Opinion
22-15120
06-29-2022
MIKEAL GLENN STINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K. GARCIA, Trust Fund Supervisor, USP/Tucson, Arizona, Defendant-Appellee, and B. VON BLANKENSEE; et al., Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 4:20-cv-00187-DCB for the District of Arizona David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Federal prisoner Mikeal Glenn Stine appeals pro se from the district court's interlocutory order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction in his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging a First Amendment violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction. Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stine's motion for a preliminary injunction because the district court lacked the authority to grant Stine's requested relief as it was not tied to the claims and parties in the complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court lacks authority to grant injunctive relief absent a "sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint"); Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the scope of an injunction is limited to the parties in the action).
Appellee's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 19) is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).