Opinion
A97A118.
DECIDED AUGUST 27, 1997.
Jessie Oliver Stewart was convicted of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, driving under the influence of alcohol, and feticide by vehicle in the first degree. Stewart appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict as to these convictions. For reasons which follow, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to support the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that on March 7, 1996, Stewart's vehicle struck the rear of a car driven by the victim, Suzie Ann Denson. Following the impact, Ms. Denson's car was consumed by fire while she remained trapped inside. She and her unborn child perished in the flames. The State presented medical testimony that at the time of death, the unborn child was "quick" or viable, but died as a result of Ms. Denson's injuries.
An inspection of the collision scene revealed a partially empty bottle of malt liquor in Stewart's vehicle. Stewart was read the Georgia Implied Consent Warning at the hospital, where he was being treated for injuries sustained in the collision. Thereafter, a blood sample was obtained from Stewart and sent to the state crime laboratory. Toxicologist Ernest Lawrence Slightom analyzed the sample, which registered a .11 blood alcohol level.
Focusing on his blood test results, Stewart contends that the State failed to prove that the test was performed "on a machine which was operated with all its electronic and operating components prescribed by its manufacturer properly attached and in good working order and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the Division of Forensic Sciences for this purpose." OCGA § 40-6-392 (a)(1)(A). He argues that the blood test was invalid and should not have been admitted under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a)(1)(A), leaving the State without sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.
Stewart, however, failed to preserve this alleged error for review. At trial, he did not challenge the validity of the blood test evidence under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a)(1)(A) or object to toxicologist Slightom's testimony regarding the blood test analysis or results. We note that prior to trial, Stewart moved to suppress the test results on several grounds, including that the test was not conducted in accordance with OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1)(A). Yet, during oral argument before the trial court, Stewart withdrew and never reasserted those portions of his motion challenging Slightom's methodology and the machine on which the test was performed.
"It is well-settled in this state that it is too late to urge objections to the admission of evidence after it has been admitted without objection. In this state it is necessary to object to evidence at the time it is actually offered, and failure to do so amounts to a waiver of any objection which might have been raised." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 485, 488 (4a) ( 458 S.E.2d 153) (1995) (physical precedent only). See also Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 180 (2) ( 477 S.E.2d 583) (1996). Although Stewart moved to suppress the blood alcohol results on other grounds, "[a]n objection on a specific ground (or grounds) at trial waives any objection to that evidence on other grounds on appeal. Accordingly, all other grounds for objection, other than the specific grounds posed at trial, are not preserved for appeal." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)Thomas v. State, 225 Ga. App. 790 ( 484 S.E.2d 797) (1997). Stewart did not object to the blood test results as invalid or inadmissible under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a)(1)(A). Accordingly, he waived his argument that the State's alleged failure to comply with this provision entitled him to a directed verdict.
We do not authorize the reporting of this opinion since it does not announce a new rule or policy or involve an interpretation that is not already precedent.
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P.J., and Eldridge, J., concur.