Hence, the date of the severance is the date the appellate timetable began to run for appellants to file the transcript with this court. See Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). (Where summary judgment was rendered on one issue, but other claims remained to be decided, filing time did not begin to run until all claims were final so that party could appeal grant of summary judgment.) Appellants did not file the transcript in this court until October 17, 1989, some eighty-two days after the signing of the order granting severance of appellants' individual claims.
The Texas Supreme Court held that a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered. We held in Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1974) that the rule of Pan American was not changed by Aldridge because " [Aldridge] states a test for determining when a judgment 'not intrinsically interlocutory' may be presumed to have disposed of parties or issues not explicitly mentioned." In the case before us, the judgment is not "intrinsically interlocutory."
It is inapplicable in a case such as the instant one where the summary judgment does not purport to dispose of all parties or claims pending before the court. See Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1974, no writ). In the instant case, there was no order of severance of appellants' counterclaim, and the judgment states, "this Court is of the opinion, and so finds . . . that there is an absence of any genuine issue of any material fact concerning Plaintiff's entitlement to judgment Based on all causes of action alleged in Plaintiff's Original Petition."
Where conspiracy is involved, the defendant-movant in a summary judgment hearing bears a negative burden of proving the absence of conspiracy. See Cheatwood v. Jackson, 442 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.)), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam,445 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Sup.1969); Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1974, no writ). The summary judgment evidence in this case will not support the judgment entered on behalf of the Central National Bank. Unlike the case of St. Joseph Pro. Bldg. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 449 S.W .2d 848 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), there is summary judgment evidence that the Central National Bank, while acting as a fiduciary of N.F.C., did participate in the sale of the pledged 46,572 shares of stock in P.N.C. with the third party purchasers of the stock.
As movants in a summary judgment proceeding, each defendant had the burden of presenting summary judgment evidence which established as a matter of law the absence of a conspiracy, the absence of malice, and the presence of good faith. Cheatwood v. Jackson, 442 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.)), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 445 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Sup.1969); Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1974, no writ). The plaintiff asserts before this Court that he pled no cause of action against the City of Kemah, the City of League City, and the City of La Marque; and that the County of Galveston is the only political subdivision of the State which was made a defendant.
It need be only 'a motivating cause.' Stockton v. Summers, 504 S.W.2d 637 (Tex .Civ.App.--Houston (14th) 1974, no writ); Pressley v. Holley, 507 S.W .2d 869 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1974, writ ref. n.r.e.); General Motors Corp. v. Dabney, 510 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1974, no writ). The trial court could readily have concluded that Tover's agreement to help with expenses was a tangible benefit moving to Taylor and was 'a motivating cause' for Taylor's decision to furnish the transportation.