Opinion
No. CA 3:03-CV-0426-R.
April 21, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 19, 2003). For the reasons detailed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marsha L. Stockbridge ("Stockbridge" or "Plaintiff") filed suit on February 28, 2003, alleging claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant First Consulting Group, Inc. ("FCG" or "Defendant"). Plaintiff seeks actual damages for each of her three claims, exemplary damages for her retaliation claim, and attorney's fees.Plaintiff spent five years working at FCG. During the course of her tenure with FCG, Stockbridge advanced to the position of Senior Consultant in the Revenue Cycle department at FCG. As a Senior Consultant, Stockbridge failed to meet the company's performance and billable goals. On October 29, 2001, Stockbridge received an annual review indicating that she failed to meet FCG's expectations for developing and demonstrating an understanding of revenue cycle components, functions, and processes. On June 13, 2002, she received a project evaluation by her manager at the time, Ed Lockliear, indicating that she failed to meet FCG's expectations in a number of performance review categories. Roy Walters, then Vice President of FCG's Revenue Cycle Practice, himself witnessed Stockbridge's performance and concluded that she lacked the expected level of knowledge and skills for her position. He spoke with Stockbridge regarding her job performance progress and concurred with Lockliear's evaluation of her performance. In July of 2002, Walters placed Stockbridge on a thirty-day performance improvement plan, and she was terminated in September of 2002.
Prior to her termination and following her initial difficulties in achieving billable goals, Stockbridge was assigned to a project in Seattle, Washington. Ed Lockliear was Plaintiff's manager on the Seattle-based project. Plaintiff alleges that Lockliear sexually harassed her while they worked together on the Seattle-based project. Stockbridge claims that Lockliear consistently called her "honey," "baby child," or "sweetie pie," and rubbed her shoulders or petted her hands. Plaintiff further describes three specific instances of alleged harassment. First, after Plaintiff favorably commented on Lockliear's necktie, he replied that he would tie her up with it later. Second, upon witnessing a heated interaction between Plaintiff and a colleague, Lockliear commented that he was going to take both women to Victoria Secret and buy them some panties that weren't in a wad. Third, Plaintiff claims that on one occasion Lockliear slid a ruler up her skirt, moved it around, and said, "Oh, now I feel much better."
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Because employment discrimination claims "involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent," summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving these cases. Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). However, if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999), or if defendant presents strong evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff is unable to counter with additional evidence of pretext, summary judgment may be properly granted. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Sexual Harassment Claim
Stockbridge asserts a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., With respect to an employer's liability, the Supreme Court laid out a framework for evaluating supervisor sexual harassment cases under Title VII. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Ind., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). The Fifth Circuit thereafter drew a "roadmap" for the determination of such claims. Casiano v. ATT Corp., 213 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2000). The court must determine "whether the complaining employee has or has not suffered a `tangible employment action.'" Id. at 283. If the plaintiff has suffered a tangible employment action, the suit is a "quid pro quo" case. Id. Next, the court must determine whether a nexus exists such that the employment action "resulted from [her] acceptance or rejection of [her] supervisor's alleged sexual harassment." Id.
In this case, Stockbridge was terminated, and her termination constitutes a tangible employment action. Thus, to find FCG vicariously liable under Title VII for sexual harassment by a supervisor, this Court must determine whether Stockbridge was terminated as a result of harassment by Lockliear. Plaintiff's sole contention with regard to the required nexus between the alleged harassment and her termination rests on the potentially questionable nature of Lockliear's negative performance evaluation. A negative evaluation, however, is not an ultimate employment decision. "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions." Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's argument that Lockliear's evaluation contributed to her placement on a thirty-day performance improvement plan, which contributed to her termination, fails to demonstrate a nexus between the harassment and her termination. Plaintiff contends in the alternative that Lockliear's negative evaluation presents a fact issue for trial. This Court disagrees. No genuine issue of material fact remains as to Lockliear's evaluation. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim under Title VII
Although Plaintiff cites her placement on a thirty-day performance improvement plan as a relevant "tangible employment action," this Circuit includes as actionable only ultimate employment actions. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997). (Buchmeyer, J.) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
C. Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff's second claim under Title VII is one of retaliation. To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she engaged in protective activity; (2) that she experienced an adverse employment action following the protected activity; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Montemayor v. City of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff carries her burden, the defendant is required to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. Then, if the defendant has established such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the adverse employment action would not have occurred "but for" her protected conduct. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for filing a complaint with the EEOC, a protected activity. Stockbridge identifies her termination as the adverse employment action constituting retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that her termination was connected to her filing of an EEOC complaint, but no evidence confirms or supports this conclusion.
Assuming that Plaintiff has proven a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, FCG has established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action: Plaintiff failed to meet FCG's job performance requirements. Given FCG's plain establishment of an alternative, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff must establish that her termination would not have occurred "but for" her filing of an EEOC complaint. Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence or factual allegations to support such a conclusion. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Plaintiff's Original Complaint puts forth a claim against Defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim fails as a matter of law. To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Texas, Stockbridge must prove: (1) that Defendant acted intentionally and recklessly; (2) that Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct caused Stockbridge emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe. See Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003).
First, in Texas, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that severe emotional distress be the intended consequence or primary risk of the tortfeasor's conduct. See Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. 1998). No such factual allegation supports this claim. Second, to qualify as extreme and outrageous, the conduct must have gone beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999). This Court finds the conduct alleged to meet the threshold of "extreme and outrageous." Conduct such as Lockliear's is intolerable. Third, Plaintiff's deposition testimony indicates that she suffered from emotional distress at least in part due to Lockliear's conduct. As a result, there is little evidence to indicate that Plaintiff's emotional distress was caused by the alleged incidents of sexual harassment at FCG. Fourth, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her emotional distress was severe. "The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Gonzales v. Willis, 995 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999). Because no genuine issues of material fact remain, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this claim.
Stockbridge's testimony consistently indicates that her "emotional distress" also was due to other life matters. Specifically, her difficulties in sleeping were also due to "financial issues" and "overall worry." Her crying bouts were due to the incidents at FCG and "other personal things" including her father's health issues.
III. CONCLUSION
After considering all of the summary judgment evidence, it is apparent that there are no disputed issues of material fact. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claim.