Since the claims of the municipal intervenors do not differ materially from those of the parties who sue as individual voters, the Court need not now determine whether the municipalities are proper parties to this proceeding. See, e. g., Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14.The original complaint named as defendants Tennessee's Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and the three members of the State Board of Elections, seeking to make the Board members representatives of all the State's County Election Commissioners.

Jud. Code, § 237(b); 28 U.S.C. § 344 (b). See Caffrey v. Oklahoma Territory, 177 U.S. 346; Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14; Columbus Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96. The contention to the contrary is answered by our decisions in Hawke v. Smith, supra, and Leser v. Garnett, supra.

State ex rel. v. State Board, 84 Fla. 592; Harv. L. Rev., June, 1929, p. 1071. See Columbus Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99; Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 258; and Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 15. The Fifth Amendment is not violated by the substitution.

We have assumed, without deciding, that the respondents, though without standing to invoke the protection of the Federal Constitution, will be heard to complain of a violation of the Constitution of the State. Their standing for that purpose, at least in the state courts, is a question of state practice ( Columbus Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99; Braxton, County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 197, 198; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16), as to which the federal courts do not exercise an independent judgment. The Maryland decisions proceed on the assumption that municipal corporations assailing a statute of exemption or other special legislation have an interest in the controversy which entitles them to be heard ( Baltimore v. Starr Church, supra; Baltimore v. Alleghany County, 99 Md. 1; 57 A. 632), though the reports do not show that their interest was questioned.

The constitutional guaranty does not extend to the mere interest of an official, as such, who has not been deprived of his property without due process of law or denied the equal protection of the laws.Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 148; Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 101; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16.Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118; Standard Stock Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488; Roberts Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50, 54, 55; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Assn., 276 U.S. 71, 88.

In still another, the Court barred a county treasurer from challenging a state tax penalty program in federal court because he had "no personal interest in the litigation" as the county officer enforcing the program. See Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16 (1915).

To be specific, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that political subdivisions of states could not obtain relief under federal law against the application of state statutes, even where the political subdivisions claimed that the state laws in question violated the federal constitution. See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of Balt, 289 U.S. 36, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923); Stewart v. City of Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S.Ct. 15, 60 L.Ed. 120 (1915); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907); see also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting additional cases). In City of Trenton, for example, Trenton challenged — under the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment — a New Jersey statute imposing a fee on the city for withdrawing water from the Delaware River.

Older cases held that an agency or officer has no standing in the federal courts to challenge the statute the agency or officer is bound to enforce. Columbus Greenville R. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 51 S.Ct. 392, 75 L.Ed. 861 (1931); Stewart v. City of Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S.Ct. 15, 60 L.Ed. 120 (1915); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 34 S.Ct. 92, 58 L.Ed. 206 (1913); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 28 S.Ct. 275, 52 L.Ed. 450 (1908); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 24 S.Ct. 51, 48 L.Ed. 125 (1903). See also Akron Bd. of Ed. v. Bd. of Ed. of Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1296 (6th Cir. 1974) (Weick, J., dissenting).

The interest of an appellant to that court must be a personal and not an official interest. The theory of this decision has been followed and cited in Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 28 S. Ct. 275, 52 L. Ed. 450; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S. Ct. 15, 60 L. Ed. 120; and Columbus Greenville R. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 51 S. Ct. 392, 75 L. Ed. 861. It is contended by counsel for defendant that the last case overruled the earlier decisions.

. 162, 134 S.W. 1007. (4) Municipal annexations are governmental functions and matters of state interest and thus subject to control by the General Assembly, even though a city is constitutionally empowered to adopt and amend its charter. Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74; Kansas City v. Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713; Secs. 19, 20, Article VI, 1945 Missouri Constitution; State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002, 137 S.W.2d 532; Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612; State ex rel. Behrens v. Crismon, 354 Mo. 174, 188 S.W.2d 937; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Smith, 343 Mo. 288, 121 S.W.2d 160; Harris v. William R. Compton Bond Mtg. Co., 244 Mo. 664, 149 S.W. 603; Sec. 1, Art. III, 1945 Missouri Constitution; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 28 S.Ct. 275, 52 L.Ed. 450; Attorney General v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S.Ct. 27, 50 L.Ed. 167; Stewart v. Kansas City, Kansas, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S.Ct. 15, 60 L.Ed. 120; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151; 37 Am. Jur., p. 639, sec. 23; 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.), p. 257, sec. 7.03; Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438; State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 175 S.W. 591; State ex rel. Volker v. Carey, 345 Mo. 811, 136 S.W.2d 324; State ex rel. Faxon v. Owsley, 122 Mo. 68, 26 S.W. 659; Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498; Siemens v. Shreeve, 317 Mo. 736, 296 S.W. 415; Kroger Grocery Baking Co. v. St. Louis, 341 Mo. 62, 106 S.W.2d 435. (5) Section 7626, R.S. 1939, is presumptively constitutional, and cannot be held otherwise unless palpably and undoubtedly unconstitutional. State ex rel. Lemay Fire Dist. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W.2d 593; State ex rel. Hughes v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 352 Mo. 715, 179 S.W.2d 77; Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bell, 353 Mo. 891, 185 S.W.2d 4, 158 A.L.R. 415; Varble