Only a few states have rejected the practice of juror questioning. See Matchett v. State, 364 S.E.2d 565, 566-67 (Ga. 1988);Stinson v. State, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ga.App. 1979); Wharton v. State, 734 So.2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998); State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991); Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992).

Correlated to this argument is the fact that counsel, whose client is being harmed by possibly prejudicial testimony, is placed in the untenable position of having to choose between not objecting and letting the possibly prejudicial testimony in or objecting to the question and risking offending the juror. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979). However, the South Carolina Court apparently has resolved the latter dilemma by holding that when a court, in its discretion, allows direct questioning by a juror of a witness, "[t]he trial judge should meticulously endeavor to make it unnecessary for offended counsel to interpose an objection to a juror's question in its presence."

The only jurisdiction which has refused to allow jurors to ask questions was Georgia. Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979). In that case, the Georgia court disapproved of the practice of allowing jurors to ask direct questions of the witness.