Opinion
3:23-cv-00577-YY
07-12-2023
STEVEN FOSTER STILES, Plaintiff, v. CAROLINE ZAPP KAHN, CLARK MATTHEW STILES, AMITY GIRT JD, and BLAINE TRUMAN LOWRY, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Youlee Yim You United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS
Pro se plaintiff Steven Foster Stiles has brought this action against his son and other defendants, asserting claims related to state court orders appointing a guardian ad litem for his wife and prohibiting plaintiff from having contact with her. Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint, ECF 7, which suffers from a myriad of problems, including failure to state a claim for relief and failure to establish the court's jurisdiction. Additionally, all claims are barred by the Rooker Feldman doctrine. Therefore, this case should be dismissed.
The court has granted plaintiff's application to proceed IFP. The IFP statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction; . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may include in the alternative or different types of relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “Rule 8 does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2006) (citations omitted). “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In addition to determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief, this court has a continuing obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case. Valdezv. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Federal courts hold a Pro se litigant's pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam) (holding a document filed Pro se “is to be liberally construed”; a plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests) (citation omitted). “Although . . . Pro se litigant[s] . . . may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes [their] pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff alleges that “federal crimes” have been committed. Am. Compl., ECF 7, at 21. However, courts have “rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute,” and where they have done so, “there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979); Garcia v. Jones, No. 6:22-CV-00118-AA, 2022 WL 2754853, at *7 (D. Or. July 14, 2022) (“To the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of fraud, stalking, money laundering, and tampering with evidence assert violations of federal criminal statutes, such statutes do not generally create a private right of action or provide a basis for civil liability.”) (citing Abcarian v.Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff has no private right of action for kidnapping, attempted murder, stalking, extortion, or the other crimes he cites.
Moreover, plaintiff's claims, which seek to undercut state court decisions appointing a guardian for his wife and issuing a restraining order against him, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “Rooker-Feldman is a powerful doctrine that prevents federal courts from second-guessing state court decisions by barring the lower federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state-court judgments[.]” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). “If claims raised in the federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
Plaintiff claims he is “fighting for my life, my wife” and “has not seen or talked with [his wife] in over 100 days because of the Elder Adult Abuse Restraining Order” and court-ordered guardianship. Am. Compl., ECF 7, at 64, 65. Plaintiff is essentially seeking a judgment in federal court that would undercut the state court decisions appointing a guardian ad litem for his wife and barring him from having contact with her. The relief that plaintiff seeks is therefore barred by the Rooker Feldman doctrine.
Even if the proceedings were ongoing, the Younger abstention doctrine would apply. Younger “espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n., 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). “Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger abstention is required if the state proceedings are (1) ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” San Remo Hotel v. City & County of SanFrancisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); see also Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1397 (10th Cir.1996). In addition, a state has a vital interest in protecting “the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.” Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). This is a particularly appropriate admonition in the field of domestic relations, over which federal courts have no general jurisdiction, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697-701, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), and in which the state courts have a special expertise and experience. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979).H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000). “When the case is one in which the Younger doctrine applies, the case must be dismissed.” Id.
Plaintiff also alleges “tortious interference,” which he asserts “occurs when one party interferes with an advantageous business relationship of another party, causing economic harm.” ECF 7, at 22. Plaintiff does not specifically allege how defendants interfered with any business relationship, other than to state that he had his wife had been “very successful in business” and “for-profit . . . ventures/enterprises,” ECF 7, at 67, and he has been ostracized from business associates. ECF 7, at 68. But even if plaintiff had properly alleged a state law claim for intentional interference with economic relations, he has failed to allege how this court would have subject matter jurisdiction over such a state law claim. Complete diversity between the parties does not exist. See ECF 7, at 1-2 (alleging plaintiff is a citizen of California and defendants are citizens of California and Oregon); see also Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.”).
Finally, in the morass of documents that plaintiff filed with his Amended Complaint- which totals 181 pages and contains four copies of what appear to be identical complaint forms, several documents marked “draft,” emails with his son, summaries of court filings, photographs of defendants, and a memo to the courtroom deputy-plaintiff mentions that he has filed a “U.S. Federal Civil RICO lawsuit.” See, e.g., ECF 7, at 57 (email to son stating, “You and they deserve everything coming your way via my U.S. Federal Civil RICO lawsuit-its will be brawny. On the criminal side - brace yourself - you have no idea what is coming your way and you are much to[o] soft to enjoy the second half of your life.”). Plaintiff has failed to allege a RICO claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2006) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, even if he did, his RICO claim would be inextricably intertwined with the state court decisions related to guardianship and the restraining order; therefore, the Rooker Feldman doctrine would bar any RICO claim in this court.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff's case should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Tuesday, June 06, 2023. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.