FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Although no Fifth Circuit precedent was located, several circuits have held that the entry of default in habeas corpus proceedings is inappropriate. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1970); Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988); Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984). Generally, these circuit courts have required the district courts to review the merits, and to grant relief only if the court finds evidence to establish a claim of unlawful detention.

FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). Although no Fifth Circuit precedent was located, several circuits have held that the entry of default in habeas corpus proceedings is inappropriate. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1970); Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988); Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984). Generally, these circuit courts have required the district courts to review the merits, and to grant relief only if the court finds evidence to establish a claim of unlawful detention.

Ruiz, 660 F.2d at 340-41. The Tenth Circuit considered this same question in Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324-35 (10th Cir. 1988). In that case the petitioner filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the government failed to respond by the required time.

Although no Fifth Circuit precedent was located, several circuits have held that the entry of default in habeas corpus proceedings is inappropriate. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1970); Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988); Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984). Generally, these circuit courts have required the district courts to review the merits, and to grant relief only if the court finds evidence to establish a claim of unlawful detention.

In Andrews v. Deland, 1989 WL 230922 *3 (D.Utah 1989) this court observed that " Matters such as default, discovery, service of process and other civil procedures do not interface well with a habeas corpus case." Citing Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1988); and Bermudez v. Reid, supra.          In Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1988), the district court ordered a habeas petitioner released from custody because the government failed to respond to the court's direction.

Some courts have even held that default judgment is inappropriate in habeas corpus proceedings. See Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1987); Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott, 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970)); see also Sparrow v. U.S., 174 F.R.D. 491, 492 (D.Utah 1997). As the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Stines:

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's petition based on its failure to attend the hearing, pointing to a number of federal cases establishing that a default judgment is not contemplated in habeas corpus cases. See, e.g., Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184 (11th Cir. 1987); Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988). This general rule stems from the fact that many petitioners have been convicted of serious crimes; therefore, it would be the public at large, and not the defaulting party, that would be made to suffer.

In these circumstances, no reasonable jurist could conclude that the State waived a limitations defense. Cf. Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing a grant of habeas relief based on the government's three-week delay in responding to the habeas petition). Thus, we decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

The delay in the receipt of the state court records has neither caused any delay in this proceeding nor prejudice to the petitioner. See Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1988) (default judgment in a habeas matter is inappropriate when delay was minor and apparently an isolated and inadvertent mistake and the court was not placed in the position of either delaying the proceedings or deciding this matter without benefit of respondent's briefing); Sparrow v. United States, 174 F.R.D. 491, 493 (D. Utah 1997) (where a delay is not so "'extensive or egregious [so as] to constitute a violation of [the petitioner's] due process rights,'" a petitioner should not be allowed to "'snap up' a default and obtain relief without consideration of substantive issues in the case.") (citation omitted). Petitioner's motion [Dkt. No. 33] will be denied.

As the Court made clear in its October 15, 2020 Order, such a sanction in habeas proceedings should be limited to cases that rise to the level of a due process violation, which is not the case here. Doc. 587 at 10 (citing United States v. Williams, No. 15-20034-JWL, 2020 WL 2572409, at *1 (D. Kan. May 21, 2020) (citing Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1988)). The Court denies reconsideration on this issue.