Stewart v. Smith

25 Citing cases

  1. Dass v. Tex. Bd. of Prof'l Eng'rs

    517 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    SeeRailroad Comm'n v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1981) ("The rule is sound that the Railroad Commission may not change an order after it loses jurisdiction by an appeal." (citing Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945, 947 (1935) (noting that agency "was without jurisdiction" to change its decision "after the judicial arm of the state had assumed jurisdiction of the matter")); South Tex. Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Water Res., 573 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("It is well settled that when a suit is brought to test the validity of an agency order, the agency loses jurisdiction over the subject matter of such order while the suit is pending."); Inman v. Railroad Comm'n, 464 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting "settled law that when a final order of the Commission is attacked by appeal, the Commission loses its jurisdiction over the order and is without authority to take any action thereon while the suit is pending"); Edgar v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 90 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1935, writ ref'd) (holding that agency lacked jurisdiction to amend order that was under judicial review) (citing Stewart, 83 S.W.2d at 945 ))

  2. Humble Oil Ref. v. Stewart Oil

    241 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)   Cited 2 times

    Excluding the 1925 mineral lease from consideration there would be no question but that the failure to include the .95-acre tract in the 1929 mineral deed and in the 1930 oil lease constitutes voluntary subdivisions looking to mineral development which would prevent the .95-acre tract from thereafter being developed as a separate tract in order to prevent confiscation. Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945; Nash v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 522 (Austin, Writ Dis.). Appellees, however, say that application of these decisions is precluded by the fact that the 1925 oil lease was made before it acquired title to the .95-acre tract, and that the 1929 mineral deed was made before the 1925 lease had expired, and that the 1930 lease was made while the 1929 mineral deed was in effect.

  3. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Buckley

    123 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)   Cited 6 times

    It was tantamount, under the facts, to a consent judgment, or an agreed judgment, and Adams obtained no greater rights thereunder than if he had acquired same by contract or conveyance from the Davises. Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Railroad Commission, Tex. Civ. App. 94 S.W.2d 1240, 1242, writ ref.; Turnbow v. Barnsdall Oil Co., Tex. Civ. App. 99 S.W.2d 1096, writ ref.; Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945. And inasmuch as the judgment obtained by Adams, upon which Buckley relies for his right to a permit, was but a circuitous effort to secure, as a vested right, that to which he would not otherwise be entitled, the adjacent lessees, whose property rights were materially affected, were clearly entitled to show such facts, though not parties to that suit.

  4. STANOLIND OIL GAS v. RD. COMM. OF TEX

    92 S.W.2d 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)   Cited 1 times

    The commission did not have the power to grant the Jackson permit for two reasons: 1. The commission lost jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the permit when suit No. 54384 was filed, and the order was therefore void. Stewart v. Smith (Tex.Sup.) 83 S.W.2d 945; Edgar v. Stanolind, etc., Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 90 S.W.2d 656. 2.

  5. Edgar v. Stanolind Oil Gas Co.

    90 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that agency lacked jurisdiction to amend order that was under judicial review

    From the facts above recited it is manifest, and has been expressly so held, that while the suit involving the subject-matter of this controversy was pending in the district court of Travis county, the Railroad Commission lost jurisdiction of its order of October 21, 1933. No change of conditions after its entry is shown in the instant case, and the order of the commission dated September 24, 1934, and herein attacked, was void for want of jurisdiction in the commission over the subject-matter thereof. Stewart v. Smith (Tex.Sup.) 83 S.W.2d 945. In addition to this, however, the judgment of the trial court should be sustained on the ground that the lease by Stinchcomb and Todd of the 107 acres adjoining the strip here involved to the Vacuum Oil Company on September 18, 1930, and that to Edgar of said strip on June 9, 1931, constituted a voluntary segregation by them of such strip from a larger contiguous tract capable of development as a whole, and one which, because of its shape, would necessarily require an exception to rule 37 in order to develop it for oil. This they were not authorized under the now well-settled rule to do; and Edgar could secure no greater right under the law than that vested in his lessors.

  6. Tysco Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas

    12 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Tex. 1935)   Cited 6 times

    4 F. Supp. 236, 237; Amazon Petroleum Corporation v. Railroad Commission (D.C.) 5 F. Supp. 633, 634; Melton v. Railroad Commission (D.C.) 10 F. Supp. 984. Likewise, the Conservation Laws of other states. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062, 86 A.L.R. 403; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 32 A.L.R. 300; Hercules Oil Co. v. Thompson (D.C.) 10 F. Supp. 988; Lacy v. Railroad Commission (D.C.) 10 F. Supp. 990; President of United States v. Artex Refineries Sales Corporation (D.C.) 11 F. Supp. 189; Clymore Production Co. v. Thompson (D.C.) 11 F. Supp. 791; Brown v. Humble Oil Refining Co. (Tex.Sup.) 83 S.W.2d 935, 941; Stewart v. Smith (Tex.Sup.) 83 S.W.2d 945; Smith v. Shabay (Tex.Civ.App.) 83 S.W.2d 719; Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 83 S.W.2d 695; Railroad Commission v. Bass (Tex.Civ.App.) 10 S.W.2d 586; Rabbit Creek Oil Co. v. Shell Petroleum Corporation (Tex.Civ.App.) 66 S.W.2d 737; Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 37 S.W.2d 367; Danciger Oil Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 49 S.W.2d 837; Shupee v. Railroad Commission, 123 Tex. 521, 73 S.W.2d 505; Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 83 S.W.2d 714; Gulf Production Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 84 S.W.2d 359; Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 68 S.W.2d 609; Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co. (D.C.) 16 F.2d 639; Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co. (C.C.A.) 22 F.2d 597, certiorari denied 277 U.S. 585, 48 S. Ct. 433, 72 L. Ed. 1000; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76 L. Ed. 136, 78 A.L.R. 826; Trimmier v. Carlton, 116 Tex. 572,

  7. Railroad Commission v. Continental Bus System, Inc.

    616 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1981)   Cited 17 times

    The Railroad Commission on August 6, 1975, after notice and after compliance with the Open Meetings Law, Article 6252-17, acted upon and granted the applications for Valley Bus for the first time. The rule is sound that the Railroad Commission may not change an order after it loses jurisdiction by an appeal. Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945 (1935); Inman v. Railroad Commission, 464 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1971, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Smith v. Wald Transfer and Storage Co., 97 S.W.2d 991 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1936, writ dism'd). That rule does not apply, when, as happened in this instance, the Commission has not yet acted upon the application from which an appeal is taken.

  8. Gardner v. Railroad Commission

    333 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    All attempts to continue to exercise jurisdiction are void. See Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Civ.App.,[160 TEX 481] 92 S.W.2d 1057, er. ref. The appellees contend that there are ways for the appellant to obtain an injunction pending appeal.

  9. Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil Refining Co.

    245 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1952)   Cited 7 times
    In Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil Refining Co., Tex.Sup., 245 S.W.2d 488, 490, the Court said: 'Only in the event the two tracts of land came under common ownership and control, so as to constitute one tract of land, would the rule against subdivision have become applicable.

    The trial court held that the .95-acre tract was not such a subdivision as would deprive the Railroad Commission of the right to determine whether the permit was necessary to prevent confiscation, and it held that Humble Oil and Refining Company take nothing by its suit. The Court of Civil Appeals held to the contrary, and reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the Humble Oil and Refining Company, based upon the following authorities: Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945; Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 1240, writ refused; Nash v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 522, writ dismissed; Tex.Jur., Vol. 31a, p. 708. These decisions hold that after the promulgation of the Railroad Commission's spacing rule, owners of a single tract cannot, by their voluntary act, subdivide the tract, through leases or otherwise, and create for themselves, or those claiming under them, the right to additional drilling permits on small strips of land, under exceptions to a spacing rule relating to the protection of vested rights, because to permit them to do so would set at naught Rule 37 and the conservation laws of Texas.

  10. R. R. Com. v. Beaver Oil Co.

    132 Tex. 27 (Tex. 1938)   Cited 5 times

    The plaintiff, the Beaver Reclamation Oil Company, did not prove, either before the Tender Board of the Railroad Commission or in the trial court, that the oil for which the plaintiff applied for a tender was legal crude oil or legal products of crude oil; therefore the tender board properly rejected its application for tender, and the trial court properly denied the relief sought by it, and it was error for the Court of Civil Appeals to reverse that judgment with instructions to the trial court to order the tender to issue. Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 128 Tex. 189, 96 S.W.2d 275; Davenport v. Railroad Commission, 91 S.W.2d 399; Stewart v. Smith, 126 Tex. 292, 83 S.W.2d 945. William Pannill, Hiner Pannill, of Fort Worth, Langston Smith, of Austin, D. M. Doyle and Wm. A. Wade, both of Longview, for defendant in error.