Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-000432-MR
02-03-2017
EDWARD R. STOESS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Edward R. Stoess, Pro Se Roederer Correctional Complex BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Todd D. Ferguson Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 06-CR-00069 AND 07-CR-00065 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. CLAYTON, JUDGE: Edward Stoess broke into the home of his friend, James D. Shuttler, III. Stoess laid in wait for Shuttler to come home, and he then murdered Shuttler. Prior to these acts, Stoess learned that his estranged wife was now in a relationship with Shuttler, and Stoess believed Shuttler intended on supplanting Stoess as father to his children and husband to his wife. After murdering Shuttler, Stoess then went to Indiana and attempted to murder his estranged wife.
Stoess would later enter guilty pleas in Oldham Circuit Court to murder and first-degree burglary, receiving agreed-to 50- and 20-year sentences, to run concurrently for a total imprisonment sentence of 50 years. He then, pro se, filed and appealed a Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure ("RCr") 11.42 motion. A panel of this Court affirmed the RCr 11.42's denial. A detailed recitation of the facts underlying Stoess's criminal acts and the events leading up to his guilty plea, along with the details of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, was contained in this Court's previous opinion and are included herein by reference only. Stoess v. Commonwealth, 2014 WL 3887903 (Ky. App. 2014) (unpublished).
Stoess next filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure ("CR") 60.02(e) and (f). In that motion, Stoess claimed his guilty plea and sentence should be vacated and set aside because the Commonwealth allegedly committed a Brady violation before he entered his guilty plea. Stoess's principal defense, had he gone to trial, was that he was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance ("EED") when he committed the murder. Stoess obtained a mental-health expert who was prepared to testify that Stoess was suffering from EED. The Commonwealth also sought to have Stoess undergo a psychiatric examination. That evaluation took place at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center ("KCPC").
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Stoess avers the Brady violation occurred while he was at KCPC. Stoess claims that Shuttler had previously worked at KCPC and that Stoess was not told about this prior employment until he had already been admitted to KCPC. Stoess claims that while he was at KCPC being evaluated, the KCPC staff "sought to intimidate [Stoess] by letting him know that they knew Mr. Shuttler." Aplt's Brf. at 4. Stoess claims he reported the alleged intimidation to the senior security supervisor at KCPC. That supervisor, Stoess claims, informed Stoess that he was Shuttler's former supervisor. Stoess ended the meeting and finished the evaluation at KCPC.
Stoess then " immediately informed his attorney about Mr. Shuttler's former employment and the intimidation he suffered while at KCPC." Aplt's Brf. at 4 (emphasis in original). Stoess's attorney later filed a motion to exclude the evaluation's results. The trial court never ruled on that motion, as Stoess accepted a 50-year imprisonment sentence rather than face the death penalty.
The trial court considered the CR 60.02 motion and rejected it on two grounds. First, the trial court found there was no Brady violation, as Stoess was aware of the alleged conflict at KCPC and had filed a motion to exclude the KCPC report prior to entering his guilty plea. Second, the trial court found Stoess failed to meet his burden of proving special circumstances that justified CR 60.02(f) relief, and he failed to demonstrate reasons of an extraordinary nature existed to warrant CR 60.02 relief.
On appeal, Stoess claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his CR 60.02 motion. The Commonwealth responds that Stoess's CR 60.02 motion was properly denied for myriad reasons: (1) his argument is precluded because it could have been raised in his RCr 11.42 motion; (2) Stoess's guilty plea waived all defenses other than his indictment failed to charge an offense; (3) Stoess's Brady claim is precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine; and (4) no Brady violation occurred. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the CR 60.02 motion.
The denial of a CR 60.02 motion is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. 1996)). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
Under this standard, we hold that the trial court's stated reasons for denying the CR 60.02 motion are not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Principally, the trial court found there was no Brady violation. We agree. Stoess admits that prior to his trial and prior to his guilty plea he was aware of the alleged conflict of interest at KCPC. Stoess admits that prior to his guilty plea his attorney filed a motion to exclude the KCPC test results. Thus, Stoess admits that prior to his guilty plea he was aware of the allegedly withheld information.
This foreknowledge destroys Stoess's Brady claim. A Brady violation "involves the discovery, after trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). As Stoess was both aware of the information and was able to file a pre-trial motion based on the information, even if the other elements of a Brady claim were present, Stoess's claim would fail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parrish, 471 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Ky. 2015) ("Consequently, when such information is disclosed at trial and the defense actively cross-examines on it, there is no Brady violation."); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where "Bowling's defense counsel knew that Chappell had been convicted in federal court and cross-examined him about the disposition of the charges."); Commonwealth v. Grider, 390 S.W.3d 803, 819-20 (Ky. App. 2012) (". . . because the exculpatory evidence was disclosed prior to trial, Brady is inapplicable.").
Our opinion should not be construed as holding that the other elements of a Brady claim are present. We need not decide that issue to resolve whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the CR 60.02 motion. --------
Stoess had an opportunity to exclude the KCPC report. Instead of pursuing that route, Stoess elected to enter a guilty plea that permitted him to avoid the death penalty and receive a 50-year imprisonment sentence. Stoess's guilty plea colloquy lasted nearly an hour and included questions about the alleged KCPC conflict of interest. See Stoess v. Commonwealth, 2014 WL 3887903 (Ky. App. 2014) (unreported). In other words, Stoess was well acquainted with the allegedly withheld information. Stoess cannot, as he attempts to do here, get a second bite at the apple after he was aware of the information and elected to take the plea rather than roll the dice on his motion to exclude the evidence. "Brady does not give a defendant a second chance after trial once he becomes dissatisfied with the outcome if he had a chance at trial to address the evidence complained of." Nunley v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2013).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stoess's CR 60.02 motion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Edward R. Stoess, Pro Se
Roederer Correctional Complex BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky