Opinion
Case No. 1:20-cv-00153-BLW
06-17-2020
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Daniel Paul Stoddard's Complaint as a result of Plaintiff's status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. Although Plaintiff has since filed a document entitled "General Amended Complaint to Specific Claims," see Dkt. 7, it does not appear that Plaintiff intended this document to replace the initial pleading in this case—the document is just over one page long and is more like a supplement than an amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Thus, the Court construes this document as a supplement to the Complaint, even though Plaintiff did not seek leave to file the supplement.
The Court previously explained its construction of Plaintiff's initial pleading as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. 3 at 1 n.1.
The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed.
1. Screening Requirement
The Court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints filed in forma pauperis, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
2. Pleading Standard
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but a plaintiff must offer "more than ... unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability," or if there is an "obvious alternative explanation" that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") currently incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution. Plaintiff's handwriting is quite difficult to decipher, and it is unclear what precisely Plaintiff is alleging in the Complaint. Plaintiff is encouraged to write slowly and legibly if he chooses to amend the Complaint.
It appears that Plaintiff is an "enfrocked ... priest" of a religious order, "from the pulpit of CAVEAT." Compl., Dkt. 1, at 1. In his supplement, Plaintiff seeks "housing unit facility usage and property, and full religiously funded activities and privileges." Suppl., Dkt. 7 at 1. Plaintiff also has attached three IDOC policies to his Complaint: the access to courts policy, the religious activities policy, and the religious property policy. See Compl. at 4-61. Therefore, it seems Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Finally, because Plaintiff's Supplement refers to "A.D.A. clients," see Dkt. 7 at 2, he may be attempting to assert claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
4. Discussion
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with the Complaint. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 60 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.
A. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To be liable under § 1983, "the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). Negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is not an abuse of governmental power but merely a "failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 ("[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct."). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
However, "[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 'if there exists ... a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.'" Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging that a defendant (1) "set[] in motion a series of acts by others"; (2) "knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury"; (3) failed to act or improperly acted in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates"; (4) "acquiesc[ed] in the constitutional deprivation"; or (5) engag[ed] in "conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others." Id. at 1205-09.
A plaintiff may also seek injunctive relief from officials who have direct responsibility in the area in which the plaintiff seeks relief. Rounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). However, states and state entities are immune from suit in federal court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity and, therefore, cannot be sued under § 1983. See; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1979); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a state is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983).
A claim that a supervisor or training official failed to adequately train subordinates ordinarily requires that, "in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor or training official] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). That is, to maintain a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a "pattern of violations" that amounts to deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011).
Likewise, "a failure to supervise that is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference" that supports a § 1983 claim, but there generally must be a pattern of violations sufficient to render the need for further supervision obvious. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, if a supervisory or training official had "knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions" through such a pattern of violations—including knowledge of the "culpable actions of his subordinates"—yet failed to act to remedy those conditions, that official can be said to have acquiesced "in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates" such that a causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional violation is plausible. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208.
A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff's injury or damage. Alleging "the mere possibility of misconduct" is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
i. Access to Courts Claims
Prisoners have a right to access the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, because the right of access to the courts is not an "abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
To state a viable access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he suffered an actual injury as a result of the defendant's actions. Id. at 349. Actual injury may be manifest if the alleged denial of access "hindered [the plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a legal claim," such as having his complaint dismissed "for failure to satisfy some technical requirement," or if he "suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by [the defendants' actions] that he was unable even to file a complaint." Id. at 351.
The Constitution does not require that inmates "be able to conduct generalized research," nor does it "guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines." Id. at 355, 360. Rather, the right of access to the courts requires only that inmates "be able to present their grievances to the courts—a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of legal assistance." Id. at 360 (emphasis added). Further, as with all § 1983 claims, a plaintiff cannot state an access to courts claim by alleging that a negligent act by a government official caused the actual injury of which the plaintiff complains. Krug v. Lewis, 852 F.2d 571 (Table), 1988 WL 74699, *1 (9th Cir. July 6, 1988) (unpublished) ("While prisoners have a due process right of access to the courts, the negligent act of a public official does not violate that right.") (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333).
The right of access to the courts is limited and applies only to direct appeals from convictions for which the inmates are incarcerated, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions regarding prison conditions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55; Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[P]risoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active interference by prison officials.") (emphasis omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015). Thus, "[i]mpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (emphasis omitted).
Claims of denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of "a litigating opportunity yet to be gained" (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that now cannot be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-15 (2002). A complaint alleging a denial of access to the courts must plausibly allege that the plaintiff suffered, or will suffer, the loss of a past or present litigating opportunity. The plaintiff must assert facts supporting three elements: (1) official acts that frustrated the inmate's litigation activities; (2) the loss (or expected loss) of a "nonfrivolous" or "arguable" underlying claim that must be set forth in the federal complaint, including the level of detail necessary "as if it were being independently pursued"; and (3) that the remedy sought through the access to courts claim is not otherwise available in another suit that could be brought. Id. at 415-17. "There is, after all, no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element." Id. at 415.
A prisoner asserting an access to courts claim must also allege facts showing that the alleged violation of his rights was proximately caused by a state actor. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 550 U.S. 1150 (2009); see also Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. The proximate cause analysis focuses on whether it was foreseeable that the state actor's conduct would result in a deprivation of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. Phillips, 477 F. 3d at 1077 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2000)).
ii. Free Exercise Claims
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion; it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Inmates retain their free exercise of religion rights in prison. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate who is an adherent of a minority religion must be afforded a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). A prison need not, however, provide "identical facilities or personnel" for "every religious sect or group within a prison," and a "special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand." Id. at 322 n.2.
To serve as a basis for a viable claim challenging a prison restriction under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate's belief must be both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, the burden placed on the inmate's religious exercise by the defendants' actions must be substantial. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). De minimis—or minor—burdens on the free exercise of religion are not of a constitutional dimension, even if the belief upon which the exercise is based is sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See, e.g., Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (the unavailability of a non-pork tray for inmate at 3 meals out of 810 does not constitute more than a de minimis burden on inmate's free exercise of religion).
Challenges to prison restrictions that are alleged "to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law." Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity for religious exercise, therefore, must be evaluated within the context of a prison's need for security, among other legitimate goals. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (1987) (holding that a prison's policy of not allowing Muslim inmates on work detail to return to the prison to attend Jumu'ah, a group worship service, did not violate the Constitution).
So long as a restriction on an inmate's religious practice "is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," that restriction is valid. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Factors to be considered in this reasonableness inquiry include (1) whether there is a logical connection between the governmental interest and the particular policy or decision at issue; (2) whether "alternative means of exercising the right remain open to prison inmates"; (3) the impact that accommodating a prisoner's religious practice would have on "other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources generally"; and (4) whether there is an absence of "obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by" prison officials. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "[E]ven where claims are made under the First Amendment," courts must take care to avoid substitut[ing] [their] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration." Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
A prison's occasional failure to accommodate a religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause where there is no evidence that the failures were caused by "anything other than institutional shortage." Id. Similarly, a temporary delay in accommodating religious practice does not violate the First Amendment when caused by ordinary administrative or institutional delay. See Tapp v. Stanley, 2008 WL 4934592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that a 3-month delay in providing a prisoner with a religious meal did not substantially burden the prisoner's sincerely-held religious beliefs where the delay was "caused by ordinary administrative delay").
B. RLUIPA Claims
The First Amendment is not the only source of religious protection within a prison. RLUIPA provides, "No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person[] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
RLUIPA applies to entities receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at (b)(1). By accepting federal funds, however, states do not waive sovereign immunity to suits for money damages under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 280 (2011). Further, although the statute provides for injunctive relief, RLUIPA does not allow for monetary damages against individuals. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 902-04 (9th Cir. 2014).
An inmate asserting a RLUIPA claim bears the initial burden of showing that the governmental action constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate's religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). For an official's action to constitute a substantial burden on an inmate's religious exercise, it "must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise." San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether an inmate's religious exercise is substantially burdened, a court may not inquire "into whether a particular belief is 'central' to a prisoner's religion." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). However, "the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity." Id.
If the inmate establishes "the prima facie existence" of a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate's religion, then the burden shifts to prison officials "to prove that [the] substantial burden on [the inmate's] exercise of his religious beliefs is both 'in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and the 'least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'" Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)).
"The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party. If a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it." Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364-65 (2015) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Prison officials or a state department of correction "cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice." Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999.
Although RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate's religious rights, id., the statute does not "elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order and safety," Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). A prisoner's requests for religious accommodation must not override other significant interests within a prison setting. "Should inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition." Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726. In the words of the Supreme Court, "context matters." Id. at 723 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
C. ADA Claims
The ADA generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's disability. Title II of the ADA applies to an "individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Title II extends to prison inmates who are deprived of the benefits of participation in prison programs, services, or activities because of a disability. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998). In order to proceed with an ADA claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997).
The governmental entity is required to "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). "The ADA does not require perfect parity among programs offered by various facilities that are operated by the same umbrella institution. But an inmate cannot be categorically excluded from a beneficial prison program based on his or her disability alone." Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008).
By statutory definition, a Title II ADA claim must be brought against the state or the state entity. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity for states for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."); compare Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that Title II's statutory language does not prohibit a plaintiff from requesting injunctive action against state officials in their official capacities). Claims against individuals asserted under the ADA are treated as official capacity claims because no individual capacity claims exist under the statute. See, e.g., Becker v. Oregon, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (D. Or. 2001).
5. Standards for Amended Complaint
If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss" or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular federal constitutional provision (or state law provision) Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging that the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of First Amendment or RLUIPA claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant.
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff's allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 ("Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend."); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent."), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).
Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as the "First Amended Complaint." Plaintiff's name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a "Motion to Review the Amended Complaint." If Plaintiff does not amend within 60 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) ("When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.").
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff has 60 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the
amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff does not amend within 60 days, this case may be dismissed without further notice.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to provide Plaintiff with the Court's form § 1983 complaint. Plaintiff is encouraged to use this form if he intends to assert civil rights claims in an amended complaint.
DATED: June 17, 2020
/s/_________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge