Opinion
NO. CIV. S-00-429 LKK/GGH PS
August 16, 2001
ORDER
On February 29, 2000, plaintiff sued, inter alia, Marilyn Day, District Director of the Internal Revenue Service, seeking release of a federal tax lien and removal of references to plaintiff as a tax protestor in Internal Revenue Service files. This matter comes before the court on the magistrate judge's recommendations to dismiss, in part, plaintiff's suit. Also before the court are plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or for relief from judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and defendants' motion to remand the matter to the magistrate judge for further consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1) (C). I deny the parties' motions and adopt in part and decline to adopt in part the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendations based on the analysis below.
I. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On January 23, 2001, the magistrate judge filed Findings and Recommendations which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections were to be filed within ten days. Plaintiff and defendants filed timely objections.
In the Findings and Recommendations, the magistrate judge suggested dismissing plaintiff's suit for release of the tax lien on the grounds that it was moot and barred by sovereign immunity. The magistrate judge, however, recommended denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for deleting references to him as a tax protestor in Internal Revenue Service files. The magistrate judge concluded that Congress abrogated sovereign immunity when it passed the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-206.
In their objections to the Findings and Recommendations, defendants averred that plaintiff's suit for removal of tax protestor references was moot. They submitted the declaration of Vicki Martinson, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 Collection Coordinator. According to Martinson, plaintiff's master file does not designate him as a tax protestor.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. After carefully reviewing the entire file, the court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by the proper analysis. However, in light of the additional evidence submitted by defendants, the court also finds that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief to compel defendants to remove references to him as a tax protestor is moot. I now turn to the parties' cross-motions.
II. MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
On February 27, 2001, the court denied plaintiff's motion to recuse the undersigned on the grounds of bias and prejudice, See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a), (b)(1), and incompetence, 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c)(1). See Order filed February 27, 2001. On April 3, 2001, the undersigned denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of that order. See Order filed April 3, 2001. Plaintiff now moves to alter or amend that judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or, in the alternative for relief from judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The court construes these motions as again seeking reconsideration of the February 27, 2001 and the April 3, 2001 orders and denies them based on the analysis below.
"Under the `law of the case' doctrine a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case." United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993)). Although motions to reconsider are directed to the sound discretion of the court, see Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd in Part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988), considerations of judicial economy weigh heavily in the process. Thus, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires that a party seeking reconsideration of a district court's order must brief the "new or different facts or circumstances . . . which . . . were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion." Generally speaking, before reconsideration may be granted there must be a change in the controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.
As with motions to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), motions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to "rehash" arguments previously presented. See Costello v. United States Government, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1991). Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis of new evidence available prior to the court's ruling. See Fay Corp. v. BAT Holdings One, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1990). Finally, "after thoughts" or "shifting of ground" do not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration. See id. These relatively restrictive standards "reflect district courts' concern for preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency." Costello, 765 F. Supp. at 1009.
For a second time, plaintiff has failed to establish a change in the controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876. Rather, he simply restates his initial argument. As noted above, a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for the litigant to rehash his prior argument. See Costello, 765 F. Supp. at 1009.
In light of the court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit, defendants' motion to remand the matter to the magistrate judge is also denied.
III. ORDERS
Accordingly, the court hereby makes the following ORDERS:1. The magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendation are ADOPTED in part and DENIED in part as noted above;
2. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED;
3. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED;
4. Defendants' motion to remand the matter to the magistrate judge for further consideration is DENIED; and
5. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.