Opinion
A163762
05-18-2023
In re the Marriage of DENNIS STILES and YOUNG HEE LEE. v. YOUNG HEE LEE, Defendant and Appellant. DENNIS STILES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HF17864852
GOLDMAN, J.
In this bifurcated marital dissolution action, defendant and appellant Young Hee Lee appeals a judgment that determined the date of her separation from plaintiff and respondent Dennis Stiles. The date of separation matters because a spouse's earnings after that date are considered separate property. Lee contended that she and Stiles separated on July 25, 2007, four months after they were married. Stiles contended that they separated when he filed his dissolution petition on June 21, 2017. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that, on balance, the evidence supported Stiles's contention rather than Lee's. Lee argues that the court erred by failing to evaluate her "intentions and conduct" in the marriage in light of the domestic violence and deportation threats she faced from Stiles. Under the applicable standard of review, however, we find no basis to reverse the trial court's judgment.
Lee also uses the American name "Jane" as reflected in various parts of the record and testimony.
Background
1. Facts
Lee owned and operated a scaffolding business and met Stiles when she came to Stiles's place of work to buy scaffolding parts. They began dating shortly thereafter. Stiles believed they were a good fit because they were both in the scaffolding business and had similar views about working and growing a business. Lee has two daughters from a prior marriage who were teenagers at the time and lived with her at a residence in Orinda. On March 25, 2007, Lee and Stiles married and Stiles moved into the Orinda residence with Lee and her daughters.
In November 2007, the parties purchased a warehouse in San Leandro. The grant deed shows that title was transferred to them as "husband and wife as community property." Lee contributed $654,000 towards the purchase of the warehouse and Stiles contributed $704,000. Lee operated her scaffolding business from the warehouse and she and Stiles both worked there. In 2008 and 2009, Stiles spent approximately $200,000 of his own separate funds to build an apartment upstairs at the warehouse and to make other improvements. The parties slept in the apartment on the nights they worked late at the warehouse to avoid driving back and forth from Orinda.
On June 21, 2017, Stiles filed a petition for dissolution. He argued that the date of separation was June 21, 2017, while Lee contended that it was 10 years earlier, on July 25, 2007.
2. Date of Separation Trial
A three-day bench trial was held on the bifurcated issue of the parties' date of separation. The court heard testimony from Lee, Stiles, Lee's two daughters, friends of the parties, and a police officer who responded to a report of domestic violence Lee made against Stiles on June 8, 2017. The parties' accounts of the history of their marriage differed on critical points.
Stiles was convicted of spousal abuse on March 2, 2018 and has since appealed that conviction.
According to Stiles, the two fell in love after dating for about four to five months. He decided to marry Lee because he thought they would be a good fit since they were both in the scaffolding business, had similar work ethics, and liked the same things. Although Stiles knew Lee was not a citizen, he said that his decision to marry her was not for any reasons related to immigration. Stiles testified that, after he moved into the Orinda residence, he and Lee shared a bed and were physically intimate. Stiles further testified that he dropped off and picked up Lee's two daughters from school, helped them learn how to drive, and attended their graduations. Although Stiles acknowledged that he regularly stayed at the San Leandro residence once an apartment was constructed there in 2009, he testified that he returned to Orinda with Lee on some weekends. In 2010, Stiles wrote Lee a check for $150,000, using money from his inheritance in his personal account, to help her with a margin call in her stock account. The parties maintained joint banking and investment accounts, with statements mailed to them in Orinda, and Stiles denied that the accounts were set up for immigration purposes. The parties also had shared medical, personal liability, and automobile insurance, registered their vehicles to both of them, and filed taxes jointly.
Stiles testified that he and Lee used the San Leandro warehouse to rent and sell scaffolding. Stiles also used it to conduct various kinds of repair work and to sell nitrous oxide for race cars. Stiles believed he was working together with Lee at her scaffolding business to advance their future. Stiles testified that when he underwent back surgeries in 2009 and 2015, Lee took him to the hospital and picked him up afterwards, and took care of him during his recovery. After his 2015 surgery, he stayed upstairs at the warehouse more permanently since Lee spent most of her time at the warehouse and could more easily assist him there. When asked about his feelings for Lee during these years, Stiles testified, "I thought she was my caring wife."
Following his third surgery in 2016 or 2017, however, Lee would not come to the hospital when the nurse called her to pick Stiles up. She also did not help him with his aftercare and no longer came upstairs to the apartment at the warehouse. Stiles thought this was strange and grew suspicious after Lee started asking where the car registrations were and began filming Stiles around the shop. Stiles filed a petition for dissolution on June 21, 2017, which he identified as the date on which the parties decided their marriage was over. Stiles denied that he ever threatened to report Lee to immigration authorities or to withdraw his support for her immigration.
Lee testified that she never loved Stiles but married him because she was attracted to him and thought she could like him. Lee testified that Stiles was verbally and physically abusive and, contrary to Stiles's testimony, threatened to have Lee and her daughters deported if they did not listen to him. She said that Stiles lived at the Orinda residence for about four months after they married, but moved out on or around July 25, 2007, after he had problems with one of Lee's daughters and said, "I'm done with you." Lee viewed this as the date of separation, and she stated that Stiles "rarely" came back to Orinda after that, but broke into the house two or three times. She testified that after Stiles moved out, she and Stiles were not physically intimate, did not go on any vacations together, did not exchange any gifts, and did not celebrate any wedding anniversaries. She did not do his laundry or prepare him any food. She assisted Stiles after his back surgeries by giving him rides, but did not otherwise take care of him. She said that Stiles threatened to kill her several times, beat her many times, and that she was afraid of him for her children, if not for herself. She wanted to divorce him when he moved out of the Orinda residence, but the immigration lawyer told her she could not. Lee testified that she never told immigration authorities that she was separated from Stiles, but she did inform the lawyer.
Lee testified that up until 2015, she and Stiles filed taxes jointly and "did everything jointly, including account number, Comcast, PG&E, because per the requests of the immigration, that was what was needed." At least in 2015, Stiles was an employee of her scaffolding business "on paper," but was "not a real employee." He worked out of the warehouse, met clients there, represented himself as the business owner, and created his own business names.
Lee's two daughters testified that Stiles was verbally abusive to them and repeatedly threatened them with deportation as well. They also described him as physically abusive to Lee and the younger daughter. They believed Lee wanted to divorce him, but, according to one of them, the lawyer at the time advised against it for immigration reasons. They said Stiles never returned to live at the house in Orinda after moving out in 2007. Lee and Stiles spent nights together at the warehouse from time to time but the daughters believed they slept in separate rooms. They did not think Stiles assisted Lee with the business and was instead doing his own things there. They said that photos showing them all together were staged for immigration purposes.
In its proposed statement of decision, the trial court determined the date of separation to be June 21, 2017, concluding that the weight of the evidence supported "a finding that neither party perceived the rift in the relationship as final until [Stiles] filed his dissolution petition." This evidence included the facts that the parties purchased a warehouse together in late 2007, worked there together, and spent nights there together. The court found that, to the extent the parties' interpretation of these facts conflicted, Stiles's interpretation was more credible. In further support of its determination of the separation date, the court pointed to the parties' finances and assets, including their joint tax filings, joint checking and investment accounts, and car insurance and registration which listed both of their names. The trial court also highlighted Stiles's 2010 check to Lee for $150,000, questioning why Stiles would have given Lee this money if the parties had separated in 2007.
The trial court discounted Lee's assertion that much of the evidence only appeared to show, for immigration purposes, that the parties were still married after 2007. The court found it more likely, for example, that Stiles attended Lee's daughter's graduation (which was photographed) "because he simultaneously assumed his marriage to [Lee] was ongoing, he cared about [Lee] and her daughters, and he wanted to advance their immigration petitions." The court further noted that Lee "made representations to the federal government regarding the parties' marriage in order to further her immigration petition" that "militate against a finding of a 2007 [date of separation]." It added that "[t]o find in [Lee's] favor would allow her to have claimed the existence of a marriage for immigration purposes and now disavow that marriage for property division purposes."
Finally, the trial court acknowledged Lee's testimony that after Stiles moved out of the Orinda residence in 2007, they were not physically intimate, did not go on any vacations together, did not exchange any gifts, and did not celebrate any wedding anniversaries. But it noted that some of these activities "may never have been part of this marriage," concluding from Stiles's testimony that the marriage was "one based on a shared passion for working in which perhaps vacations and romantic celebrations played no meaningful part." It found that the evidence "overwhelmingly establishes a DOS after June [sic] 2007," and noted that the only other date proposed by either party was June 21, 2017.
The statement of decision erroneously referred to Lee's proposed date of separation as June 25, 2007, rather than July 25, 2007, but Lee did not call the court's attention to the error and it does not matter to our analysis.
Lee filed objections to the proposed statement of decision and claimed that the trial court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining the date of separation, including the risk of deportation and domestic violence that Lee faced from Stiles. She also argued that the proposed statement of decision failed to adequately account for her deposition testimony, which was admitted into evidence, and failed to identify Stiles's 2007 departure from Orinda as conduct that evidenced an intent to end the marriage. By that time, she argued, she and her daughters "had learned to fear [Stiles's] violent behavior and threats," and their "experiment in living as family ended with finality-except for performative conduct for immigration and business purposes."
In response to Lee's objections, the trial court issued a final order adopting and supplementing its statement of decision. The order overruled Lee's objections and held that they were "simply subterfuge for filing yet a third post-trial brief by new counsel to reargue a case that had already been submitted after full briefing." With respect to issues of witness credibility, the order stated that "[Lee's] testimony and position that the date of separation was in June 2007 lacks credibility given the balance of the evidence as set forth in the SOD." The court added that while the outcome of the immigration proceedings was irrelevant, "[t]he parties' representations to governmental authorities regarding their marriage and their conduct during the course of the immigration proceedings to demonstrated [sic] that they were married-well after [Lee's] purported date of separation-however, are relevant."
Lee filed a motion for direct appeal of the bifurcated judgment, which this court granted.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
"The date of separation is a factual issue established by a preponderance of the evidence. We review the trial court's determination for substantial evidence [citation], indulging all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's decision. [Citations.] To the extent we must interpret [Family Code section 70, we apply our independent judgment." (In re Marriage of Lee &Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) Where there was conflicting evidence presented below, "we are bound by the trial court's interpretation of the facts. [Citations.] On appeal, we have no power to weigh or judge the effect of evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence. This is the province of the trial court." (In re Marriage of Liu (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 156.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
Lee acknowledges that a determination of the date of separation is generally reviewed for substantial evidence. She argues, however, that we should apply de novo review here because "[t]his case requires independent construction and application of §§ 70, 771, and 4325(a)(3) as applied to evidence of verbal and physical abuse, threats of deportation, coercive control, and financial exploitation." We disagree that de novo review is appropriate. Lee primarily argues that the trial court did not adequately consider the evidence she put forth regarding her subjective intent in the context of her unique predicament. While we apply the standards in sections 70 and 771 to the facts, Lee's arguments do not raise questions of statutory construction but challenge the court's analysis of the evidence. Substantial evidence is therefore the appropriate standard of review.
While Lee also referred to section 4325, subdivision (a)(3), we have no occasion to apply that provision. It creates a rebuttable presumption that, where a spouse has been convicted of domestic violence, the date of separation is the date of the incident giving rise to the conviction, or earlier if the court finds circumstances that justify an earlier date. While Lee relied on this provision in her opening brief, in her reply she conceded that it applies only to convictions that occurred on or after January 1, 2019. (§ 4325, subd. (f).) Stiles was convicted of spousal abuse on March 2, 2018.
2. Law on Date of Separation
As noted, this case involves sections 70 and 771 of the Family Code. As originally enacted, section 771 stated that "[t]he earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . ., while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." (§ 771, former subd. (a).) Senate Bill No. 1255 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), which became effective on January 1, 2017, amended section 771 by substituting the phrase "after the date of separation of the spouses" for the phrase "while living separate and apart from the other spouse." (§ 771, subd. (a).) Senate Bill No. 1255 also added section 70, which defines "date of separation" as "the date that a complete and final break in the marital relationship has occurred, as evidenced by both of the following: [¶] (1) The spouse has expressed to the other spouse the intent to end the marriage. [¶] (2) The conduct of the spouse is consistent with the intent to end the marriage." (§ 70, subd. (a).) The court is further required to take "all relevant evidence" into consideration in determining the date of separation. (§ 70, subd. (b).)
The requirements of section 70 are consistent with case law interpreting "separate and apart" under former section 771 to mean "a complete and final break in the marital relationship." (In re Marriage of Baragry (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 444, 448.) "The ultimate question to be decided in determining the date of separation is whether either or both of the parties perceived the rift in their relationship as final. The best evidence of this is their words and actions." (In re Marriage of Hardin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 448, 453, italics omitted (Hardin).) To that end, the parties' "subjective intents are to be objectively determined from all of the evidence reflecting the parties' words and actions during the disputed time in order to ascertain when during that period the rift in the parties' relationship was final." (Ibid.) This includes, for example, whether the parties continued to see each other regularly, whether their economic relationship changed, or whether the spouse voiced the intent to end the marriage to the other spouse. (Id. at p. 454.)
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Determination
In its statement of decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of Lee and her daughters with respect to Stiles's verbal and physical abuse, his departure from the Orinda residence in July 2007, and the temporary domestic violence restraining order requested by Lee and issued against Stiles in June 2017. The trial court found, however, that the evidence Stiles put forth "overwhelmingly" established that the date of separation was later than July 2007, and it adopted the only other date proposed-June 21, 2017, when Stiles filed his dissolution petition. The court referenced evidence regarding the parties' purchase of the warehouse and time they spent there together, their financial entanglements, the representations made to immigration authorities, and the parties' shared passion for work as a basis for their marriage. These facts, as construed by the trial court, constitute substantial evidence in support of its decision.
Lee contends that this evidence is not indicative of her subjective intent when viewed in the context of the domestic violence and potential immigration consequences she faced. But while she criticizes the trial court for failing to assess her subjective intent through "a well-informed lens" that includes an awareness of the domestic violence faced by immigrant spouses, surmising that "[t]he court's credibility assessment would likely have been significantly different" had it done so, her argument necessarily asks us to reweigh the evidence and revisit the trial court's credibility determinations. We cannot do so.
Lee briefly argues that the trial court failed to exercise "informed discretion," and points to the rule that substantial evidence review does not apply, and there is no presumption of correctness, "[w]here the record demonstrates the trial judge did not weigh the evidence ...." (Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.) But this argument rests at least in part on Lee's contention that the trial court failed to consider its discretion under section 4325, and as noted previously, she acknowledged in her reply brief that this section is not applicable because Stiles's domestic violence conviction preceded the statute's operative date. Moreover, the record here establishes that the trial court did weigh the evidence. Indeed, Lee complains that the trial court gave "undue weight" to the fact that the parties stayed together in the warehouse while giving "little or no weight to the testimony of Lee and her daughters about Stiles's use of threats of removal as an instrument of power and control, along with physical and verbal abuse." Decisions about how much weight to give the evidence are the prerogative of the trial court.
Lee cites cases in which parties sought to annul so-called "green card marriages," highlighting in particular the definition of marriage in one of those cases as a relationship that involves duties of sympathy, confidence, and fidelity. (See In re Marriage of Rabie (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 917, 922.) She argues that any such relationship between the parties here "was extinguished by four months of [Stiles's] abuse and coercive control while he was living in her home." But again, the trial court found that a preponderance of the evidence supported a contrary conclusion, and we are not free to reject its finding.
Lee also contends that the trial court "essentially" found that she was "equitably estopped" from claiming a July 2007 date of separation after having made contrary representations to immigration authorities, and argues that such a consideration is improper when the court's task is only to determine her subjective intent. We acknowledge that some language in the statement of decision is susceptible to Lee's interpretation, but taking the statement of decision as a whole, we believe the trial court concluded that the representations about the parties' marriage were not the complete sham, for either Stiles or Lee herself, that Lee contended they were.
For the same reason, we reject Lee's argument based on In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925 that the trial court applied an "objective," rather than "subjective," test in evaluating her intent. In Manfer, the couple agreed to end their marriage, and no longer engaged in sexual relations with one another, commingled their funds, or supported one another. But they also agreed to conceal their decision from family and friends and to "keep up appearances" until after the year-end holidays because they were concerned about how the news would affect their children. (Id. at p. 928.) Manfer held that the trial court erred by disregarding the parties' own understanding of their relationship in favor of an "objective" test that asked at what point "society at large [would] consider the couple separated." (Ibid.) Here, the trial court distinguished Manfer by quoting its statement that the couple had "essentially disentangled their lives in all respects, save occasional social engagements" (id. at p. 933), and it pointed out that Lee and Stiles, by contrast, did not disentangle their finances from each other. While Lee argues that they maintained joint finances only for immigration purposes, the trial court was free to reject, and in our view did reject, Lee's contention that those entanglements had no other subjective significance for her or Stiles.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we have some sympathy for Lee's argument that the trial court "failed to explore" her state of mind, at least in this respect: it is true that the statement of decision said comparatively more about Stiles's understanding of the parties' relationship than it did about Lee's. For example, the court wrote that, if the parties separated in July 2007, it was "not clear why [Stiles] would then continue to spend his separate funds on the property," or "why [Stiles] would give [Lee] $150,000" to "help her avoid trouble with a stock account." Similarly, "even assuming that the pictures were taken for immigration purposes," the trial court found it "more likely" that Stiles "attended and photographed the events because he simultaneously assumed his marriage to [Lee] was ongoing, he cared about [Lee] and her daughters, and he wanted to advance their immigration petitions." The court said relatively little about Lee's likely point of view during the same period. Beyond noting that the parties worked together in the warehouse and spent nights together there (perhaps in separate bedrooms), the trial court focused primarily on the fact that Lee made (or allowed Stiles to make) representations to immigration authorities that were inconsistent with her current claim-a state of affairs that it characterized, along with the allegations of Stiles's domestic abuse, as "not pretty." It did not expressly address whether it found credible the testimony about the threats and abuse Lee experienced during the months Stiles lived at the Orinda residence, nor opine on how such conduct, if the court believed it occurred, likely impacted Lee's view of the parties' relationship.
As for Stiles's intent, Lee contends that he made it clear by telling her he was "done" with her and leaving the Orinda residence in July 2007. While the trial court did not say in the statement of decision whether it credited Lee's testimony about what happened that day, it clearly rejected her contention that Stiles had formed an intent to end the marriage at that point, and it found that he had no such intent until he petitioned for dissolution many years later. (See In re Marriage of von der Nuell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 730, 736 ["rifts between spouses may be followed by long periods of reconciliation"].)
Although this asymmetry may be a consequence of the court's conclusion that Stiles's testimony was more credible, we nonetheless believe it bears mention because a separation occurs "when either of the parties does not intend to resume the marriage and his or her actions bespeak the finality of the marital relationship." (Hardin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [italics added and original italics omitted].) In other words, it is enough for only one of the parties to exhibit the requisite state of mind. If the trial court had considered only Stiles's subjective intent and failed altogether to consider Lee's, we would have to conclude that the analysis was fatally incomplete. But we find no such error. While some of the relevant findings may be implicit, the statement of decision indicates that the trial court did not credit Lee's account of how she viewed their marriage, concluding based on the parties' ongoing entanglements that "neither party perceived the rift in the relationship as final" until Stiles filed his dissolution petition.
Even accepting Lee's testimony that she maintained joint bank accounts and held assets jointly only to advance the immigration petition Stiles filed, Lee herself acknowledges that the maintenance of the marriage served "business venture purposes" as well. Purchasing the warehouse together and working and staying there together over a period of years may not compel the conclusion that Stiles and Lee had not separated, but it was not unreasonable for the trial court to rely on this evidence to conclude that there was no "complete and final break in the marital relationship," particularly in light of Stiles's testimony that a shared passion for work was central to the marriage from its inception. Finding Stiles's interpretation of the facts more credible, the court could reasonably determine that Stiles and Lee were growing a business together to advance their future as husband and wife. We are bound by the trial court's interpretation. (In re Marriage of Liu, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 156.)
While we do not discount the gravity of Lee's account of domestic abuse and of the immigration-related threats about which she and her daughters testified, her argument on appeal fails to account for the limits the law places on our review. Our role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination of the date of separation and, on this record, we find that it does.
4. We Find No Structural Errors
Lee argues that the trial court committed structural errors by failing "to create a courtroom environment conducive to a victim telling her story" and by failing to consider the parties' deposition testimony that was admitted into evidence. We are unpersuaded.
"In the civil context, structural error typically occurs when the trial court violates a party's right to due process by denying the party a fair hearing. [Citation.] Structural errors requiring automatic reversal include denying a party's request for a jury trial [citation] and violating a party's right to present testimony and evidence." (Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 534.) Reversal was warranted for example, where a trial court arbitrarily cut off a party's presentation of evidence by exiting the courtroom, thereby violating the party's right to due process. (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 313.)
Lee contends that during trial, the trial court "chilled [her] ability to present her case" by losing patience with Lee when she was testifying through an interpreter and rushing the attorney's presentation of evidence. This argument is belied by the record. First, the trial spanned three separate days and there is no indication that Lee was rushed in presenting her evidence, which included her own testimony as well as that of her two daughters and her friend. Lee points to a portion of her testimony during which she claims the court grew impatient. The court asked Lee whether Stiles worked out of the warehouse, and Lee responded, "No. When I first met him, he likes car racing-." The court interjected and asked whether Stiles ever worked out of the warehouse. Lee responded, "Yes. He worked there, but he did whatever he wanted. He said 50 percent is mine, and then he said, building 50 percent is his, he said. And then he stole his-." At this point, the court told Lee to stop since she had answered the question. After trial adjourned that day, the court noted that the time spent had not been an efficient use of judicial resources-not because of the time needed for translation, however, but because Lee did not give straightforward answers. Any frustration shown by the court to Lee's narrative responses does not amount to structural error.
Lee further contends that her testimony was chilled by the court's Fifth Amendment admonition, which it gave when she testified about representations made to immigration authorities. We fail to see how an admonition regarding a party's constitutional right against self-incrimination amounts to a structural error or a due process violation by the court.
Finally, Lee complains that the trial court's statement of decision failed to consider or reference the parties' deposition testimony that was admitted into evidence at trial, arguing that the depositions "represent a significant portion of that record and fill in critical details." Lee does not specify what "critical details" were absent from the parties' trial testimony. Lee's objections below argued the parties' deposition testimony "adds significant detail to their live testimony and is also vital to any credibility assessment." To the extent Lee is again arguing that we should re-assess the credibility of the witnesses based on the deposition testimony, we decline to do so for the same reasons stated above.
Moreover, the fact that the statement of decision does not reference the parties' deposition testimony does not mean the trial court failed to consider it. Lee objected that the trial court failed to consider or reference the parties' deposition testimony in the statement of decision. The court's final order adopting the statement of decision stated that it "carefully considered the totality of the evidence presented at trial and the argument of counsel." We see no reason to doubt that this representation encompassed the deposition testimony admitted into evidence. In any event, "[a] statement of decision need not address all the legal and factual issues raised by the parties. Instead, it need do no more than state the grounds upon which the judgment rests, without necessarily specifying the particular evidence considered by the trial court in reaching its decision." (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1124-1125.) That was done here and we find no structural error.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Stiles is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, Acting P. J., FINEMAN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.