Opinion
No. 00 C 369
February 26, 2003
OPINION
On November 4, 2002, I determined that Stive was entitled to attorneys' fee with two limitations. Fees incurred during the administrative process and fees incurred to establish damages were off the table. Stive has submitted a petition asking for fees in the amount of $52,560. The Government objects to this petition on two bases: (1) that Stive has failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to fees at the rates claimed; and (2) that he is seeking recovery for fees incurred in the administrative and damages processes.
As to the rates used, it is Stive's burden to provide evidence of the reasonableness of the hourly rate at which his attorneys' fees are claimed. The Seventh Circuit describes the method of determining the appropriate market rate in attorney fee matters as follows: An attorney's "market rate is the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question." . . . "The attorney's actual billing rate for comparable work is `presumptively appropriate' to use as the market rate."
Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Here, Stive claims a rate of $300/hour for Gregory Kulis, $200/hour for Shehnaz Mansuri, and $220/hour for Kathleen Coyne-Ropka. These rates are reasonable. The City of Chicago paid exactly the same rates to the same attorneys in Lumpkins v. Kelly, 01 C 6891, and Ellis v. Sandoval, 01 C 1126. In addition, the affidavit of Kenneth Flaxman, an attorney who practices in the area of civil rights, demonstrates that these rates are comparable to, if not more favorable than, the rates that lawyers of similar abilities and experience in the community would normally charge paying clients for the type of work in question. Therefore, these hourly rates are approved.
As to the second objection, Stive concedes that he is seeking recovery for some fees incurred in the administrative process. With limited exceptions, I am subtracting from the total amount all work alleged to have been done during the administrative process. As for the fees alleged incurred in the damages phase of the trial, this issue is difficult because of the unique nature of this case. As Stive notes, the doctors testifying in this case disagreed as to whether Officer Bussell was liable for causing the aggravation of Stive's pre-existing tear in his rotator cuff. Therefore, the expert testimony addressed both damages and liability. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish between fees incurred in establishing causation as opposed to establishing damages. Nonetheless, after reviewing the disputed items allegedly dealing with damages, I am subtracting from the amount a total of 0.7 hours from Mr. Kulis and 13.9 hours from Ms. Mansuri.
These exceptions are the disputed items of work dated 1/10/00 (misidentified as 1/1/00 in the Government's Response) and 1/26/00.
Accordingly, I award plaintiffs and ORDER defendants to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of $49,272.00.
The total amount is calculated as follows:
Gregory E. Kulis 53.0 x $300.00 = $15,900.00
Shehnaz I. Mansuri 157.4 x $200.00 = $31,480.00
Kathleen Coyne-Ropka 8.6 x $220.00 = $1,892.00.