All charges, allegations, and averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether legally sufficient to obtain it or not, are privileged. However false and malicious such charges, allegations, and averments may be, they shall not be deemed libelous.See Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82(2), 326 S.E.2d 738 (1985) (noting that OCGA § 51–5–8 creates an absolute privilege from suit). The absolute privilege afforded by OCGA § 51–5–8 is not limited to “ pleadings” as defined by OCGA § 9–11–7(a) of the Civil Practice Act but “has been more broadly construed ... to include ‘official court documents' and acts of ‘legal process.’ ”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82 (2) ( 326 SE2d 738) (1985). See Fedderwitz, 195 Ga. at 696; Simmons, 262 Ga. App. at 839.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82 (2) ( 326 SE2d 738) (1985). Moreover, Vito was not totally without recourse if, as he asserts, the statements in the expert affidavit were false.
The questions now before this Court are whether and to what extent the privilege afforded by OCGA § 51-5-8 applies to statements made in a surveyor's lien. Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82(2) ( 326 S.E.2d 738) (1985).Davis v. Shavers, 269 Ga. 75, 76 ( 495 S.E.2d 23) (1998).
Although Parrott characterizes his claim as "an action in equity," he clearly seeks money damages, which constitutes a legal rather than an equitable remedy. See Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82(1) ( 326 S.E.2d 738) (1985) ("action for money damages provides an adequate remedy at law"). 1.
" "The privilege is intended `for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.' [Cit.]" Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82 (2) ( 326 S.E.2d 738) (1985). It is clear from a review of past decisions that, in light of the foregoing policy considerations, we have not strictly limited the privilege under OCGA § 51-5-8 to "pleadings" as they are defined under OCGA § 9-11-7 (a). Rather, the absolute privilege afforded by OCGA § 51-5-8 has been more broadly construed to cover a notice of lis pendens, an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant, and the words of a judge in the course of a judicial proceeding.
2. Taylor contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment because the adultery counterclaim against Kluge that he filed on behalf of Renn was privileged under OCGA § 51-5-8. OCGA § 51-5-8 provides that pleadings filed in a case, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, even if they are not legally sufficient to obtain the relief sought, and even if they are false and malicious, are not subject to a claim for libel. Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82 ( 326 S.E.2d 738) (1985). The privilege established under OCGA § 51-5-8 does not bar a claim for abusive litigation pursuant to OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. Phillips v. MacDougald, 219 Ga. App. 152 ( 464 S.E.2d 390) (1995); see Alcovy Properties, Inc. v. MTW Investment Co., 212 Ga. App. 102 ( 441 S.E.2d 288) (1994).
The immunity extends to every step in the proceeding and covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at issue, including pleadings and affidavits. See Stewart v Walton, 254 Ga. 81; 326 S.E.2d 738 (1985) (complaint); Gunter v Reeves, 198 Miss. 31; 21 So.2d 468 (1945) (search warrant); Jenson v Olson, 121 Minn. 388; 141 N.W.2d 488 (1966) (testimony at civil service hearing). The judicial proceedings privilege should be liberally construed so that participants in judicial proceedings are free to express themselves without fear of retaliation.
The Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that "equitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which is `adequate,' i.e., as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity." Mayor of Wadley v. Hall, 261 Ga. 681, 410 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1991); see also Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 326 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1985) ("Equity will grant relief only where there is no available adequate and complete remedy at law."). Pomeroy, the author of a foundational treatise on equity, explains that "it has often been said by courts as well as by text-writers that the equity jurisdiction extends to and embraces all civil cases, and none others, in which there is not a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law."
"The Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that 'equitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which is adequate, i.e., as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.'" Mitsubishi Int'l Corp, v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mayor of Wadley v. Hall, 410 S.E.2d 105, 106 (Ga. 1991)); see also Stewart v. Walton, 326 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. 1985) ("Equity will grant relief only where there is no available adequate and complete remedy at law."). In this case, Plaintiffs had numerous remedies at law based on the valid Contract; therefore, Plaintiffs were able to seek their remedies at law and are not entitled to equitable relief.