Opinion
7:19-CV-34 (WLS)
08-30-2021
PORTERFIELD STOKES, Plaintiff, v. TONIE BENEFIELD [1], et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This action was filed with the Court in February 2019, and by Order dated June 21, 2019, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal search claim related to the search of his home and his malicious prosecution claim were allowed to proceed against Defendants Benefield and Woods. (Docs. 1, 16). Pending is Defendant Benefield's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 53).
In allowing certain of Plaintiff's claims to go forward, the Court recommended dismissal of certain Defendants and Plaintiff's claims for false arrest and imprisonment, due process violations, conspiracy, and deliberate indifference to his safety. (Doc. 16). The Court also noted that Plaintiff had filed a complaint, a brief in support of the complaint, an amended complaint, and a memorandum in support of the amended complaint. (Doc. 16, n. 2). The Court considered all of these filings, and deemed the amendment as one “allowed as a matter of right”. Id.
Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims were ultimately dismissed. (Docs. 44, 51). By Order dated December 14, 2020, the Court denied a portion of Defendant Woods' Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the issue of whether and how Plaintiff consented to the search and the reasonableness of Defendant Woods' actions in the search Plaintiff's of home. (Doc. 60).
Factual background
In this action, Plaintiff asserts that, on the morning of April 19, 2017, Defendant Officer Tonie Benefield of the Georgia Department of Community Supervision, along with Defendant Officer Jason Woods of the Valdosta Police Department Narcotics Unit and agents from the Lowndes County Sheriff's Office, the FBI, ATF, and the FBI Gang Task Force, conducted a “multi-agency probationary check” in Valdosta, Georgia. (Docs. 1, 15). After knocking on Plaintiff's door, Benefield announced that the officers were making a probation check, to which Plaintiff responded that he was not on probation or parole. (Doc. 7). Nevertheless, Benefield, Woods, and other agents rushed into Plaintiff's house with their guns drawn and began to search Plaintiff's home without a warrant or probable cause. Id. Plaintiff had a copy of his release papers available to show that he was not on parole or probation, which he explained to Benefield and the other agents, but no one would look at his papers or listen to what Plaintiff was telling them. Id.
During the check, Benefield threatened to arrest Plaintiff and take him to jail if he did not sign a “request for drug test/chain of custody form” and a consent to search his home. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff apparently signed the documents as a result of Benefield's threats. See id. Following the search, agents took over $3,500 from Plaintiff's home, and Benefield and Woods arrested Plaintiff for violation of his parole, felony possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, felony possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, felony possession of tools during the felony commission of a crime, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana. (Docs. 1, 7, 15).
Pursuant to the arrest, Plaintiff was booked into the Lowndes County Jail, and thirty-five (35) days after Plaintiff was initially arrested, the violation of parole charge was changed to violation of probation. (Docs. 1, 7). Plaintiff alleges that this new charge was based on falsified information and documents. Id.
On May 9, 2017, Plaintiff moved for a bond hearing. (Doc. 15). The court set Plaintiff's bond at $20,000. On December 11, 2017, Plaintiff appeared for a motion hearing and again produced documents showing that he had maxed out of his previous sentence, such that he was not on parole or probation when he was released. Id. The court dismissed all of the charges against Plaintiff the next day. Id. In all, Plaintiff was confined for 65 days on the charges.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
As the party moving for summary judgment, the Defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3). Defendant Benefield has supported his summary judgment motion with his declaration, Plaintiff's deposition testimony, and documentary evidence. (Docs. 53-3 - 59-6).
The Clerk of Court notified Plaintiff of the filing of the Defendant Benefield's Motion for Summary Judgment, advised him of his obligations under the law, and directed him to respond to the motion within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 54). Plaintiff has responded to Defendant Benefield's motion. (Doc. 56).
The Court will not consider Plaintiff's sur-reply brief which was filed without leave of court. (Doc. 59).
Illegal search
In his declaration, Defendant Benefield states that he was a surveillance officer with the Georgia Department of Community Supervision at the time of the April 19, 2017 incident, providing security protection for parole officers when they were out in the field. (Doc. 53-5, ¶¶ 4, 5). On April 19, 2017, Defendant Benefield accompanied Michelle Smith, Chief of Probation and Parole for the Southern Judicial Circuit, in a multi-agency “check on gang members then on parole in the Lowndes County area.” Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff was on the list of “gang affiliated parolees for the task force to visit.” Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9. Defendant Benefield, by means of a “Chromebook computer”, “saw Mr. Stokes' parole papers showing that his effective parole date began on February 5, 2015 and that his parole was scheduled to end on May 21, 2017.” Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.
Defendant Benefield knocked on Plaintiff's door and announced a parole check inspection, which was conducted by the task force. Id. at ¶¶ 13-16. Benefield states that “Mr. Stokes opened the door and members of the task force entered Mr. Stokes' home to begin an inspection.” Id. at ¶ 16. After the discovery of illegal drugs, the task force requested and ultimately was provided a urine sample from Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24.
Benefield maintains that “[u]pon his release from prison, Mr. Stokes signed a parole agreement stating that his ‘parole officer or any other parole officer may, at any time, conduct a warrantless search of [his] person, papers, and place of residence, automobile, or any property under [his] control.” Id. at ¶ 27. A firearm, marijuana, instruments used for the sale of marijuana and a significant amount of money were found during the search of Plaintiff's residence. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19. Benefield maintains that Plaintiff did not complain about the warrantless search of his residence until contraband was found. Id. at ¶ 21.
In contrast to Defendant Benefield's contentions in his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Woods maintained in his summary judgment motion that he observed Defendant Benefield interact with Plaintiff, and receive verbal and written consent to search Plaintiff's house. (Doc. 39-2, pp. 13, 16). Woods maintained that he received the written consent to search from Defendant Benefield, and arrested Plaintiff after observing marijuana on the dining room table and reading Plaintiff his Miranda rights. Id. at p. 16. In his detective report, Defendant Woods states that “[u]pon arrival, I observed DCS Officer T. Benefield make contact with Stokes and during their conversation DSC received verbal and written consent to search Stokes' residence (see attached signed consent form). After consent was received, I entered the residence and assisted officers in the search of the residence.” (Doc. 39-2, pp. 8-9).
In response to Defendant Benefield's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has submitted his declaration, declaring the “within information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief”, apparently referring to his entire responsive submission, and various pieces of documentary evidence. (Docs. 56-2 - 56-16). Plaintiff also filed a Statement of Facts in response to Defendant Woods' summary judgment motion, which appears to apply to the action as a whole. (Doc. 52-1).
According to Plaintiff's allegations, he was not on parole or probation at the time of the April 19, 2017 search of his house, and he told Defendant Benefield and the other officers that he was not on parole or probation before he opened his door. (Doc. 56-1). Defendant Benefield and Defendants Woods, along with other law enforcement officers, knocked on Plaintiff's door on April 19, 2017, announcing a probation check. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff responded that he was not on probation or parole. Id. Woods and other agents thereafter searched Plaintiff's home without a warrant or probable cause. Id. Although Plaintiff tried to show agents his paperwork showing he was not on parole or probation, none of the officers looked at the papers. Id.; Doc. 56-1. Defendant Benefield threatened to arrest Plaintiff if he did not sign a “request for drug test/chain of custody form” and a consent to search his home. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff signed the documents as a result of Defendant Benefield's threats. Id. Plaintiff points out that the standard conditions form supporting Defendant Benefield's summary judgment motion was not signed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 56-1).
In his deposition testimony, submitted in support of Defendant Benefield's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff testifies that he told Defendant Benefield at his door, after Defendant Benefield had knocked, “I'm not on parole or probation”. (Doc. 53-3, p. 14). Plaintiff testifies that he repeatedly told the officers, after they had commenced to search his house, that he was not on parole or probation and that he could show them the papers to prove it. Id. at pp. 14-18. Plaintiff testifies that he was forced, upon threat of being taken into custody, to sign a urinalysis consent and a consent to search. Id. at p. 15.
Generally, law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant, based on probable cause, before searching s suspect's home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). “A consensual search is constitutional if it is voluntary; if it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001) “If we assume that [Plaintiff's] allegations are true, the [] search [based on involuntary consent while Plaintiff was not on parole or probation] violated the Fourth Amendment. Brock v. City of Zephyrhills, 232 F. A'ppx 925, 928 (11th Cir. 2007). The question of whether consent occurred and whether it was voluntary is a “heavily fact-dependent inquiry”, and Defendant Benefield has not established that he is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Menta v. Foskey, 877 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1379 (S.D.Ga. 2012).
To the extent that Defendant Benefield relies on Plaintiff's alleged status as a parolee, who was subject to a search of his residence without a warrant as a condition of his parole, Plaintiff has testified that he repeatedly told Defendant Benefield that he was not on parole or probation, and the Parole Certificate offered by Defendant Benefield is not signed by Plaintiff or by the required institutional official. (Doc. 53-6). The Court has already noted that this Certificate was issued on January 28, 2015 and lists a different address than the one for the home searched in 2019, raising genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Certificate was outdated and unreliable. (Doc. 51, pp. 3-4).
Although a parole search condition may significantly diminish an expectation of privacy so that a search warrant is not required to conduct a suspicionless search of a parolee's residence, such searches have been upheld where the search conditions were “clearly expressed” and accepted by the parolee, evidenced by his signature submitting to the search conditions. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006). No such submission by Plaintiff to a warrantless search has been produced herein, creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a parole search condition was in place and whether it was valid.
Qualified immunity
Defendant Benefield also maintains that he is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).
To demonstrate that the law was clearly established, courts look to “either (1) earlier case law from the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest court of the pertinent state that is materially similar to the current case and therefore provided clear notice of the violation or (2) general rules of law from a federal constitutional or statutory provision or earlier case law that applied with ‘obvious clarity' to the circumstances, establishing clearly the unlawfulness of Defendants' conduct.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, “in some cases, we may find that the right is clearly established, even in the absence of case law.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009). See also Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.”) internal citations omitted.
Defendant Benefield was pursuing duties within his role as a surveillance officer with the Georgia Department of Community Supervision at the time of the search. Such “objective circumstances . . . compel the conclusion that [Defendant Benefield's] actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.” Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). “[W]here . . . it is undisputed that government officials were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. A'ppx 595, 597 (11th Cir. 2007).
“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), receded from on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
In order to establish that the right was clearly established, and that Benefield is not entitled to qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Benefield had clear notice that his actions were unlawful. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007). If an officer is reasonably mistaken regarding the lawfulness of a search, he is still entitled to qualified immunity. Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.3d 658, 661 (11th Cir. 1998 As previously found by this Court in regard to Defendant Woods' summary judgment motion, it was clearly established at the time of the search of Plaintiff's home “that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. . . unless the officers engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error.” Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1995). As with Defendant Woods, the Court concludes that there is at least a genuine question as to whether Defendant Benefield acted reasonably in searching Plaintiff's home under the circumstances set out by Plaintiff, where Plaintiff informed Benefield that he was not on parole or probation. (Doc. 60, p. 8).
Although Defendant Benefield maintains that he relied on the Parole Certificate in searching Plaintiff's residence, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the document produced by Defendant Benefield, which was not signed by Petitioner or any Institutional Official, authorized the warrantless search of Plaintiff's home, and therefore whether it was reasonable for Defendant Benefield to rely on the unsigned document. As noted by Plaintiff, Defendant Benefield references several sources for his information that Plaintiff was a parolee, to wit, a list of parolees to be visited that day, the use of a “Chromebook” to see, on an unidentified source, Plaintiff's conviction start and end dates, as well as the Parole Certificate showing a parole end date of May 21, 2017. However, Defendant Benefield has produced only the Parole Certificate in support of his summary judgment motion, and this certificate was not signed or dated by Plaintiff or any parole authority.
As set out in the Court's Order denying Defendant Woods' Motion for Summary Judgment, the record contains sufficient asserted facts that taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff indicate that Defendant Benefield was aware that Plaintiff might not have been on probation or parole but nonetheless persisted in the search of Plaintiff's home, without a warrant or exigent circumstances. (Doc. 60, p. 9). The law was clearly established that a warrantless search of a home is “presumptively unreasonable”, unless the officers engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 955. According to Plaintiff's version of the facts, which the Court must accept as true, Plaintiff told Defendant Benefield and the other officers that he was not on parole and tried to show the officers papers allegedly proving this, and genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Defendant Benefield's reliance on allegedly mistaken information was reasonable.
Inasmuch as genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Defendant Benefield's warrantless search of Plaintiff's home, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that Defendant Benefield's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.
Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to the recommendations herein, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the 12
District Judge for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.