does not establish that the conveyance was "voluntary" within the meaning of OCGA § 18-2-22 (3), supra.