Opinion
Case No. 8:02-CV-18-T-24TGW
January 13, 2003
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 19). Plaintiff flied a response in opposition to Defendant's motion (Doc. No. 26). Defendant also filed a reply to Plaintiffs response (Doc. No. 27).
I. Background
In March of 1996, Defendant's parent corporation, IMC Global Operations, Inc., purchased Vigoro Industries ("Vigoro"), an agricultural manufacturer and distributor located in Winter Haven, Florida. Prior to this purchase, Plaintiff had been employed as a distribution and sales coordinator with Vigoro for over five years. As distribution and sales coordinator, Plaintiff was responsible for customer service, customer invoicing, working with salesmen, coordinating deliveries, trucking payroll, inventory of 105 bulk trailers, dispatching trucks, and weighing trucks (Doc. No. 26, p. 1-2). After the purchase of Vigoro, Defendant relocated Plaintiff to Defendant's Mulberry, Florida plant where Plaintiff held a position substantially similar to the position already held by another employee named Pat Moses (Doc. No. 22, Dep. of Stokes, p. 53, 59-60). While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff was paid an annual salary of approximately $32,000 to $33,000 (Doc. No. 22, Dep. of Stokes, p. 79).
Soon after the purchase of Vigoro, it became clear to Defendant that the Mulberry plant was heading toward a revenue deficit of over $9 million (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 7). Consequently, Defendant had to cut costs and increase profits at the plant (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 8; Doc. No. 23, Dep. of Marovich, p. 10). Defendant ultimately decided to reduce the workforce at the Mulberry plant by terminating any employee whose duties duplicated the duties of another employee at the plant (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 8; Doc. No. 23, Dep. of Marovich, p. 16). Plaintiff was one of four employees terminated. On June 18, 1997, Defendant informed Plaintiff that his position was being eliminated. At the time of Plaintiffs termination, there was a plant foreman's position open at Defendant's plant located in Indiantown, Florida. Defendant selected another employee named John Richie to fill that vacancy.
In or around October of 1997, Defendant experienced a brief increase in workload at the Mulberry plant (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 11). To meet this rise in production, Defendant temporarily hired Shandra Davis at an hourly wage of $6.00 per hour (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 12). Ms. Davis was employed by Defendant until approximately April 11, 1998 (Doc. No. 20, Marovich Affidavit, ¶ 12; Doc. No. 23, Dep. of Marovich, p. 37-38).
On April 14, 1998, Plaintiff filed a charge of age discrimination against Defendant with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On October 9, 2001, Plaintiff filed the current action in state court in the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida (Doc. No. 2). Subsequently, Defendant removed the case to this Court.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by "showing" or "pointing out" to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. Rule 56 permits the moving party to discharge its burden with or without supporting affidavits and to move for summary judgment on the case as a whole or on any claim. See id. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 257 (11th Cir. 1989); Samples on behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit has explained the reasonableness standard:
In deciding whether an inference is reasonable, the Court must "cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonableness." [citation omitted]. The opposing party's inferences need not be more probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts. When more than one inference reasonably can be drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one.WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988).
Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. See Augusta Iron Steel Works v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine", if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
III. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims of age discrimination. Defendant first argues that there is no direct evidence of age discrimination or statistical proof of a pattern of age discrimination by Defendant. Defendant next asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination with circumstantial evidence under the McDonnel-Douglas burden shifting scheme. Defendant further contends that even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not retaining Plaintiff are pretextual.
Florida Civil Rights Act Claim
The Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA") is "closely patterned after its federal equivalent;" as such, the Court examines Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under the FCRA in the same manner as it would evaluate Plaintiffs claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). See Malewski v. NationsBank of Florida, N.A., 978 F. Supp. 1095, 1105 (S.D. Fla. 1997); see also, Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County commissioners, 162 F.3d 653, 659 (11th Cir. 1998). Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes three ways a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination: (1) direct evidence of discriminatory intent, (2) circumstantial proof supporting all elements of the McDonnell Douglas test, or (3) statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination. See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 439 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has offered neither direct evidence of discriminatory intent nor statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination. Consequently, this Court will only address Plaintiffs circumstantial proof supporting the burden-shifting analysis of theMcDonnell Douglas test.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Even in the absence of direct evidence or statistical proof of discrimination, a plaintiff may establish a presumption of discriminatory intent by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination through circumstantial evidence. Under the modified McDonnell Douglas test, a prima facie case requires a showing that (1) Plaintiff is in the protected age group of persons age 40 to 70; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual; and (4) he was qualified for the position. Chapman v. A.I. Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
In reduction-in-force cases, such as the one at issue, the McDonnell Douglas test is further modified by eliminating prong three (the replacement requirement) because "[i]n situations involving a reduction in force . . . the employer seldom seeks a replacement for the discharged employee." Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987)) (alterations in original). Therefore, in reduction-in-force cases, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating "(1) that he was in a protected age group and was adversely affected by an employment decision, (2) that he was qualified for his current position or to assume another position at the time of discharge, and (3) evidence by which a fact finder reasonably could conclude that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of age in reaching that decision."Benson v. Tocco, Inc. 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997).
If the plaintiff discharges this burden, a rebuttable presumption of age discrimination exists and the defendant must then come forward and articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the termination. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. Finally, if the defendant rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's asserted reason is "merely a pretext for a discriminatory dismissal." Id. The plaintiff must prove not only that the reason offered by the defendant is false, but that discrimination was the real reason for the termination. See id. If the plaintiff does not produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is pretextual, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim. See id. at 1025.
In the present case, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has met his burden as to the first prong of the reduction-in-force variation of the McDonnell Douglas test. Plaintiff was a member of the protected class at the time he was discharged as part of a reduction-in-force. As to the second prong, in his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff claims that he was qualified for a vacant foreman's position at Defendant's Indiantown plant. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff may have been qualified for the position. However, Defendant states that age was not a factor in choosing another employee, rather than Plaintiff, to fill the open position. John Richie, the employee hired to fill the vacancy, was 44 years old (only five years younger than Plaintiff), had been employed with Defendant for almost twenty years, and had previously held a position similar to the available foreman's position (Doc. No. 27, p. 4-5).
As to the third prong of the modified McDonnell Douglas test, Plaintiff must produce evidence from which a neutral fact-finder can determine that, in making its employment decisions, the employer intended to discriminate against the individual on the basis of age. The Court finds that Plaintiff has produced no evidence that the employer terminated him on the basis of age. Hiring, for a limited time, an hourly employee who happens to be younger than Plaintiff does not indicate to this Court that age was a factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff Approximately four months after Plaintiff was terminated, this temporary, hourly position was added for a limited time to meet unexpected production demands. When Defendant had been forced to reduce the size of its force, it had not anticipated this future need. Likewise, the fact that Pat Moses, the employee retained by Defendant to assume Plaintiff's tasks in addition to the tasks that she already performed, is merely one month younger than Plaintiff further undermines Plaintiffs assertion that he was terminated because of his age.
However, even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, he has not shown that Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for not retaining him are mere pretext. Pretext means more than an inconsistency or mistake; pretext is "a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action." Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff cannot establish pretext by merely questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasoning, especially where "the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer." See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996)). Finally, courts cannot reexamine an employer's business decisions; the court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior. See Elrod v. Sears. Roebuck Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff simply has not proven that Defendant's proffered legitimate non — discriminatory reason terminating him — that Defendant was suffering from difficult economic times and Plaintiffs position duplicated the work of another employee at the plant — is pretextual. Because Plaintiff has not shown evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant made decisions regarding Plaintiffs employment based on Plaintiffs age in violation of the ECRA, summary judgment in Defendant's favor is appropriate.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT for Defendant, CLOSE this case, and TERMINATE any pending motions.