Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99cv182-D-D
August 21, 2000
OPINION
Before the court is the motion of Defendant Lowndes County, Mississippi, for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.
The parties have submitted extensive memoranda in support of and in opposition to the instant motion. In addition, both parties have attached as exhibits to their briefs excerpts from depositions and extraneous materials relevant to this cause. It is entirely within the discretion of the court to accept material outside the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss and, therefore, convert the motion into one for summary judgment. Ware v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980); Bolton v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1219, 1220 (S.D.Miss. 1985). Should the court decide to accept the extraneous material, it must then treat the matter as one for summary judgment. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 1234, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972). Thus, because the submitted material is comprehensive enough to enable the court to make a complete and rational determination, the motion to dismiss shall be converted to one for summary judgment.
Factual Background
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rather, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court's factual summary is so drafted.
Plaintiff Jessica Stockman (Stockman) filed the underlying Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Lowndes County, Mississippi, former Lowndes County Detention Officer Brandon Hill and former Lowndes County Detention Supervisor Emmitt Stallings, alleging violations under the Violence Against Women Act, constitutional violations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
On or about May 19, 1998, the Plaintiff entered the Lowndes County Adult Detention Center (LCADC) in Columbus, Mississippi. Approximately one week later, after attempting suicide, Stockman was transferred to a holding cell in the booking area of the detention center where she could be closely monitored. On or about June 13, 1998, Defendant Stallings approached the duty officer in charge of the booking area and instructed her to take a lunch break in a separate area of the jail. Stallings remained present in the booking area, providing access to the Plaintiff and acting as a lookout for Hill. Shortly thereafter, Hill entered the Plaintiff's holding cell and raped her. Roughly two months later, Stockman reported the sexual assault, an investigation was initiated, and the individual Defendants were placed on administrative leave pending the investigation. Ultimately, Hill and Stallings were terminated from employment and Hill pleaded guilty to criminal charges in connection with the assault.
Lowndes County presently seeks dismissal of the claims against it.
Discussion
At the outset, the court notes that the Plaintiff has abandoned her claims under the Violence Against Women Act and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, these claims shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("The burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Claims Against Lowndes County
Stockman alleges that her constitutional rights were violated by the County's deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights and by its failure to properly train Hill and Stallings regarding sexual misconduct between inmates and jailers.
A sexual assault on an inmate by a guard, regardless of the gender of the guard or of the prisoner, is deeply offensive to human dignity. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). "Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not `part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
In analyzing such constitutional challenges by inmates, the court must first assess the classification of a challenge as either an attack on a "condition of confinement" or as an "episodic act or omission." Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997). A condition of confinement challenge is a constitutional attack on general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of confinement. Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Conversely, where the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials, the action is characterized properly as an "episodic act or omission" case. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 645. In an "episodic act or omission" case, an actor is usually interposed between the inmate or detainee and the municipality, "such that the detainee complains first of a particular act of, or omission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission." Scott, 114 F.3d at 53.
In an episodic act or omission case, courts employ different standards depending on whether the liability of the individual defendant or of the municipal defendant is at issue. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n. 14. Here, the only issue before the court is that of the liability of Lowndes County.
In her Amended Complaint, Stockman complains generally of improper staffing procedures, i.e., allowing unsupervised male guards to escort female inmates to or from the shower facility, and/or failing to properly train the detention officers regarding sexual misconduct between inmates and jailers. The actual harm of which she complains, however, is the sexual assault committed by Hill — an episodic event perpetrated by an actor interposed between Stockman and the County, but allegedly caused or permitted by the aforesaid general conditions.
In many prison or jail condition cases, the conditions of confinement themselves constitute the harm. This is true, for example, where inadequate food, heating, or sanitary conditions constitute miserable conditions. See Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. In the case at bar, however, Stockman did not suffer from the mere existence of the alleged improper staffing or lack of training, but only from Hill's specific sexual assault committed on but one occasion. Consequently, this case does not fit well within the "conditions of confinement" category and, in the opinion of the court, bears a closer resemblance to cases regarding episodic acts by jail personnel.
As in most cases involving episodic acts by jail employees, the Defendants in this cause of action are both individual and governmental. While the subject episode may be perpetrated by one or more persons, any underlying conditions that may have caused it or made it possible are the product of the municipality's policy, action, or inaction. Thus, Hare requires that the court separate the inquiry pertinent to the episodic act or omission from that pertinent to the custom, rule, or policy that is alleged to have permitted the act. Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n. 4. Thus, to hold a municipality accountable for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the municipal employee violated her clearly established constitutional rights with deliberate indifference; and (2) that the employee's act resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id.; Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1999). So, as to the discrete, episodic act, the inmate must establish only that the constitutional violation complained of was done with subjective deliberate indifference to that inmate's constitutional rights. In the instant case, Stockman has met that burden. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Accordingly, the court must next determine whether Lowndes County may be held accountable for that violation. Under Hare, as stated above, this latter burden may be met by putting forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that the predicate episodic act resulted from a municipal custom, rule, or policy adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights. See Grabowski v. Jackson County Pub. Defenders Office, 79 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n. 4).
Stockman offers the following arguments to suggest that the County should have known about the risks inherent in its improper staffing procedure: (1) despite jail policy requiring minimal interaction between male guards and female inmates, the jail had a custom or practice of permitting unsupervised male jailers to take female inmates to or from the shower facility; and (2) that there existed a persistent level of sexual misconduct at the jail resulting from this improper interaction. Stockman contends that this conduct reveals a custom or usage by the County reflecting "deliberate indifference to the safety of female inmates who were placed in a vulnerable position, vis a vis a male jailer without any form of supervision." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, at 13.
Municipal custom or usage is demonstrated by:
1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees;
2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and
3) The plaintiff's injury by acts pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., proof that the custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Ware v. Jackson County, Missouri, 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990)). To demonstrate custom or usage, the Plaintiff cites prior instances and allegations of sexual misconduct in the County facility. Indeed, the Defendant concedes there were prior incidents of sexual encounters between inmates and jailers or other inmates, but it submits that in each instance the responsible party was promptly reprimanded or terminated from employment. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hill, prior to the Stockman rape, had been the subject of two allegations: first that he had asked a female inmate for "a date," and second that he was exchanging drugs for sexual favors.
Notwithstanding the Defendant's prompt responses, the court finds persuasive the fact that none of the prior alleged instances of sexual misconduct involved non-consensual relations. Each prior incident cited by both Plaintiff and Defendant whether between inmates and jailers or between inmates, involved voluntary, consensual sexual conduct. Moreover, no allegation similar to Stockman's claim appears in the record before the court.
It appears well-established that while consensual conduct may violate municipal policy, it carries no constitutional implication. See Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that welcome and consensual sexual contact between inmates and prison personnel does not violated the Eighth Amendment); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "minimal intrusions on an inmate's privacy," such as the surveillance of a showering inmate, may be outweighed by penological and safety concerns). While the Plaintiff's claim is not based on a consensual encounter, each instance offered to establish a municipal custom or usage is based on voluntary conduct. With respect to the Plaintiff's allegations regarding male guards escorting and observing female inmates in the shower facility, visual surveillance is an essential factor in maintaining jail security and such observation is rationally related to prison needs. Absent a showing that the practice is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, the conduct does not impermissibly violate the inmate's privacy rights. Timm, 917 F.2d at 1102. Because the Plaintiff has failed to establish the first prong of demonstrating a custom or policy, i.e., the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees, the court need not proceed.
Nevertheless, the court also notes that the County had promulgated Standard Operational Guidelines to regulate the management of the jail and had trained its jailers in its provisions. Among other things, the Guidelines (1) require that detention staff respect the privacy needs of inmates, particularly in situations wherein male inmates are supervised by female staff and female inmates are supervised by male staff; (2) prohibit male officers from entering the female housing unit except in the event of emergency; (3) require that male officers entering the female housing unit do so only with appropriate staff back-up; and (4) generally limit conduct between male officers and female inmates.
The County's actions, viewed individually and taken in whole, reflect substantial attention to the safety of female detainees. "This effort indicates not apathy, but concern." Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1992). At best, the evidence proffered by Stockman may be construed to suggest that the jail could have been managed better, or that the County lacked sufficient prescience to anticipate that a well-trained jailer would, without warning, assault a female inmate. In either event, they do not reflect a municipal policy, custom, or usage adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to Stockman's constitutional rights.
With respect to the Plaintiff's "failure to train" allegation, the Supreme Court has established two fundamental requirements for establishing municipal liability under § 1983 for inadequate training policies: culpability and causation. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998). First, as discussed above, the municipal policy or custom must have been adopted with "deliberate indifference" to known or obvious consequences. Second, the municipality must be the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation. Id. Plaintiffs seeking to win under a failure to train theory must first prove a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation; they then must establish that the municipality consciously enacted a policy reflecting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
In determining the issue of a municipality's liability, the focus must be on the adequacy of the training program relative to the tasks the particular officers must perform. Id. at 390-91, 109 S.Ct. at 1205-06.
That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program . . . Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). Furthermore, proof of a single incident ordinarily is insufficient to hold a municipal entity liable for inadequate training. The plaintiff must demonstrate "at least a pattern of similar incidents in which the citizens were injured . . . to establish the official policy requisite to municipal liability under section 1983." Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798-99.
The court has heretofore addressed the Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate either a pattern of similar incidents in which inmates were sexually assaulted or injured or a custom or practice reflecting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates. Stockman has failed to show that the County knew of or tolerated any sexual assaults in the detention center.
Based on the foregoing principals, the court finds that Stockman has failed to establish any fact sufficient to support a claim against Lowndes County. Accordingly, the Defendant Lowndes County, Mississippi, is entitled to summary judgment.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1) the Defendant Lowndes County, Mississippi's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;
the Plaintiff's claims under the Violence Against Women Act are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
the Plaintiff's claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
the Plaintiff's claims against Lowndes County, Mississippi are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
The Defendant's motion to strike is DENIED.