Since it has been unequivocally stated that in this state "a juror should not be permitted to examine witnesses under any circumstances," denial of appellant's motion for a new trial must be reversed. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536 (1) ( 260 S.E.2d 407) (1979); Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 256 (4) ( 244 S.E.2d 833) (1978). Further contentions as to improper charges are without merit.

In this state, "a juror should not be permitted to examine a witness under any circumstances." Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 260 S.E.2d 407) (1979); Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252 (4) ( 244 S.E.2d 833) (1978); see (now Justice) Gregory, Evidence, 32 Mercer L. Rev. 63, 68 (1980). However, in the course of the examination of witnesses a juror may have a question concerning the testimony.

No harmful error has been shown. Counsel's argument is based upon language used by this court in Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 260 S.E.2d 407), in discussing Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 256 (4) ( 244 S.E.2d 833) wherein the Supreme Court has held that jurors are not permitted during the trial to interrogate witnesses. While the juror's reply, "I'm sorry," does to some degree express her embarrassment, nevertheless, she was instructed by the court that no harm was done, and we find no reversible error in the court's failure to grant defendant's motion for mistrial. Compare Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490 ( 278 S.E.2d 97). There is no merit in this complaint.

The practice of permitting jurors to directly question witnesses is a dangerous one. Jurors are not schooled in the rules of evidence which govern the posing of questions in a trial and are likely to be personally offended if their questions are objected to. Even those jurisdictions which allow the practice urge that it be exercised with caution. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533 ( 260 S.E.2d 407) (1979). In Georgia, the practice is not permitted. Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252 ( 244 S.E.2d 833) (1978).

But see People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 186-188 (1972); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 499-500 (1976); Cheeks v. State, 266 Ind. 190, 195-196 (1977). Compare State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 133-134 (1945); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 390 (1955); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536-537 (1979). 2.

Furthermore, on six occasions, a juror spoke up to interpret an answer of appellant's. Appellant contends these actions by the jury resulting from the appointment of the court reporter as interpreter, amounted to jury participation in his trial of the type forbidden by Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533 ( 260 S.E.2d 407) (1979), and require reversal of his conviction. We disagree.

See Rose v. State, 249 Ga. 628, 630 (2) ( 292 S.E.2d 678); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90 (2) ( 263 S.E.2d 131). The question here is whether the court in ruling upon the issue of whether or not the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights were given him prior to his statement, in the presence of the jury, erred in advising the jury that the officer did comply with the constitution and the statute with reference to notices required by law or warnings required by law and thus expressed an opinion as to the evidence with reference to voluntariness in violation of OCGA § 17-8-55 (formerly Code § 81-1104). See also Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 537 ( 260 S.E.2d 407); Ford v. State, 2 Ga. App. 834 ( 59 S.E. 88); Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347, 348 (2) ( 228 S.E.2d 371). In the Stinson case the court's repeating a certain line of questioning was held to establish an inference from which the jury could assume that the judge's thoughts were expressed to the jury with reference to the crime or that he condoned certain conduct, citing Crawford v. State, 139 Ga. App. 347 (2), supra.

Correlated to this argument is the fact that counsel, whose client is being harmed by possibly prejudicial testimony, is placed in the untenable position of having to choose between not objecting and letting the possibly prejudicial testimony in or objecting to the question and risking offending the juror. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979). However, the South Carolina Court apparently has resolved the latter dilemma by holding that when a court, in its discretion, allows direct questioning by a juror of a witness, "[t]he trial judge should meticulously endeavor to make it unnecessary for offended counsel to interpose an objection to a juror's question in its presence."

We agree that under the facts here no reversible error occurred. At the outset we note that the ground urged on appeal, to wit, that the exchange violated the prohibition against jurors interrogating witnesses, (see, e.g., Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252 (4) ( 244 S.E.2d 833) (1978); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533 (1) ( 260 S.E.2d 407) (1979)), was not urged below. "`A ground not raised by objection at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Cit.)' Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 216, 217 (2) ( 342 S.E.2d 703) (1986)."

The only jurisdiction which has refused to allow jurors to ask questions was Georgia. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979). In that case, the Georgia court disapproved of the practice of allowing jurors to ask direct questions of the witness.