Opinion
CIVIL 1:22-cv-00114
07-25-2022
RONALD TERELL STOCKTON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
(Judge Wilson)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Ronald Stockton, a state inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. In 2014, Stockton was convicted of aggravated assault, a charge which stemmed from a confrontation with correctional staff at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield in December of 2013. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 27 to 100 months to run consecutive to any other state sentence he was serving.
Stockton now challenges this conviction and sentence on a variety of constitutional grounds. However, this habeas corpus petition is fatally flawed on one significant ground-it was filed more than one year past the statute of limitations deadline. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this petition be dismissed as untimely.
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The factual history of this case was aptly summarized in the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision affirming Stockton's conviction and sentence:
On December 20, 2013, Stockton was housed as an inmate on the “K Block” at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, in Huntington County, Pennsylvania. On the date in question, Correctional Officer Adam Park was controlling the K Block operations when he accidentally opened the wrong set of cell doors. Stockton was residing in one of the cells that Officer Park accidentally opened. Stockton immediately exited his cell. Officer Park ordered Stockton to return to his cell. Stockton initially ignored the order, and told Officer Park that, because he let Stockton out, he could put him back in. Stockton then returned to his cell and put on his red prison jumpsuit. He then came back out into the general prison area. Officer Park sealed off the area and then informed other correctional officers about the situation.
Officer Ryan Willinsky was one of the first correctional officers to approach Stockton. Officer Willinsky repeatedly ordered Stockton to return to his cell, which Stockton ignored. Officer Willinsky then ordered Stockton to face the wall and place his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. Stockton also ignored that order. Instead of complying, he took a defensive stance, pushed Officer Willinsky away, and attempted to punch Officer Willinsky in the face. Stockton then threw multiple other punches at Officer Willinsky, many of which landed on Officer Willinsky's head and neck. Other officers appeared on the scene and attempted to subdue Stockton. Stockton refused to comply with the officers. Stockton began kicking at the officers, continuing to do so until five correctional officers were able to get Stockton to the ground and under control.
Correctional Officer Timothy Barndt also was involved in the attempt to subdue Stockton. During the melee, Officer Barndt was struck in the face and head two or three times by Stockton. Eventually, the officers
placed Stockton in leg shackles and took him to be evaluated by the prison's medical services.
Following a jury trial, Stockton was convicted of aggravated assault, as noted above. On November 13, 2014, the trial court sentenced Stockton to twenty-seven months to one hundred months' incarceration.Commonwealth v. Stockton, 2015 WL 7938639, at*1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). Stockton's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on April 20, 2016. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016).
Stockton filed a timely petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., on April 19, 2017. The PCRA court denied the petition on August 15, 2017, and the Superior Court affirmed the denial of his PCRA petition on August 6, 2018. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 2018 WL 3719751 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). Stockton then filed a second PCRA petition on May 3, 2019, which was dismissed as untimely by the PCRA court, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Superior Court on November 25, 2019. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 2019 WL 6318152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). Stockton's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Supreme Court on August 12, 2020. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 237 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2020).
On September 18, 2020, Stockton filed a third PCRA petition, claiming that he had received newly discovered evidence in support of his actual innocence claims. Specifically, Stockton argued that the Commonwealth withheld evidence of two reprimands given to Officers Kim and Willinsky regarding the confrontation underlying Stockton's assault conviction. The PCRA court dismissed this petition as untimely, noting that Stockton had not met his burden to establish a newly discovered evidence claim because Stockton was aware of the facts underlying this alleged newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 1-14, at 2-5). Moreover, the court found that the other claims advanced in this third untimely petition had already been litigated or waived. (Id., at 5). The Superior Court affirmed the denial of this third PCRA petition on May 3, 2021, and Stockton's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied on November 2, 2021. Commonwealth v. Stockton, 256 A.3d 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021); Commonwealth v. Stockton, 266 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2021).
The instant habeas corpus petition was filed on January 21, 2022. (Doc. 1). In his petition, Stockton raises several grounds which he believes entitle him to relief, including a Brady violation and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The respondents have filed a response to the petition, arguing that the petition is time-barred. (Doc. 28). After review, we conclude that Stockton's petition is plainly barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and we will recommend that the petition be denied.
III. Standard of Review
A. State Prisoner Habeas Relief-The Legal Standard.
(1) Substantive Standards
In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
.....
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b).
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy exacting substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
(2) Procedural Benchmarks - Statute of Limitations
Furthermore, state prisoners seeking relief under Section 2254 must also satisfy specific, and precise, procedural standards. Among these procedural prerequisites is a requirement that petitioners timely file motions seeking habeas corpus relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, established a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners. In pertinent part, § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an plication created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or,
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.See Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998).
The calculation of this limitations period is governed by a series of well-defined rules. At the outset, these rules are prescribed by statute, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), prescribes several forms of statutory tolling. First, with respect to tolling based upon a petitioner's direct appeal of his conviction: “The limitation period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The courts have construed this tolling provision in a forgiving fashion, and in a manner that enables petitioners to toll their filing deadlines for the time periods in which they could have sought further direct appellate review of their cases, even if they did not, in fact, elect to seek such review. Thus, with respect to direct appeals, the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which a petitioner could have sought discretionary appellate court review, by way of allocator or through a petition for writ of certiorari, even if no such petition is filed. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119, 129 S.Ct. 681, 685, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). After this period of time passes, however, by statute the judgment of conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), in turn, prescribes a second period of statutory tolling requirements while state prisoners seek collateral review of these convictions in state court, and provides that:
The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).
In assessing § 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision, for purposes of tolling the federal habeas statute of limitations, a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review” only includes applications which are filed in a timely fashion under state law. Therefore, if the petitioner is delinquent in seeking state collateral review of his conviction, that tardy state pleading will not be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and will not toll the limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-14 (2005); Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3d. Cir. 2004). Moreover, in contrast to the direct appeal tolling provisions, this post-conviction petition tolling provision does not allow for an additional period of tolling for the petitioner who does not seek further discretionary appellate court review of his conviction and sentence. Miller v. Dragovich, 311 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
Beyond this tolling period mandated by statute, it has also been held that AEDPA's one-year limitations period is not a jurisdictional bar to the filing of habeas petitions, Miller, 145 F.3d at 617-18, and, therefore, is subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 618-19. Yet, while equitable tolling is permitted in state habeas petitions under AEDPA, it is not favored. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
[E]quitable tolling is proper only when the “principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair.” Generally, this will occur when the petitioner has “in some extraordinary way ... been prevented from asserting his or her rights” The petitioner must show that he or she “exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.” Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted). Indeed, there are only three recognized instances in which equitable tolling is permitted: (1) if the petitioner was actively misled; (2) if the petitioner has been prevented from asserting his rights in some extraordinary way; or (3) if the petitioner timely asserted his rights but asserted them in the wrong forum. Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).
Applying this exacting standard, courts have held that: “In non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling.” Id. (citing Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no basis for equitable tolling where the statute of limitations was changed to shorten the time for filing a PCRA only four months prior to the filing of the petition); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding lawyer's inadequate research, which led to miscalculating the deadline, did not warrant equitable tolling)). Courts have also repeatedly rejected claims by pro se litigants that the burdens of proceeding pro se should somehow exempt them from strict compliance with the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). This is true even when the pro se litigant has filed an untimely petition due to a misunderstanding of the statute of limitations. See Jones v. Morton, 195, F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the petitioner's “misunderstanding of the exhaustion requirement is insufficient to excuse his failure to comply with the statute of limitations”); Sanders v. Link, 2017 WL 9437539, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2017) (pro se petitioner's misunderstanding did not permit equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations). Thus, while tardy habeas petitioners often invite courts to find extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling, those invitations are rarely embraced by the courts. See, e.g., Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157 (3d.Cir. 2003) (denying equitable tolling request); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128 (3d. Cir. 2002) (same).
III. Discussion
Turning to the instant case, we conclude that Stockton's petition is plainly untimely, as it was filed more than one year outside of the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Stockton was convicted in the Huntingdon County Court of Common Pleas on September 16, 2014 and sentenced on November 13, 2014. Stockton appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed his conviction and sentence on December 4, 2015, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal on April 20, 2016. Thus, his conviction and sentence became final, and the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitation began to run, ninety days later on July 19, 2016. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(3) (noting that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including “at the expiration of time for seeking the review” by the Supreme Court of the United States); U.S. S.Ct. Rule 13 (providing that a writ of certiorari to review a judgment is timely when it is filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment).
Stockton then filed a timely PCRA petition, thereby tolling the statute of limitations, on April 19, 2017, 274 days after his conviction and sentence became final. His PCRA petition was denied, and the Superior Court affirmed the denial on August 6, 2018. Stockton did not file an appeal, and thus the statute of limitations resumed on September 5, 2018, and Stockton had 91 days remaining to file his habeas corpus petition. However, Stockton did not file the instant petition until January 21, 2022, more than three years after the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, on its face, Stockton's petition is untimely.
See Pa. R.A.P. 1113(a) (setting a thirty-day time period to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
Moreover, Stockton has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances that would justify the equitable tolling of the limitations period. At the outset, we are constrained to note that a tardy state pleading will not be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and will not toll the limitations period. Pace, 544 U.S. at 412-14; Long, 393 F.3d at 394-95. Moreover, a pro se litigant's misunderstanding of the statute of limitations is not grounds for equitable tolling. See Jones, 195, F.3d at 160 (finding that the petitioner's “misunderstanding of the exhaustion requirement is insufficient to excuse his failure to comply with the statute of limitations”); Sanders, 2017 WL 9437539, at *3 (pro se petitioner's misunderstanding did not permit equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations). In the instant case, both Stockton's second and third PCRA petitions were dismissed as untimely by the state courts. Accordingly, these untimely petitions do not work to toll the limitations period.
Stockton asserts a claim of newly discovered evidence in an attempt to equitably toll the limitations period. He avers that this newly discovered evidence- the reprimands issued to two officers involved in the confrontation in December of 2013-demonstrate his actual innocence of the aggravated assault charge. Stockton asserted these claims in his untimely PCRA petition, and the court found that Stockton's newly discovered evidence claims were unfounded:
[Appellant's] newly discovered evidence claims fail because the facts underlying both verbal reprimands were known to him at the time of trial. In regard to the video, CO Kim was not reprimanded for “tampering” with the video, but rather turning off the camera too early. Per the written record of the reprimand and CO Kim's own written incident report, he was not given the video camera until after [Appellant] was removed from his cell to the strip search area for evaluation and treatment by medical staff, and only then after the medical staff had arrived (all of which occurred after the assault for which [Appellant] was convicted). CO Kim recorded the strip search and evaluation, the escort of [Appellant] back to his cell, and another three to five minutes of the aftermath of the incident after [Appellant] was returned to his cell. The reprimand notes that per Department of Corrections policy, once recording of an incident starts, it is to continue until the entire incident is completed, including the debriefing. The video was played at trial, so [Appellant] was certainly aware of its endpoint at that time. See Commonwealth v. Stockton, 2016 WL 1052210, at *4 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Finally, we note that contrary to appellant's assertion, the corrected sentencing order is not a newly discovered fact because appellant's sentence was known to him, as he was present when the trial court sentenced him in open court, and he acknowledged his understanding of the sentence imposed.”).
Similarly, [Appellant] cannot claim to have had no knowledge of the facts underlying CO Willinsky's reprimand for using inappropriate language, as [Appellant] was present when CO Willinsky made the statements at issue.Commonwealth v. Stockton, 256 A.3d 2, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (quoting PCRA Court Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 10/23/20, at 1-3).
Moreover, it is well settled that “[p]roving actual innocence based on new evidence requires the petitioner to demonstrate (1) new evidence (2) that is reliable and (3) so probative of innocence that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). In the instant case, even if the reprimands constituted new, reliable evidence, in our view they are not so probative of innocence that no reasonable juror would have convicted Stockton of the aggravated assault charge. C.O. Kim was reprimanded for turning the camera off before the debriefing session after the unplanned use of force. (Doc. 1-4, at 4). C.O. Willinsky was reprimanded for using abusive language toward Stockton during the confrontation. (Id., at 1). Neither reprimand demonstrates that Stockton was actually innocent of the assault charge. Moreover, taken in context with the other evidence, including employee incident reports documenting the December 2013 use of force incident, we cannot conclude that no reasonable juror would have convicted Stockton. Indeed, the incident reports show that Stockton was the initial aggressor toward C.O. Willinsky and other responding officers after refusing Willinsky's order to return to his cell. (See Doc. 1-7). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that these reprimands establish new evidence that would be grounds for equitable tolling of this untimely habeas petition. Accordingly, this untimely petition should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case be DENIED, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.