" (Citations omitted.) Stinson v. State , 294 Ga. App. 184, 186 (1), 668 S.E.2d 840 (2008). Importantly, the recent possession of the stolen item was not the sole evidence to support the burglary charge.
(Footnote omitted.) Stinson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 184, 184-185 (1) ( 668 SE2d 840) (2008); OCGA § 16-2-20 (b). "Mere presence at the scene is not sufficient to convict one of being a party to a crime, but criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the commission of a crime." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
On April 4, 2008, Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence did not support guilty verdicts on Counts 2, 3, 9, 15, and 18. Resp't's Ex. 4, at 3-4. On October 22, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed each of Petitioner's convictions except for the Count 9 theft by taking conviction, finding the evidence did not support a felony amount and remanding Petitioner's case for resentencing on Count 9. Resp't's Ex. 5, at 1, ECF No. 17-5; Stinson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 184, 184-87 (2008). On September 2, 2009, the Muscogee County Superior Court granted the State's motion for nolle prosequi of Count 9. Resp't's Ex. 6, at 2, ECF No. 17-6.
(Footnote omitted.) Stinson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 184, 184-185 (1) ( 668 SE2d 840) (2008); OCGA § 16-2-20 (b). "Mere presence at the scene is not sufficient to convict one of being a party to a crime, but criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the commission of a crime." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
See Stinson v. State.Stinson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 184, 186-187 (2) ( 668 SE2d 840) (2008). (d) Theft by taking of a motor vehicle.