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Stewart v. Quidachay

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Oct 11, 2001
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-3020-CM (D. Kan. Oct. 11, 2001)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION No. 00-3020-CM

October 11, 2001


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


Plaintiff Wayne Anthony Stewart, who appears pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At all times relevant to this complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at Hutchinson Correctional Facility. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated as a result of defendants' use of excessive force during a forced cell move. This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31). I. Facts

In pro se prisoner litigation, the Tenth Circuit endorses the completion and filing of a "Martinez report" where prison officials construct an administrative record detailing the factual investigation of the events at issue. Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978). The Martinez report "is treated like an affidavit, and the court is not authorized to accept the factual findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff has presented conflicting evidence."Green v. Branson. 108 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997).
In the present case, plaintiffs response brief was accompanied by a declaration made by plaintiff under penalty of perjury and, therefore, can be treated as an affidavit. Id. In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff failed to specifically controvert defendants' facts as required by D. Kan. Rule 56.1. However, since plaintiff appears pro se, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court will construe liberally any facts alleged by plaintiff in his declaration in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

The incident giving rise to plaintiff s cause of action occurred on August 18, 1999, when plaintiff was moved from cell 144 to cell 146 by way of a forced cell move. In the days preceding the forced eel move, plaintiff had engaged in numerous disciplinary infractions. On August 15, plaintiff was cited for disobeying orders (two counts) and insubordination or disrespect (two counts). The next day, plaintiff was cited with interference with official duties, disobeying orders, and insubordination for grabbing the previous day's disciplinary report out of the hands of the officer who was attempting to serve plaintiff with the report, tearing up the report, flushing the report down the toilet, and cursing at the officer. On August 18, plaintiff was cited for unsanitary practices and insubordination or disrespect for tossing a container of human feces in the A-1 cellhouse officer's station as he was being escorted to a disciplinary hearing. While at the disciplinary hearing, plaintiff began cursing to an employee in the hearing room, which resulted in another disciplinary citation, this time for threatening or intimidation and disrespect. Later that day, plaintiff threw a meal tray at a corrections officer, striking the officer as he was attempting to shut plaintiffs cell door.

Shortly after plaintiff threw the meal tray, defendants contend that plaintiff was throwing feces at officers and placing it on himself and on the cell in which he was residing. To clean the cell, plaintiff was moved to a different cell by way of a forced cell move. By affidavit, the officers involved in the forced cell move testified that defendant Quidachay convinced plaintiff to be compliant, to lie down on his bunk, and to permit the officers to handcuff him. Once handcuffed, plaintiff was walked out of the cell, placed face-down, and his clothes were removed. Plaintiff struggled a bit and was then carried into the new cell.

Plaintiff denies in his declaration that he threw feces or that he smeared himself or his cell with feces. Plaintiff contends that the officers simply entered his cell, placed him in a strangle-hold, kneed him in the face, kicked and struck him, then dragged him out of the cell, shoved him to the ground, ripped his clothes off, and bent his legs back in a hog-tied position. The officers then carried plaintiff into the next cell, banging his head on the concrete floor. Plaintiff asserts that, after being placed on the floor, the handcuffs were applied even tighter, cutting off circulation to his hands, and the officers continued to knee plaintiff in the back, face, and hands.

As soon as the officers left the cell, plaintiff stated that he could not move. Medical personnel were summoned, which was standard protocol after a forced cell move. A nurse evaluated plaintiffs right hand and determined that a knuckle had been fractured. Plaintiff claims that the injury was caused by being knes-kicked by one of the officers during the move. The officers contend that plaintiffs injury likely was caused by plaintiffs own conduct earlier in the day when he was attempting to throw feces out of the cell and probably struck his hand on the cell bars. At the time, plaintiff also complained of blurred vision and numbness to his right shoulder. The next day, and for more than a week thereafter, plaintiff refused further medical evaluation or treatment.

Attached to the Martinez report was a video tape depicting the forced cell move. The video tape shows defendant Quidachay ordering plaintiff to lay down on his bunk, face-down. Four correction officers then entered plaintiffs cell, handcuffed plaintiff, and placed plaintiff on his feet. Plaintiff then walked out of the cell, and the officers made plaintiff lie face-down on the ground and took off plaintiffs shorts. The officers then carried plaintiff face-down into his new cell and unhooked the handcuffs. The video tape further depicts the condition of the cell from which plaintiff was removed, where a substance which looked to be feces, was splattered about the cell floor. The video also depicts that within minutes of the forced cell move, a nurse arrived at plaintiffs cell and evaluated his hand. II. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Id. (citing Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 670-71. In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Id. at 671 (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325(1986)).

Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 n. 1 (concerning shifting burdens on summary judgment). The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Adler. 144 F.3d at 671. "To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein," Id. Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

The court acknowledges that plaintiff appears pro se and his response is entitled to a somewhat less stringent standard than a response filed by a licensed attorney. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, this does not excuse plaintiff from the burden of coming forward with evidence to support his claims as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this court.Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs". Inc. v, Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1988). Even a pro se plaintiff must present some "specific factual support" for his allegations. Id.

III. Discussion

The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from the use of excessive force while in prison. Whitlev v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). To resolve the issue of whether excessive force was used, the court must analyze (1) whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and (2) whether the alleged wrongdoing was "sufficiently serious" to establish a constitutional violation. Hudson v. McMillian. 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).

A. State of Mind

The court must first examine "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain ajid restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically" for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. Force is malicious and sadistic when no disciplinary rationale or penal purpose justifies it. Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Anu., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999). In determining whether force was applied constitutionally the court must consider (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible official and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 .

First, the need for force in this case was apparent. Plaintiff had been involved in numerous disciplinary infractions in the days preceding the incident, which included disobeying orders, cursing at corrections staff, and throwing human feces at officers. In order to extract plaintiff from his cell so that the cell could be cleaned, the officers reasonably applied force. Second, the force used by the officers was reasonably related to the need for force. The officers used force in a manner that merely maintained order during the cell move. Third, the officers reasonably perceived that plaintiff posed a threat. The officers were aware that plaintiff had been openly defiant that day and in the preceding days. Fourth, it appears that defendant Quidachay tempered the severity of a forceful response by attempting to convince plaintiff early on to be compliant and lie down on his bunk. The court therefore concludes that the officers acted in a good faith effort to maintain discipline and that there is no evidence that the officers acted maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm to plaintiff. B. Severity of Alleged Wrongdoing

Even if plaintiff could establish that defendants acted maliciously and sadistically, plaintiff must show that the alleged wrongdoing was sufficiently serious to establish a constitutional violation. A de minimis use of physical force does not qualify unless it is the sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.

Although it is not possible to see everything that took place inside the cell during the extraction, the videotape depicts no beating or hitting inflicted upon plaintiff and shows no excessive force directed toward him. The videotape shows that plaintiff offered little resistance throughout the move and that the officers responded accordingly. However, plaintiff asserts that his right hand was injured during the move. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court will assume that plaintiffs hand was injured during the forced cell move. Even assuming this, the court finds that the use of force, which resulted in plaintiffs injury, was de minimis and in no way "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs excessive force claim.

The court notes that, in his response brief to defendants' summary judgment motion, plaintiff asserts that he was denied procedural due process and denied medical care. Neither of these claims were set forth in plaintiffs complaint. In any event, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that he was denied procedural due process. Indeed, plaintiff fails to alleges what procedural due process he was denied. Plaintiff also has failed to set forth facts showing that he was denied medical treatment. To the contrary, the record shows that plaintiff was offered medical treatment on at least several occasions, including within minutes of the forced cell move, and that plamtiff himself denied such treatment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31) is granted. Plaintiffs case is hereby dismissed.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

pursuant to the Memorandum and Order filed October 11, 2001, plaintiff to take nothing and the action is dismissed on the merits. Defendant to recover of plaintiff their costs of action.


Summaries of

Stewart v. Quidachay

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Oct 11, 2001
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-3020-CM (D. Kan. Oct. 11, 2001)
Case details for

Stewart v. Quidachay

Case Details

Full title:WAYNE ANTHONY STEWART, Plaintiff, v. J. QUIDACHAY, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, D. Kansas

Date published: Oct 11, 2001

Citations

CIVIL ACTION No. 00-3020-CM (D. Kan. Oct. 11, 2001)