Opinion
No. 1-816 / 00-1975.
Filed April 24, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, GEORGE BERGESON, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court order dismissing her libel suit on statute of limitations grounds. AFFIRMED.
L. Jay Irwin III of L. Jay Irwin III P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Michael A. Giudicessi and William J. Hunnicutt of Faegre Benson L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by MAHAN, P.J., and ZIMMER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court order dismissing her libel suit on statute of limitations grounds. She contends the court erred because her suit was filed within the statute of limitations as extended by the discovery rule. In the alternative, she contends her amended petition should relate back to the date of her original petition, which was indisputably filed within the two-year limitations period. Defendant requests an award of attorney's fees. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Plaintiff, Lisa Stites, filed a libel action for a short article that ran in the Urbandale Press Citizen on July 22, 1998. The petition, filed July 21, 2000, incorrectly named the "Press-Citizen Company, Inc.," an entity wholly unrelated to this suit, as the defendant. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. (Ogden) is in fact the owner and publisher of the Urbandale Press Citizen. On July 28, 2000, Stites served an amended petition and original notice on Ogden, correcting the mistake.
Ogden filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment on August 18, 2000. As grounds for dismissal, Ogden asserted the statute of limitations bar, and alleged in the alternative that Stites had failed to identify in her petition the alleged defamatory statements. The district court dismissed the petition on the statute of limitations ground. In part, the court found the relation-back doctrine inapplicable because Ogden had no actual notice of the suit prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Stites appeals.
II. Statute of Limitations . The statute of limitations for Stites's claim was two years. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (1999). Because the allegedly defamatory article was published on July 22, 1998, the district court found the statute of limitations on Stites's claim ran out on July 22, 2000. Stites argues the court erred in failing to apply the discovery rule to her claim. She contends the statute of limitations should not be found to have run until August 2, 2000, two years from the date she claims she first learned of the libel. Alternatively, Stites contends the amended petition related back to the original petition, which was filed July 21, 2000. We review these claims for correction of errors at law. See Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass'n v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam'rs., 625 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 2001) (rulings on motions to dismiss are reviewed for corrections of errors at law).
A. Discovery Rule . In civil cases, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party has actual or imputed knowledge of the facts that would support a cause of action. Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 291 (Iowa 2001). In other words, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known both the fact of the injury and its cause. Id. Because Stites did not discover the allegedly defamatory article until August 2, 1998, she argues her filing of the amended petition on July 27, 2000 falls within the two-year statute of limitations. We disagree.
In Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1990), the court notes the two-year statute of limitation for slander claims "begins to run on the date of publication." Kiner, 463 N.W.2d at 13. In determining whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the court held, "For Kiner's slander action to be timely under section 614.1(2), it must be based on the August 25 publication because, as already noted, that is the only publication within the two-year limitation period." Id. at 14. Likewise, in Jean v. Hennessy, 69 N.W. 373, 28 N.W. 645 (Iowa 1886), the court found an action for libel filed May 30, 1885 alleging the libelous letter was written sometime in 1882 would be barred if the letter was indeed written "at any time previous to May 30, 1883." Jean, 69 Iowa at 375-76, 28 N.W. at 647. Accordingly, we conclude the statute of limitations on a libel claim begins to run on the date of publication.
B. Misnomer . Stites alternatively argues her amended petition corrected a misnomer and/or related back to the date her original petition was filed, which was within the two-year limitations period running from the date of publication. Her original petition correctly used Ogden's trade name, "Urbandale Press Citizen," in identifying defendants and she contends Ogden had constructive notice of her suit. She adds she notified Ogden of her claims much earlier in a demand letter sent to the paper's publisher in January 1999. Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), she also asserts her amended petition should relate back because she served it on Ogden within the maximum time allowed for service of the original petition.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5) outlines the circumstances in which an amended petition is deemed to relate back to the original.
Formerly Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 69(e).
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if. . ., within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(5). It is the plaintiff's burden to satisfy the relation-back requirement of Rule 1.402(5). Alvarez v. Meadow Lane Mall Ltd. P'ship, 560 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa 1997).
We find Stites has failed her burden of showing the amended petition relates back to the original petition. Ogden received no notice that Stites was commencing an action against it prior to the expiration of the July 22, 2000 statute of limitations. While Stites argues Ogden had constructive notice because of her January 1999 demand letter, Iowa law is clear that "[n]otice of intention to bring suit is in no way tantamount to its filing." Id.
Stites contends her case is a "misnomer" case and, therefore, does not require a relation-back analysis. In a "misnomer" case, the right party is before the court, although under a wrong name. Thune v. Hokah Cheese Co., 260 Iowa 347, 350, 149 N.W.2d 176, 178 (1967). Here, the defendant before the court in the original petition was the Press-Citizen Company, not Ogden Newspapers. As such, Stites's case is wholly distinguishable from a "misnomer" case.
Finally, Stites notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) has been changed to allow relation-back if the real defendant has received notice within the time period for service of process of the original complaint. However, Iowa has not extended this rule to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5). See Estate of Kuhns v. Marco, 620 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Because Stites's petition did not relate back to the original and does not qualify as a "misnomer" case, we find the district court did not err in granting Ogden's motion for summary judgment.
III. Attorney Fees . Finally, Ogden requests an award of appellate attorney fees for bringing an action known to be barred by the statute of limitations. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 provides counsel's signature to a pleading certifies the following: Counsel has read the motion, pleading, or other paper; that to the best of counsel's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass or cause any unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Iowa R. App. P. 1.413(1). The rule further provides the court shall impose sanctions for violations upon the person signing the document, the represented party, or both. Id. Because we believe Stites made a good faith argument for extension of the statute of limitations under the discovery rule, we deny Ogden Newspaper's request for an award of appellate attorney fees.
Formerly Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 80.
AFFIRMED.