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Stokes v. Adams

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Apr 25, 2022
Civil Action 21-1060 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2022)

Opinion

Civil Action 21-1060

04-25-2022

JEFFREY STOKES Plaintiff, v. M. ADAMS, Superintendent K. FEATHER, Corrections Health Care Administrator, MORRE, Safety Manager, W. ROUDA, Unit Manager, Defendants.


District Judge Colville

ECF NO. 26

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by M. Adams, K. Feather, Morre, and W. Rouda be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

II. REPORT

A. Relevant Factual Allegations and Procedural History

Plaintiff Jeffrey Stokes (“Plaintiff”) instituted this civil action by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. The Motion was granted on August 16, 2021 (ECF No. 6) and the Clerk of Court filed Plaintiff's Complaint on that same day. ECF No. 7. The Court Ordered that the Plaintiff amend his complaint to cure various deficiencies and to file the amended complaint with the Court by November 1, 2021. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint naming Melinda Adams (“Adams”), Karen Feather (“Feather”), Jason Moore (“Moore”), and Rouda as party defendants (collectively “Defendants”). ECF No. 16. On January 26, 2022, the Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss at bar. ECF No. 26. On January 27, 2022, the Court ordered that Defendants provide Plaintiff with all grievances and appeals or other similar documents in their possession concerning the alleged incident or incidents at issue in the Complaint in light of Defendants' argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court further ordered that Plaintiff respond to all arguments in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by March 11, 2022. Plaintiff failed to file his response by the March 11, 2022, deadline so the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court extended the deadline for Plaintiff to file his response until April 18, 2022 and indicated that if Plaintiff failed to respond by this date, the Court would either rule on the motion without benefit of a response, or dismiss the action for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 31. As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion.

It appears that Moore's name is misspelled in the caption. The Court will use what appears to be the correct spelling of Defendant Jason Moore's name.

B. Legal Standards

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):

Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).

When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the pleadings, documents, electronically stored information, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits or declarations, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (a) & (c). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; that is, the movant must show that the evidence of record is insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof. Id. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added by Matsushita Court). An issue is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty-Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court noted the following:

[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.... [T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).

C. Analysis

Through the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to prohibit prisoners from bringing an action with respect to prison conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law, until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. Specifically, the act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required under this provision regardless of the type of relief sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In addition, the exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence, including those that involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all the available remedies prior to filing the action. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (by using language “no action shall be brought, ” Congress has “clearly required exhaustion”).

This broad rule favoring full exhaustion admits of one, narrowly defined exception. If the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate's procedural default on a grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (Section 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust such administrative remedies “as are available”). In Rinaldi v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that “once a defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, “the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.” 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018). The appellate court held that to defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense, “an inmate must show (1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate. Id. at 269.

No analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative process available to the inmate. “Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.' The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirement, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

Relevant Provisions of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Grievance Procedure

Within DC-ADM 804, the Inmate Grievance System Policy, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections established a three-step Inmate Grievance System to provide inmates with an avenue to seek review of problems that may arise during the course of confinement. Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, after an attempt to resolve any problems informally, an inmate may submit a written grievance to the facility's Grievance Coordinator for initial review. This submission must occur within fifteen days after the events upon which the claims are based. Specifically, relevant portions of DC-ADM 804, Section 1 provide as follows:

C. Initial Review
1. The Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee shall assign a grievance tracking number to every tracking number to every grievance (even a rejected grievance) upon receipt and enter every grievance into the Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System. ...
3. If the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee determines that the grievance is properly submitted according to this procedures manual, the Facility Grievance
Coordinator/designee will designate a staff member to serve as the Grievance Officer tor that grievance. ...
4. If the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee determines that the grievance is not properly submitted according to this procedures manual, it shall be rejected and returned to the inmate with a Grievance Rejection Form (Attachment1-C) enumerating the reason(s) the grievance was rejected.
...
A. Filing of an Initial Grievance
...
20. If a grievance is rejected, the grievance may be resubmitted, using the same grievance number, within five working days of the rejection notice date. A rejected grievance may only be re-submitted one time.
21. An inmate may appeal the rejected grievance to the Facility Manager in accordance with Section 2 of this procedures manual.
DC-ADM 804 § 1.C. & A (emphasis in original). Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator, an inmate may then appeal to the Facility Manager of the institution. Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Facility Manager, an inmate may file a final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). An appeal to final review cannot be completed unless an inmate complies with all established procedures. An inmate must exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (outlining Pennsylvania's grievance review process).

Here, Defendants attach the Declaration of Amanda West to their Motion. She is the Grievance Review Officer in the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). As part of her duties, she is responsible for reviewing grievance records of appeals. The SOIGA conducts the final review of inmate grievances in accord with Administrative Directive 804 (“DC-ADM 804”). This directive is part of the inmate handbook which is provided to each inmate and serves as the rules and regulations of the institution. She was contacted by the Office of Chief Counsel and asked to review the grievance appeal records of inmate Stokes (NX6961). Her review revealed that Stokes has not submitted any grievances while incarcerated with the DOC. Declaration of Amanda West, ECF No. 27-1 at 1-3. Clearly, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and has submitted no response to the Defendants' Motion to suggest otherwise.

Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be granted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by M. Adams, K. Feather, Morre, and W. Rouda be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.


Summaries of

Stokes v. Adams

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Apr 25, 2022
Civil Action 21-1060 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2022)
Case details for

Stokes v. Adams

Case Details

Full title:JEFFREY STOKES Plaintiff, v. M. ADAMS, Superintendent K. FEATHER…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Apr 25, 2022

Citations

Civil Action 21-1060 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2022)